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Port scanning is the first activity an attacker pursues when attempting to 
compromise a target system on a network. The aim is to gather information 
that will result in identifying one or more vulnerabilities in that system. For 
example, network ports that are open can reveal which applications and 
services are running on the system. How a port responds when probed with 
data can reveal which protocol the port utilises and can also reveal which 
implementation  of  that  protocol  is  being  employed.  One  of  the  most 
valuable  pieces  of  information  to  be  gained  via  scanning  and  probing 
techniques  is  the  operating system that  is  installed  on  the  target.  This 
technique is called operating system fingerprinting. 
The purpose of this research is to alert computer users of the dangers of 
port scanning, probing, and operating system fingerprinting by exposing 
these  techniques  and  advising  the  users  on  which  preventative 
countermeasures to take against them. 
Analysis is  performed on the Transmission Control Protocol  (TCP),  User 
Datagram  Protocol  (UDP),  Internet  Protocol  (IPv4  and  IPv6),  and  the 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv4 and ICMPv6). 
All the software used in this project is free and open source. The operating 
system used for testing is Linux (2.4 and 2.6 kernels). Scanning, probing, 
and detection techniques are investigated in the context of the Network 
Mapper and Xprobe2 tools. 
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A synopsis of the events that took place in this project are:
1. A  broad  investigation  into  security  notions  pertaining  to  common 
computer security threats. For example, email spamming, password 
guessing,  computer  viruses,  computer  intrusion,  and  social 
engineering. The investigation covered well-known techniques and 
related countermeasures.
2. Gained  awareness  and  deeper  understanding  of  data 
communications  and  networking  protocols,  architecture,  and 
implementations.
3. Acquired technical orientation within the Linux operating system in 
terms  of  architecture,  system  commands,  administration,  and 
security  features.  This  was  solidified  by  completing  the  Linux 
Professional  Institution  (LPI)  exams  and  acquiring  the  related 
certification.
4. Conducted  a  deeper  investigation  of  the  techniques  and  related 
countermeasures  of  computer  hacking,  with  particular  focus  on 
Linux and inter-networking vulnerabilities.
5. Investigated hacking methodologies with the intent of identifying a 
specific phase that is of interest.   Operating system fingerprinting 
was identified as a crucial activity that would be of much value to 
counteract – it is currently a nascent field.
6. Investigated  the  various  tools  and  techniques  currently  employed 
during  the  phase  of  scanning,  probing,  and  operating  system 
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fingerprinting.  Determined  what  information  an  attacker  receives 
from a target via these methods.
7. Investigated and experimented with techniques that could be used to 
modify the Linux operating system in order to prevent it from being 
fingerprinted on a network. 
8. Investigated and experimented with the Linux firewall (iptables), its 
configuration,  and  its  modules  that  are  currently  available  to  aid 
preventing or deterring fingerprinting techniques. 
An outline of the content of the dissertation is as follows:
1. Should  the  reader  have  little  knowledge  on  the  subject,  the 
dissertation begins with an introduction to the domain of the project. 
This  includes  a  background  to  data  communications,  information 
security,  and  a  discussion  that  highlights  the  significance  of  this 
research.
2. An  overview  of  computer  network  architectures  and  relevant 
networking protocols is  provided as this knowledge is required to 
understand the hacking techniques relevant to this project.
3. The  techniques  applied  by  operating  system  fingerprinting  tools, 
particularly the popular Nmap and Xprobe2 applications, is provided. 
4. The results of tests and experiments that were performed with the 
tools is presented.
5. The characteristics that make it possible for scanning and probing 
tools to fingerprint the Linux operating system is discussed.
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6. A  preliminary  set  of  countermeasures  is  proposed.  These 
countermeasures  primarily  involve  the  modification  of 
characteristics,  identified  in  the  previous  section,  of  the  TCP/IP 
stack.  The  results  of  investigating  these  countermeasures  is  also 
presented.
7. Various  techniques  employed  by  operating  system  fingerprinting 
tools  can  be  detected  by  the  target  system,  thus  providing  an 
opportunity  for  reactive  countermeasures.  These  techniques  are 
discussed and the results of experimentation performed when these 
techniques are applied is also presented.
8. The dissertation concludes with a final list of valid countermeasures, 
presented in order of significance, and a brief outline of further work 
that should be undertaken as a result of the results of this project. 
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Introduction
The  primary  reason  for  a  communication  system  is  the  exchange  of 
information between two parties.  Communication systems are so deeply 
ingrained into  modern life  that  we almost  take  them for  granted.  As  a 
result of an ongoing need for more efficient and capable communication 
systems, the fields of computer science and data communications merged 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Networking is a resulting field that concerns 
itself with the technology and architecture of the communication systems 
used to interconnect communicating devices. The emergence of this field 
had  a  radical  impact  on  technology,  products,  and  companies  of  the 
computer industry.  [Stallings 2004a] 
Most computer networks are, by nature, shared resources used by many 
applications for many different purposes. Sometimes the data transmitted 
between applications is confidential. In these situations, security measures 
are applied to restrict access to the information while it is being exchanged 
via the data transmission system. Access restrictions are also applied to the 
information while it is being stored on the computers themselves. [Peterson 
2003] One of the more undesirable side-effects of using shared computer 
networks, such as the Internet, for the exchange of confidential information 
is the ever growing security threat  that  confidential  information can be 
stolen. 
By the nature of the fact that more and more computing resources can be 
utilised  remotely,  there  is  another  equally  significant  and  increasing 
security threat – computing resources can be hijacked, or vandalised.
Security experts accept that it is an ongoing battle to secure an information 
system –  an information  system has to  provide at  least  some access  to 
itself, and the information on it, in order to be of any use. This access can 
be obtained by garnering security information, such as access passwords, 
from  valid  users  of  the  system.  Passwords  can  be  bought,  stolen,  or 
4
managed carelessly. The system could also have flaws, or bugs, that make it 
vulnerable to other forms of attack. Security experts work in a grey area, 
only ever able to answer the question: is it secure enough? [Schneier 2000]
Information security is a volatile field, particularly in the context of data 
communication networks.  Computer technology progresses exponentially 
over time, according to Moore's Law, and techniques for exploiting these 
technologies are realised at an equally alarming rate. 
Some examples of security exploits, obtained from a news survey [Schneier 
2000], that occurred over a period of just one month – March 2000 – are:
● The SalesGate.com website was broken into. Almost 3000 customer 
records,  including  credit  card  numbers  and  personal  information, 
was stolen.
● Convicted criminal hacker Kevin Mitnick testified before Congress. 
He told them that social engineering is a major security vulnerability. 
He said he can often obtain passwords and other  secrets  just  by 
pretending to be someone else and asking for the information.
● Pierre-Guy  Lavoie,  22,  was  convicted  in  Quebec  of  breaking  into 
several  Canadian  and  US  government  computers.  He  served  12 
months in prison.
● Japan's Defense Agency delayed the development of a new defense 
computer system after it was discovered that the software had been 
developed by members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult.
● An  email  virus,  or  worm,  called  Pretty  Park,  spread  across  the 
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Internet. It was not the first of its kind – it spreads automatically by 
sending  itself  to  all  the  addresses  listed  in  the  user's  Outlook 
Express address book. 
● Guiseppe Russo and his wife, Sandra Elazar, were arrested in Sicily 
after stealing about 1000 credit cards on the Internet.
● A hacker, a.k.a. 'Coolio', denied launching massive denial-of-service 
attacks in February 2000. he admitted to hacking about 100 websites 
in  the  past,  including  cryptography company RSA Security  and  a 
website belonging to the US State Department.
● Attackers launched a denial-of-service attack on Microsoft's Israeli 
website.
● Jonathan  Bosnak,  a.k.a.  'The  Gatsby'  was  sentenced  to  eighteen 
months in prison for hacking into three separate telephone company 
systems.
● The military of Taiwan announced that it had discovered more than 
7000 attempts by Chinese hackers to enter the country's  security 
systems. 
Some  examples  of  software  vulnerabilities  discovered  [Schneier  2000] 
during that same time period of March 2000 are:
● A vulnerability was discovered in the Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.0 
that allows an attacker to set up a web page giving her the ability to 
execute any program on a visitor's machine.
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● By  modifying  a  URL,  an  attacker  can  completely  bypass  the 
authentication  mechanisms  protecting  the  remote  management 
screens of the Axis StarPoint CD-ROm servers.
● If an attacker sends a Netscape Enterprise Server 3.6 a certain type 
of long message, a buffer overflow crashes a particular process. The 
attacker can then execute arbitrary code remotely on the server.
● It  is  possible  to  launch  a  denial-of  service  attack  that  Internet 
Security System's RealSecure Network Intrusion Detection software 
fails to detect.
● By sending a certain URL to a server running Allaire's ColdFusion 
product,  an  attacker  can  receive  an  error  message  giving 
information about the physical paths to various files.
● Omniback  is  a  Hewlett-Packard  product  that  performs  system 
backup routines. An attacker can manipulate the product to cause a 
denial-of-service attack.
● By manipulating the contents of certain variables, an attacker can 
exploit a vulnerability in DNSTools 1.0.8 to execute arbitrary code. 
● If you send a long login name and password, even an incorrect one, 
to BisonWare's FTP Server 3.5, it will crash.
Any two points on the Internet are adjacent,  regardless of geographical 
location. Attackers can choose a country with weaker computer crime laws 
to base their operations. Internet attackers don't have to be anywhere their 
target. This has enormous security implications and, therefore, was chosen 
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as the general area to investigate in this research project. A security officer 
of  a  computer  on  the  Internet  has  to  worry  about  all  the  computer 
criminals in the world. The global nature of the Internet also complicates 
criminal investigation and prosecution. It is often unclear how to go about 
prosecuting a computer criminal in many cases – due to a lack of political 
borders on the Internet, it is unclear who should police it.
Hacking remote computer systems is considered illegal in most countries. 
In some countries, such as the U.S.A. and Singapore, the use of hacking 
techniques  are  considered  analogous  to  using  munition.  Therefore,  the 
techniques like those investigated in this project are closely guarded by 
those who use them. Hackers generally do not want their identities known, 
nor their hacking exploits publicised. Some, however, have been caught, 
convicted, and exposed to the public in the process. Others have changed 
their profession. For example, Dr. K is a hacker that does not want his real 
name known. He started the Phreak/Hack – United Kingdom (P/H-UK) e-
zine  and  now works  as  a  computer  networking  and  security  specialist. 
There  are  some  “purist”  hackers,  that  release  software  tools  that 
implement  their  techniques  for  others  to  study.  There  are  also  some 
hackers  that  seek  acknowledgement  from  their  peers  by  releasing 
automated versions of their techniques in the form of software tools called 
'exploits'. These tools are usually proof of the techniques they employ, but, 
on the darker side, they are often intended to be used by others. Hackers 
tend to proliferate their techniques by sharing with each other.
There is, therefore, not much pertinent academic literature available on the 
specific topic of research, apart from documents written by the authors of 
specific tools and the odd turned-professional such as Dr K. Regarding the 
public arena, many security professionals and researchers who do publish 
their work merely repeat the above-mentioned documents when covering 
the topic of this research project. 
Port  scanning is  one such set  of  techniques.  Port  scanning,  or probing, 
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techniques are used to determine which services are running on a remote 
system and,  more importantly,  whether the services are in the listening 
state or not. These listening services, or open ports, are the entry points for 
networked applications, such as web browsers and email clients, to make 
use of the services on a remote system. 
Port scanning techniques are used by system administrators to test and 
troubleshoot  their  networked  systems,  so  there  are  many  benign  tools 
available for this purpose. Port scanning is a double-edged sword, however, 
because similar techniques are also used by hackers to gain information 
about systems they have become aware of and want to target. Open ports 
are, therefore, also the entry points attackers use to penetrate vulnerable 
systems.
For example,  if  an attacker knows which services,  and which version of 
those services, are running on a target system, then an attack strategy to 
penetrate the target can be formulated. This is  because software vendors 
and engineers publish  the vulnerabilities of  specific versions of services 
they produce or use. A mailing list that addresses issues experienced in 
using a particular vendor's product is a common place to begin this type of 
research.  An  attacker  needs  no  more  than  one  exploitable  service  to 
compromise a system.
For an attacker, there is far more valuable information to be gained by port 
scanning  than  simply  determining  which  version  of  which  services  are 
running  on  a  target.  A  subset  of  port  scanning  techniques,  known  as 
operating system fingerprinting, involves determining the type and version 
of the operating system employed by a target. This information is valuable 
for an attacker because operating systems have vulnerabilities too, and it 
is, in fact, the operating system that will ultimately be compromised if an 
attack is successful. In this regard, services are merely gateways to the 
operating system, and many successful attacks have been achieved through 
exploiting a combination of a service vulnerability, to gain remote entry to a 
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system, and an operating system vulnerability.
An example of a hacker that used port scanning techniques in successful 
attacks  is  Kevin  Mitnick.  He was  convicted  for  theft  of  documents  and 
manuals from PacBell (1982), breaking into Digital Equipment Company's 
network (1998) and stealing credit card numbers from Netcom (1995) (Dr 
K 2000).
Examples of known attacks that can be performed once the open ports of a 
target system is known, are: Project Loki (daemon9 1996), ping flooding 
and  IP  spoofing,  to  name  a  few.  With  regards  to  operating  system 
fingerprinting,  examples  of  known  attacks  that  can  be  performed  on  a 
fingerprinted operating system are described by McClure et. al. (2005)
It is vital for system administrators and individuals to countermeasure port 
scanning techniques as this could deter attackers from subsequent stages 
of  their  attack  strategies  or,  even  better,  prevent  attackers  from 
formulating strategies altogether  (due to a lack of  sensitive  information 
about target systems). Failure to provide scanning countermeasures could 
result in considerable loss. For example, the infiltration of important and 
confidential information, the corruption of data, and, in the worst case, loss 
of control of mission-critical systems such as medical or military systems. 
Recall that system administrators use port scanning tools and techniques 
for  testing  and  troubleshooting  their  networks.  Though  malignant  port 
scanning  must  be  counteracted,  and  ideally  prevented,  system 
administrators might find a secondary value in the techniques presented in 
this project – seeing  their systems  from the perspective of an attacker is 
the  best  way  to  determine  the  vulnerabilities  and,  therefore,  the 
countermeasures they need to apply to secure their systems as much as 
possible.  Once  suitable  countermeasures  have  been  applied,  the  same 
scanning,  probing,  and  fingerprinting  techniques  can  then  be  used  to 
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validate the effectiveness of those countermeasures.
For the reasons mentioned above,  this  research project  is  justified as a 
valuable  contribution  to  the  ongoing endeavour  of  keeping up with  the 
vulnerabilities and resultant dangers we expose ourselves to as we advance 
our networked computing technology.
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Chapter 1: Protocols and Techniques
For  information  exchange  between two  systems to  occur,  they  must  be 
interconnected  directly  or  via  a  communications  network.  A 
communications  model  is  typically  comprised  of  the  following  elements 
[Stallings 2004a]:
● Source – The device that generates data to be transmitted.
● Transmitter – The device that transforms and encodes the data so 
as to produce a signal that can be transmitted across some sort of 
transmission system.
● Transmission  System –  A  single  transmission  line  or  a  more 
complex network of transmission lines that ultimately connect the 
source and destination.
● Receiver –  Accepts  the  signal  from the  transmission  system and 
decodes it  into a format that can be processed by the destination 
device.
● Destination – Receives the transmitted data.
Apart from the data to be transmitted, some additional data is required to 
allow  for  the  communication  to  take  place.  The  source,  transmission 
system,  and  destination  devices  must  perform  other  tasks  [Stallings 
2004b]:
● The source system must notify the communication network of  the 
identity of the destination system.
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● The  source  system  must  be  sure  that  the  destination  system  is 
prepared to receive data.
As a result,  special  information regarding the data must be added in a 
specific order with the data sent.  An agreement that specifies the format 
and  meaning  of  messages  computers  exchange  is  known  as  a 
communication protocol [Comer 2004].
Port  scanning,  probing,  and  fingerprinting  involves  the  analysis  of 
information  about  remote  systems.  This  information  is  in  the  format 
specified  by  network  protocols  used  on  computer  networks.  The  next 
section introduces network architecture and the various protocols that are 
significant  in  the  context  of  this  project.  Scanning,  probing,  and 
fingerprinting techniques are then introduced.
1.1. Protocol Architecture
A layered protocol architecture is needed to allow for the development of 
standardised network technologies. [Stallings 2004a] The advantage of the 
layered approach is that the protocols of each layer are easy to manage 
and  maintain  in  isolation.  The  lower  layers  can  be  changed  without 
affecting  the  upper  layers.  For  example,  the  layers  that  comprise 
internetworking  technology,  the  architecture  of  the  Internet,  can  be 
deployed on a wide variety of communication systems. Similarly, the upper 
layers can also reuse the functionality provided by the lower layers. For 
example, for most communication systems, three are a number of protocols 
that can be transmitted through them.
The OSI model and TCP/IP stacks are the two main layered architectures 
that are investigated in this project. OSI is an architecture model, while the 
TCP/IP stack is an implementation that happens to have a lot in common 
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with  the  OSI  model,  even  though  they  were  developed  independently. 
TCP/IP is the network architecture that enables the Internet.
A comparison of the two architectures and their corresponding layers is 
depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1 – Comparison of the OSI and TCP/IP Architectures
The layers that are focussed on in this project are the Transport, Internet 
and Network Access layers of TCP/IP stack. 
1.1.1 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
Most  of  the  information  in  this  section  has  been  taken  from RFC 793 
(Postel 1981a), which deals with the TCP protocol.


















Applications that utilise the TCP protocol interact with the TCP stack. The 
TCP stack is a software module that interacts with the operating system. 
The operating system, in turn,  interacts with the software driver of the 
network interface card (NIC). The NIC is directly connected to a local area 
network (LAN). 
TCP is a connection-oriented end-to-end protocol. It is designed to be as 
reliable as possible, and achieves this reliability by providing transmission 
flow-control  functionality.  When  a  packet  is  transmitted  a  copy  of  the 
packet is put into the re-transmission queue and a timer is started. If an 
acknowledgement is not received after a specified time, then the packet is 
re-transmitted.  It  should  be  noted,  though,  that  even  if  an 
acknowledgement is received within the time-window (the TCP layer has 
done its part), the packet has not necessarily been delivered to the other 
end of the connection. The format of the TCP packet header is presented in 
Appendix A.1.  The TCP window is an indication to the sender as to the 
amount  of  data  it  can send to the receiver  before  the receiver's  buffer 
overflows. As a result of the TCP stack reporting the window value, flow-
control can be achieved by the sender. The window notifies the sender as to 
how  many  octets,  starting  with  the  acknowledgement  number  of  that 
packet being sent, the receiver is willing to receive.
A TCP connection is a two-way connection – both hosts must establish their 
own end. This is achieved with the exchange of three messages, known as 
the three-way handshake, as depicted in Figure 2.  The system that wants 
to  initialise  the  connection  (A),  transmits  a  TCP  packet  with  the 
synchronise  (SYN)  control  flag  set  to  1.  This  is  the  first  message.  The 
receiving system (B) acknowledges the reception of the SYN packet from A 
and requests  to  initialise its  own end of  the connection.  Therefore,  the 
packet  that  is  sent  by  B  in  response  to  A  has  both  the  SYN  and 
acknowledge (ACK) control flags set to 1. This is the second message. A's 
end of the connection is established upon receipt of the second message. 
Finally, A sends a packet to B with the ACK control flag set to 1. This is the 
third message. B's end of the connection is now also established. To close a 
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connection, a similar protocol is employed, only the FIN control flag is used 
instead of SYN.
1.1.1.1 Sequence Number Field
The  purpose  of  the  sequence  number  is  to  confirm,  in  an 
acknowledgement,  that  all  packets  from  the  most  recently  confirmed 
packets up to, but not including the most recently sent packet, have been 
successfully received.  This is  done via an acknowledge packet.  Once an 
acknowledgement  of  a  packet  has  been  received,  the  copy  in  the  re-
transmission queue can be removed. The sequence number also identifies 
the order that incoming packets should be processed. This field cycles from 
0 to 232-1 and therefore all arithmetic is done modulo 232.
The  sequence  number  of  the  sender  differs  from  that  of  the  receiver. 
Therefore,  the  sender  needs  to  notify  the  receiver  of  its  initial  send 
sequence number (ISN) and the receiver needs to notify the sender of its 
ISN.  The  initial  receive  sequence (IRS)  number  is  the  ISN sent  by  the 
receiving computer (system B in Figure 2). Once the sequence number of 
the other host has been received, the sequence number of that host must 
be confirmed. This process is explained in  Figure 2, where A and B are 
considered to be separate systems. 
The three-way  handshake  is  needed as  hosts  are  not  synchronised and 
might have different ways of generating the ISNs. 
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Figure 2 – A description of the “Three-way handshake”
1.1.1.2 Opening and Closing Connections
The  establishment  of  a  TCP  connection  is  based  on  the  three-way 
handshake, as shown in Figure 2. Figure 3 elaborates on this, considering a 
situation  where system B received an old  packet  that  was  still  floating 
around in the network, after system A crashed. The initial state of system A 
is closed and system B is listening. After step 5 in Figure 3, the sequence of 
steps 2 to 3 in Figure 2 will occur.
This  situation  does  not  usually  occur,  as  an  engineering estimation  has 
been made that a system should be connected to a network after it has 
crashed after a delay time of 2 minutes (Postel 1981a).  The time that a 
packet lives is considered to be less than this delay value.
Step 1: A B
Description of data being 
sent
Step 2: A B
Step 3: A B
System A sends a packet 
with SYN flag to system B, 
notifying system B of it's 
ISN.
System B sends system A a 
packet with ACK flag, 
confirming system A's ISN, 
and a SYN flag, notifying 
system A of its ISN.
System A sends system B a 
packet with ACK flag, 
confirming system B's ISN.
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Figure 3 – The initial stages when an old packet is received
A similar situation occurs in the event of a system that crashes. A crashed 
system is one that does not respond due to an abnormal event that has 
occurred. In this scenario, the crashed system or the related daemon on 
the system might have to be restarted before subsequent connections can 
be established. 
Step 1: A B
Description of data being 
sent
System A sends a SYN 
packet to system B with a 
sequence number with a 
value of 100.
Step 2: A B
...
...
System B receives a SYN 
packet from system A that 
has a sequence number 
with a value of 90.
Step 3: A B
System B replies to system 
A with a packet that has a 
sequence number of 300, 
and acknowledges that it is 
expecting the next packet 
from system A to be one 
with sequence number 91.
Step 4: A B
System A recognizes that 
there must be an error, as 
system B is not awaiting 
the same sequence number 
that system A is willing to 
send, and therefore a RST 
packet is sent to system B, 
putting it back into a 
listening mode.
Step 5: A B
System B eventually 
receives the original SYN 
packet from system A that 
has a sequence number 
with a value of 100.
...
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If  system  A  crashes  (assuming  that  the  daemon  of  the  TCP  control  in 
system A had to restart), then system B is still under the impression that it 
has an established connection to system A. System A then sends a SYN 
packet  to  system B,  in  which  instance  system B will  ignore  it,  as  it  is 
already connected to system A. System B continues to send data from the 
prior  connection,  but  system A will  realise  something is  wrong as  it  is 
expecting a SYN/ACK packet acknowledging the sequence number it has 
sent recently. System A responds to system B with an RST packet, which 
closes the connection with system B, and a new connection is established. 
This is known as a half-open connection.
Other scenarios can occur other than the example shown above. According 
to RFC 793 (Postel 1981a) all scenarios have to follow the rules as to when 
an RST packet  is generated. These rules are not always obeyed as some 
operating systems don't follow them. RST packets are sent in the following 
conditions:
● If  the connection does not exist,  and packets are received from a 
system.
● Should the ports that the receiving SYN packet is trying to connect 
to be closed.
● The receipt of an ACK packet without establishing the connection. As 
seen later in the document, these rules are not always obeyed as 
some  operating  systems  don't  follow  them  for  either  security  or 
ignorance reasons.
● The receipt of an ACK packet that has a different sequence number 
than that expected.
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● If  there  is  an  unacceptable  level  in  security,  precedence  or 
compartment. This could involve a user trying to login to a system, 
but they do not have rights to that system, or an incorrect password 
has been entered.
If an RST packet is sent after a sequence number has been initiated, then 
the  sequence  number  of  the  RST  packet  is  taken  from  the 
acknowledgement  field  of  the  incoming  packet,  otherwise  the  sequence 
number is taken to be zero.
The RST packets are validated by checking the sequence number of the 
packets. Once the RST packet is confirmed to be valid and the system is in 
the listen state, it ignores it. Should it be in a SYN-received state (from a 
prior listen state) the system should return to a listen state, otherwise the 
system changes to a closed state.
A connection is closed when no further data is needed to be transported 
between two systems. On closing a connection,  an action similar to the 
three-way handshake is implied. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4. System A and system B have a connection 
established between them. System A is currently on a sequence number 
with a value of 99 and system B is currently on a sequence number with a 
value of 299. In Figure 4, step 2 and step 3 is often combined into a single 
step.
The TCP protocol and previous examples explain the basic communication 
process that occurs in a network. 
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Figure 4 – Closing “three-way handshake”
TCP is one of the commonly used protocols in port scanning and probing 
techniques.
Step 1: A B
Description of data being sent
System A wants to close the 
connection, and goes into the 
FIN-WAIT-1 state. A FIN/ACK 
packet is sent from system A to 
system B that has a sequence 
number of 100 and 
acknowledges that it is waiting 
for a packet with a sequence 
number with a value of 300.
Step 2: A B
System B goes into the CLOSE-
WAIT state on reception of FIN 
packet, and replies with an ACK 
packet (that has a sequence 
number with a value of 300) that 
acknowledges that it is waiting 
for the reception of packet 101. 
System A goes into FIN-WAIT-2 
state on receipt of the packet.
Step 3: A B
System B is ready to close and 
goes into a LAST-ACK state and 
therefore sends a FIN/ACK 
packet with a sequence number 
to system A with a value of 300, 
and acknowledges that it is 
waiting to receive a packet with 
a sequence number with a value 
of 101.
Step 4: A B
System A goes into the TIME-
WAIT state and sends an ACK 
packet to system B with a 
sequence number that has a 
value of 101, and acknowledges 
that it is ready to receive a 
packet with a sequence number 
with a value of 301. System B 
closes on reception of this 
packet, in which system A then 
closes after twice the time of the 
maximum packet lifetime.
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1.1.2 User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
It  must be noted that  most of  the information in this section,  has been 
taken from RFC 768 (Postel 1980), which deals with the User Datagram 
Protocol.
The UDP protocol corresponds with the Transport layer in Figure 1. UDP is 
a connectionless protocol. It is mainly used for sending messages that are 
not guaranteed to be delivered. It has therefore no flow and congestion 
control. The format of the UDP packet is shown in Figure 5.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32





Figure 5 – UDP packet format
Source Port (16 bits): This field is used should a reply be needed to be 
sent to it. If this field is not needed, it has a value of zero.
Destination Port  (16 bits):  This  specifies  the  port  that  the  packet  is 
being sent to of the destination address.
Length (16 bits): This field specifies the length of the datagram, including 
the length of the header and the data, in terms of bytes.
Checksum  (16  bits):  This  is  the  one's  complement  of  the  one's 
complement of  the sum of  the pseudo header,  the UDP header and the 
22
data.  The  pseudo  header  prevents  against  misrouted  datagrams.  The 
checksum procedure  is  the  same as  in  TCP.  The  format  of  the  pseudo 
header is shown in Figure 6.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Source Address
Destination Address
Zero Protocol UDP Length
Figure 6 – UDP Pseudo Header
Data Octets (variable length): This field is padded with zeroes to make it 
a multiple of two bytes.
UDP is one of the commonly used protocols in port scanning and probing 
techniques.
1.1.3 Internet Protocol (IP)
The TCP and UDP protocols both rely on the Internet Protocol (IP). The IP 
protocol corresponds with Internet layer in Figure 1. The reason for having 
this layer is to allow data to be propagated from one network to another. 
This  concept  is  often  referred  to  as  inter-networking  and  is  the  key 
architectural layer that enables the Internet itself.
The  popular  IP  versions  that  are  currently  being used are  the Internet 
Protocol version 4 (IPv4) and Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). 
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1.1.3.1 Internet Protocol version 4
It  must be noted that  most of  the information in this section,  has been 
taken from RFC 791 (Postel 1981b), which deals with the Internet protocol.
This version of IP is still used widely around the world. IPv4 has a 32-bit 
address  space,  meaning  that  there  are  232 IP  addresses  that  can  be 
assigned world wide.
The purpose of  the IP protocol is  to move packets between hosts in an 
interconnected set of networks, taking into account that the packets are 
limited in  size.  Therefore,  two key functions  of  the Internet  Protocol  is 
addressing and fragmentation.
The higher layers of the TCP/IP stack are responsible for associating the 
names  of  the  destination  with  its  unique  address.  These  addresses  are 
included in the header of the IP protocol, and the routers and gateways on 
the network direct the packets to the correct destination.
With Network Address Translation (NAT), a gateway is assigned an IPv4 
address.  Should  a  packet  be  received,  the  gateway  determines  which 
system in the private network requested information from that host, and 
sends that packet to that system. 
Even  though  NAT  is  a  fast  and  cost  effective  solution  of  giving  many 
computers access to the restricted Internet public address range, it has 
some problems. One of these problems is that it violates certain IP security 
mechanisms that rely on IP addresses, since the IP address has effectively 
been  spoofed.  As  a  result  of  this,  many  network  services  will  not  run 
through  a  NAT  gateway  (Burgess  2006).  This  is  not  always  effective 
because  many  users  have  the  same  IPv4  addresses  as  seen  from  the 
Internet, which restricts some users to some servers. 
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The masquerading of packets is a similar process to NAT, but instead of 
altering only the IP layer, the TCP layer is also altered, resulting in a new 
port  number  being  assigned  at  the  gateway.  In  so  doing,  two  systems 
behind the NAT gateway will be able to communicate to other systems on 
the Internet, referring to the same port number. With masquerading, the 
gateway will also alter the port number of the source to a higher unused 
port number internally (as well as change the address of the source).
The format of the IPv4 header is discussed in Appendix A.2.
IPv4  has  the  option  of  having  packets  fragmented  during  transmission. 
Fragmentation allows larger packets to be divided into smaller size packets 
(not  necessarily  equal  in  size).  The  primary  reason  for  packet 
fragmentation is that data might have to traverse many networks to get 
from source to destination, where the maximum transmission unit (MTU) 
size may differ from one network to another. 
There is, however, a Don't Fragment (DF) flag that can be set in the packet, 
and should a node not be able to deliver it, it is simply discarded. In this 
scenario  an  ICMP  error  message  is  returned  to  the  sender.  These 
fragments are controlled by setting the identification field to be the same 
for the fragments of  that  packet,  therefore preventing the fragments of 
different packets from being mixed. The More Fragment (MF) flag is set 
when  subsequent  fragments  are  still  expected.  In  the  case  of  the  last 
fragment of a packet, the MF is set to a value of zero.
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1.1.4 Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
Most  of  the  information  in  this  section  has  been  taken  from RFC 792 
(Postel 1981c), which deals with the Internet Control Message Protocol.
ICMP acts as if it is a higher-level protocol than IP, but it is actually part of 
the IP protocol. It provides feedback about problems that have occurred on 
the network.  It  should be  noted,  however,  that  these  messages are  not 
necessarily sent in the event of an error.
Should an ICMP message be sent, it is indicated in the Protocol field in the 
IP packet header, which will have a value of 1. There are basically eight 
different formats for an ICMP packet, each for different types of message.
The 32 bit unused field is not used for all the code values, and should be 
set zero by the sender. The receiver should ignore this field.
1.1.4.1 Destination Unreachable Message
These messages are sent  when a  packet  is  not sent  successfully  to  the 
destination.
The  format  of  the  Destination  Unreachable  Message  ICMP is  shown in 
Figure 7.




Internet Header + 64 bits of Original Data Datagram
.
Figure 7 – Destination Unreachable Message ICMP
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The fields in the Destination Unreachable Message ICMP has the following 
functions.
Type (8 bits): The value of this field is 3.
Code  (8  bits): The  code  has  the  following  values  for  the  respective 
message:
0 = Net unreachable
1 = Host unreachable
2 = Protocol unreachable
3 = Port unreachable
4 = Fragmentation needed and DF set
5 = Source route failed
Codes 0, 1, 4 and 5 are usually received from a gateway. Codes 2 and 3 are 
usually received from a host.
Checksum (16 bits): The value of this field is the one's complement of the 
one's complement sum of the ICMP message starting with the ICMP Type 
field. For the calculation of the checksum, the checksum field is taken to be 
zero.
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Internet Header + 64 bits of Data Datagram: Should the higher level 
protocol use a port number,  it is then taken as part of the first 64 data bits 
of the original packet's data.
1.1.4.2 Echo or Echo Reply Message
In the event that an Echo Message ICMP is sent to a host the host replies 
with an Echo Reply Message ICMP. Should the host reply with an Echo 
Reply message, then the Identifier and Sequence Number field should be 
the same as that of the Echo Message.
The format of the Echo and Echo Reply Message is shown in Figure 8.






Figure 8 – Echo and Echo Reply Message ICMP
The fields in the Echo and Echo Reply Message ICMP has the following 
functions.
Type (8 bits): The value of this field is 8 for echo messages and 0 for echo 
reply messages.
Code (8 bits): The code field has a value of 0 for both type of messages 
and are usually sent by either a host or a gateway.
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Checksum (16 bits): The value of this field is the one's complement of the 
one's complement sum of the ICMP message starting with the ICMP Type 
field. Should the total length be odd, then an extra byte of zeroes is added. 
For the calculation of the checksum, the checksum field is taken to be zero.
Identifier (16 bits): Should the code be equal to zero, then an identifier 
to aid the matching request and reply messages may be zero. Otherwise, 
the Identifier field of the Echo Reply message must be the same as that in 
the Echo Request message field.
Sequence Number (16 bits): Should the code be equal to zero, then an 
identifier to aid the matching request and reply messages may be zero. 
Otherwise, the Sequence Number field of the Echo Reply message must be 
the same as that in the Echo Request message field.
The other ICMP formats are discussed in Appendix A.3.
1.1.5 Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)
As IPv6 has many security  features  added to it,  further  investigation is 
needed  to  determine  if  it  will  function  as  a  countermeasure  for  port 
scanning.
Most  of  the information in  this  section has  been taken from RFC 2460 
(Deering & Hinden 1998), which deals with the Internet protocol version 6.
The  changes  from  IPv4  to  IPv6  are  that  IPv6  has  expanded  address 
capabilities, header format specifications, improved support for extensions 
and  options,  flow  labelling  capability  and  authentication  and  privacy 
capabilities. Although IPv6 increases the address space, it is not  widely 
used due to the fact that people are either not affected by this constriction 
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or that most networks use Network Address Translation (NAT).
IPv6 has IP addresses that are 128 bits in length. This results in  over 3.4 x 
1032 addresses that can be assigned to computers.
The  formats  of  the  headers  and  extension  headers  are  discussed  in 
Appendix A.4.
As ICMP is considered as part of the IP, this is different in the case of IPv6. 
More details of ICMPv6 are discussed in Appendix A.5.
1.1.7 Summary
The  information  presented  in  this  chapter  provided  an  adequate 
introduction to network architectures and protocols. Concepts of NAT, IP 
Masquerading and packet filtering were also introduced. Finally, how the 
Linux operating system provides these facilities was discussed. This is of 
interest in the context of the scanning and probing techniques introduced 
in the following chapter. 
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1.2. Scanning Techniques
An anatomy of a hack is described by McClure (McClure  et al. 2005) as 
shown in Figure 9.
















Target address range, namespace 
acquisition and gathering 
information about the target
Identification of services listening. 
Identifies the most promising point 
of entry for the attacker
Attacker determines valid user 
accounts and poorly protected 
resources
Using the information gathered to 
attempt to gain access to the system
Instead of just having restricted 
rights to the system, the attacker 
seeks to gain access of the complete 
system
Further information is gathered to 
gain access to the system as a 
trusted user
Hiding any evidence from the system 
administrator that access has been 
gained by the attacker
Trap doors are set so that the 
attacker can easily gain full control 
of the system in the future
As a last resort, the attacker will use 
readily available exploits to disable 
the target
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As it can be seen in Figure 9, footprinting is the first step in hacking a 
system.  Footprinting  involves  the  location  of  the  company,  postal 
addresses, administrators telephone numbers and the IP address that has 
been  assigned  to  them.  This  information  is  available  on  the  from  the 
Internet  Corporation  for  Assigned  Names  and  Numbers  (ICANN; 
http://www.icann.org) and  Internet  Assigned  Numbers  Authority  (IANA). 
Not much can be done about the public viewing of these pages, apart from 
restricting access to a target's network details.
Operating  System  Fingerprinting  is  part  of  the  Scanning  stage.  The 
attacker sends data, using some or other network protocol, to the target 
system.  The  response  from  the  target  system  is  monitored  and  then 
analysed for useful information such as the operating system, its version, 
which services are running, and so on. 
The Enumeration phase of the hack entails the gathering of information 
such  as  user  accounts  and  poorly  protected  resources.  The  resulting 
information  gained  from  the  Scanning  phase  is  used  during  the 
Enumeration  phase.  Needless  to  say,  the  information  gathered  in  the 
Enumeration  phase  can  be  catastrophic  to  a  computer  network.  If  the 
Scanning phase is countermeasured to an adequate degree, the attacker 
would never reach the Enumeration phase.
The  first  line  of  defence  against  scanning,  probing,  and  by  extension, 
operating system fingerprinting, is the network firewall. Firewalls aid the 
network administrator by filtering network information at any node of the 
network, including the network gateway to the Internet. The next section 
will  provide  a  simple  introduction  to  firewalls.  The  remainder  of  the 
chapter  discusses  the  scanning,  probing,  and  fingerprinting  techniques 
used by attackers at the time of writing.
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1.2.1 Firewalls
A firewall is a network mechanism that separates systems from the rest of 
the network by restricting the data that can pass through it, both from the 
network to the protected system, and  from the protected system to the 
network. For example, the firewall could only allow incoming data to pass 
through ports that correspond to requests made by systems within the local 
network. In this sense, firewalls can be utilised as simple packet filters. We 
refer  to  this  type  of  firewall  as  a  stateless  firewall.  Stateful  firewalls, 
however, are more intelligent in that they can filter data at higher levels in 
the protocol architecture.
Stateful  firewalls  open  the  packets  and  analyse  the  contents  before 
allowing it to be processed by the system. The fields in the TCP/IP stack are 
analysed to see whether they are valid, making it possible to know if it is an 
erroneous  packet  that  was  received  for  potentially  malignant  or 
antagonistic purposes.
The most dominant technique of packet filtering in Linux is the  IPtables 
statefull  firewall.  IPtables  gives  the  user  access  to  packets  as  they  are 
handed from the NIC to the operating system and,  it  also provides this 
access at various stages of propagation through the TCP/IP stack, including 
just before packets pass out of the operating system and onto the NIC. 
The IPtables technology is enabled by providing a set of 'call-back' system 
calls that give the programmer access to packets just before they pass into 
the kernel, into the TCP stack implementation, as they propagate up the 
layers of the TCP/IP stack, down the stack and, finally, just before they are 
about to leave the kernel. 
The result of this software architecture realises a high-level application, 
called  IPtables,  that  allows  system administrators  the  ability  to  control 
network traffic  by  setting a  set  of  simple  conditional  rules  that  control 
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incoming and outgoing network traffic. These rules are simple because, for 
the network administrator, the firewall is configured by specifying which 
types of packets are allowed and which are not. 
IPtables has a modular architecture, due to the lower-level system-calls it is 
built with. The various modules are used to add semantics for various types 
of protocols, routing features such as NAT and IP masquerading, logging 
and messaging facilities, and, more interestingly, the state of packets in the 
context of a known connection using a known protocol.  If  packets don't 
make sense in the context of a particular 'conversation', an IPtables module 
can detect this and take appropriate action.
1.2.2 Port Scanning
Recall that the second phase of a hack is the scanning of a system's NIC to 
see  which  ports  are  listening.  This  could  involve  TCP  and  UDP  port 
scanning.  It  could  also  involve  higher-level  analysis  such  as  operating 
system fingerprinting. There are many types of port scanning techniques, 
but the following types are the most common TCP scans (McClure  et al. 
2005)  and  are  also  used  by  Network  Mapper  (Nmap),  as  described  by 
Nmap's manual pages. 
UDP scan: UDP scanning is usually slower and difficult than TCP scans, 
but  some  system  administrators  ignore  the  monitoring  of  these  ports. 
Versions scans can be deployed to help differentiate between open ports 
and filtered ports. The disadvantages for this scan is that it is slow and 
closed ports send back an ICMP port unreachable error message.
TCP connect scan: This is a three way handshake scan, in which a SYN 
packet is sent to the target from the attacker. The target replies with a 
SYN/ACK packet, to which the attacker replies with an ACK packet. This 
scan is easily detected by the target system. Should this scan be available, 
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it is better to use. The disadvantage, however, is that it takes longer for the 
scan  to  be  performed.  Furthermore,  these  scans  can  be  detected  and 
logged by the target system. This is one of the oldest types of scan.
TCP SYN scan: This scan is referred to as half-open. This is because a full 
TCP connection is not established. A SYN packet is sent from the attacker 
to the target. If a SYN/ACK packet is received from the target, it means 
that the port is listening. Should a RST/ACK packet be received, it would 
indicate that the port is not listening.  The SYN scan is the most popular 
scan  because  it  is  faster,  and  stealthy,  as  a  TCP  connection  is  never 
completely  established.  This  scan  is  also  able  to  differentiate  between 
open, closed, and filtered ports.
TCP FIN scan: The attacker sends a FIN packet. According to RFC 793 
(Postel 1981a), the target system should send a RST packet back to the 
attacker  for  a  closed  port.  This  scan  genrally  effective  on  Unix  TCP/IP 
stacks.
TCP Xmas Tree scan: The attacker sends a packet with the FIN, URG and 
PUSH flags set (making it look like a Christmas tree). 
The PUSH control flag is activated in the packet if the nature of the packet 
is such that it must be pushed immediately to the receiver. This includes all 
unsent data that has not been sent from a node before the PUSH packet 
has been received.
Again, according to RFC 793 (Postel 1981a), a RST packet is sent from the 
target back to the attacker if the port is closed.
TCP Null scan: A packet is sent from the attacker to the target that has all 
the flags turned off. According to RFC 793 (Postel 1981a), a RST packet is 
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sent from the target to the attacker if the port is closed.
The advantage of the Null, XMAS and FIN scans is that they can sometimes 
penetrate certain non-stateful firewalls and packet filtering routers.  These 
scan types are therefore slightly more stealthy. The disadvantage of these 
scans is that they cannot differentiate between open and filtered ports.
TCP ACK scan: This scan is used to map out firewall rule sets. It can be 
used to determine if the firewall is a simple packet filter, which only allows 
established connections (with the ACK bit set) or whether it is a stateful 
firewall, which performs advanced packet filtering.
TCP Window scan: With this scan it can be determined if ports are open 
and if they are filtered or not. This is due to the way the TCP window size is 
reported. Different operating systems report different window sizes. With 
open ports a positive window size is reported even if a RST packet is also 
returned. Closed ports are known if a window size of zero is reported. Only 
a small number of operating systems on the Internet give this report, so 
this kind of scan cannot be reliable.
TCP RPC scan: This scan is specific to Unix systems, and is used to detect 
and identify Remote Procedure Call (RPC) ports and the associated services 
along with their  version.  This scan can also be used on a MS Windows 
system on port 445 instead of port 111 on Unix systems.
Maimon Scan (Maimon 1996): Maimon indicates that this is a “Stealth 
scan” as the SYN flag is not set. It uses two methods. The first method is 
that a packet with the FIN and ACK flags set are sent. An RST packet will 
be returned from the target if the port is open, otherwise nothing will be 
received. The other method is to send an ACK packet, and if the TTL value 
of  the  received  RST  packet  is  different  to  that  of  the  other  packets 
received, then this is an indication that the port is open.
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For all the scanning methods mentioned above, the target system is able to 
determine  who  is  performing  the  scans  against  it.  This  is  achieved  by 
identifying the system with the same IP address that is scanning the target 
system on different ports and protocols. Furthermore, this traffic is usually 
logged.  In  this  event,  the  system  administrator  can  block  any 
communication with this IP address. 
Countermeasures  for  these  scans  are  available  (an  example  is  Psionic 
PortSentry  (www.psionic.com/abacus)  from  the  Abacus  project),  that 
detects and responds to the attack. A response to this attack could be to set 
filtering rules that will not allow the attacker's unique IP address to have 
access  to  the  system (Postel  1981a).  This  is  not  always  reliable  as  the 
attacker could modify it's IP address for the time period that the scans have 
been  performed,  making  it  possible  to  continue  with  the  attack.  The 
attacker could also perform a 'denial of service' (DoS) attack with spoofed 
packets.
The most common and secure countermeasure is to disable all ports and 
services  of  the  system  that  are  not  needed. This  countermeasure  is 
probably not the most convenient countermeasure as some open ports will 
still  be  needed  for  effective  communication  across  a  network.  Another 
countermeasure  that  could  be  implemented is  to  set  filtering  rules  and 
allow  only  selected  systems  with  their  specific  IP  addresses  to 
communicate with it. This will work for situations where a user can dial 
into the system and then login.
1.2.2.1 A new port scanning proposal
A  new  type  of  scanning  technique  has  been  invented  by  Antirez 
(http://www.kyuzz.org/antirez/),  which  is  known  as  the  basic  IPID  scan 
technique. This scanning method is also known as the Stealth, Blind or Idle 
scan. It works on the concept that there are three computer systems. The 
Attacker,  the  Target  and  the  Zombie.  The  zombie  system  can  be  any 
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computer system on the network that is idle. The IPID scan is described in 
Figure 10.
Figure 10 – IPID scan process
The IPID scan operates on the idea that the attacker monitors the IPID (the 
IP Identification field) of the packets received from the zombie system. The 
condition that must be observed, is that the zombie system is idle, i.e. it is 
not actively sending packets over the network.
The attacker sends a SYN packet to the zombie system, which returns a 
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The first scenario occurs when the port is open on the target system. The 
attacker  sends a spoofed packet  to  the target,  in which the destination 
address is that of the target system, but the source address is that of the 
zombie system. Since the port is open, the target system sends a SYN/ACK 
packet to the zombie system. The zombie system did not establish a prior 
connection to the target system, therefore it will reply with a RST packet 
which will  have an IPID of (x+1).  The attacker then again sends a SYN 
packet to the zombie system, which then replies with a SYN/ACK packet 
that has an IPID value of (x+2).
The  other  scenario  is  if  the  port  is  closed  on  the  target  system.  The 
attacker sends a spoofed packet to the target, which has the destination 
address of the target system, but the source address is that of the zombie 
system. As the port is closed, the target system sends a RST packet to the 
zombie system, to which the zombie system does not react. The attacker 
then sends a SYN packet to the zombie system, which then replies with a 
SYN/ACK packet that has an IPID value of (x+1).
The attacker knows if the specific port of the target system is open if the 
difference in IPIDs is 2, otherwise it is closed should the difference of the 
IPIDs be 1.
The advantage of the IPID scan is that the target system has no records 
that the attacker is trying to do a port scan on it. The target system thus 
has only records of the zombie system scanning its ports, and therefore can 
set filtering rules to block any communication with the zombie system.
Another advantage is that the attacker can use a zombie system that the 
target system trusts. In this case, the target system won't mind if scans are 
done from the trusted system, allowing the attacker to do a thorough scan 
without being interrupted.
39
This  well  designed  scanning  method  so  impressed  Gordon  Lyon,  also 
known as Fyodor (a hacker) that he programmed this scanning method in 
his popular program Network Mapper, also commonly known as Nmap.
The IPID scan does not work on zombie systems running OpenBSD and 
Linux kernel 2.4.x, as the IPID values are sequential. This is discussed in 
section 1.2.4 Operating System (OS) Fingerprinting.
According  to  Fyodor  (http://www.insecure.org/nmap/idlescan.html)  there 
are challenges with the IPID scan. Scanning the ports one at a time could 
take a lot of time. Another challenge is that, should the zombie be a non-
idle host, then this will make it difficult to scan for open ports. The solution 
is to either use another system as the zombie system, or as Fyodor has 
done  in  Nmap,  to  rescan  for  open  ports  should  the  IPID increment  be 
greater than two for each port.
Another challenge for IPID scanning is egress filtering done by the Internet 
Service Provider or ISP (e.g. the ISP checks to see if the packet being sent 
from it actually comes from a valid system in its network). To bypass this, 
one could either try another ISP, or use IP tunnelling. Another method is to 
use  a  zombie  system that  is  in  the  same network  resulting  in  the  ISP 
sending the spoofed packet.
Since  the  attacker  does  not  receive  any  packets  from  the  target,  it  is 
impossible to  use IPID scanning for  operating system fingerprinting (as 
shown in section 2.3.2.2 Xprobe2's Results) of the target system. 
1.2.3 Other TCP/IP Attacks
As a result of the previous discussions, the worst type of attack that uses 
the TCP/IP stack is port scanning. Therefore, some attacks, described by 
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Dr. K (Dr. K 2000), that use the TCP/IP stack are discussed next.
1.2.3.1 IP Spoofing (IP Hijack)
This attack involves the attacker, a target and a trusted host that the target 
is communicating with. The attacker SYN-floods the trusted host, possibly 
using an illegitimate source address. At the same time the attacker sends a 
SYN packet to the target. The target replies with a SYN/ACK packet with a 
sequence number, making it possible for the attacker to guess of a possible 
sequence number that the target is using to communicate with the trusted 
host. The attacker will adjust the packets sent to the target so that the host 
will believe the packets are coming from the trusted host.
The attacker then sends a spoofed SYN packet to the target with the source 
address of the trusted host. The target replies to the trusted host with a 
SYN/ACK packet, but the trusted host does not receive it as it's buffer is 
overflowing with the SYN-flooding.
Thereafter the attacker sends an ACK packet to the target with the source 
address of  the trusted host and a sequence number previously guessed. If 
the  sequence  number  is  correctly  guessed,  then  the  attacker  can 
communicate with the target and penetrate it. Similar techniques can be 
used for packet alteration as described in section 1.2.2 Port Scanning.
1.2.3.2 Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Spoofing
ARP is a protocol used to identify an unknown IP address with a system's 
MAC address.  ARP spoofing is the process where an attacker will  send 
spoofed ARP messages on the network that contain the false MAC address. 
In this way the packets that were intended for a system are sent to the 
attacker's  system for  analysis.  ARP  spoofing  is  also  used  for  Denial  of 
Service (DoS) attacks, if the host becomes unreachable, and can only be 
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done on local LAN segments.
The technique of ARP spoofing makes it possible for a man-in-the-middle 
attack,  in  which  the  attacker  acts  as  a  router  and  forwards  packets 
between systems. This gives the attacker the opportunity to either analyse 
the packets being sent, or to alter them and send inaccurate packets to the 
destination system.
1.2.3.3 ICMP Attacks
Ping Flood: A program such as Packet InterNet Gopher (PING) is used 
(PING  is part of “iputils” package and the latest versions are  available in 
source  form   for   anonymous   ftp   ftp://ftp.inr.ac.ru/ip-rout ing/iputils-‐
current.tar.gz.)  The  UDP  protocol  is  mainly  used  for  this  attack,  even 
though some versions of PING can send TCP packets. Due to the fact that 
the TCP/IP stack has higher priorities than that of user programs, the user 
programs will start to run slowly. This is because the processor is spending 
most of it's time on the incoming ICMP Echo packets and returning ICMP 
Echo Reply packets. This is more effective if a number of computers attack 
a single host at the same time. Ping flooding will also reduce the available 
network bandwidth to a system, resulting in the valid users of that system 
to experience very slow access.
Oversized Packets (Ping of Death): When a packet is larger than 65536 
bytes , and after the fragments have been combined, the buffer overflows. 
With older OS such as MS Windows 3.1, MS Windows 3.11 and DOS, the 
Ping of Death can be successfully achieved with packet sizes of 7999 bytes. 
This can cause the system to reboot, shutdown, fail, or the kernel to start 
panicking. 
Destination Unreachable  Message to “Nuke” network connection: 
The target has an established connection with a server. The attacker then 
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sends a Destination Unreachable ICMP message to the target that has the 
same source address as that of the server. The target is disconnected but 
this  gives  the  attacker  an  opportunity  to  connect  to  the  server  as  the 
target.
Traceroute: This  is  not  really  an  attack,  but  it  gives  the  attacker  the 
opportunity  to  discover  the  route  that  the  packets  are  travelling. 
Traceroute tracks the route that packets travel across a TCP/IP network to 
a specified host. Since a Time Exceed ICMP packet is sent to the attacker 
when the TTL value has reached zero, the attacker starts sending a packet 
with a small value in the TTL field. The attacker receives these messages, 
with  the  address  of  the  node  that  sent  it.  Every  time  the  attacker 
increments the TTL value, the next node sends the message. If the packet 
that the attacker is sending has a port number that does not exist then, as 
soon as the packet has reached its destination, the target will return a Port 
Unreachable message to the attacker. Since traceroute relies on the TTL 
value in the IP protocol, other protocols that travel with the IP protocol 
packet could also be used to route the packet path.
Bypass Firewalls: Some firewalls (depending on the configuration) don't 
allow  ICMP  messages  through,  but  some  are  allowed  through  for  the 
network to perform properly. A program like Simple Nomad's “icmpenum” 
uses the Timestamp Request and ICMP Information messages to be able to 
map  the  network  behind  the  firewall.  This  will  only  be  possible  if  the 
firewalls are configured to allow Timestamp Request or ICMP Information 
messages through.
Project Loki (daemon9 1996): The technology developed in this project 
stores  data  inside  Echo  messages.  It  allows  attackers  to  retrieve 
information  from a  target  that  has  been  compromised  before,  with  the 
request of these messages and without the permission of the user of the 
target system. The project's objection was initially to allow traffic between 
two systems without noticing the flow of traffic between them, but it can be 
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a tool used by an attacker. This tunnelling effect might also allow packets 
to bypass the firewall as described above.
1.2.4 Operating System (OS) Fingerprinting
Operating system fingerprinting is the process of detecting the operating 
system  of  a  remote  target.  It  is  done  by  probing  –  sending  different 
“formats” of packets and analysing the packets received is response. This 
technique is considered to be part of the scanning process because it the 
same technical process as port scanning techniques do.
It must be noted that most of this information is gathered from Fyodor's 
paper (Fyodor 1998) as well as from Ofir Arkin's paper (Arkin 2001a).
The reason why detection of the OS of a remote system is necessary is that 
when an attack is made on a system (whether it is a hacker or a system 
administrator trying to audit how secure the system is), the attacker might 
only have one chance of doing so. The daemon might crash and, in this way, 
notify the administrator that somebody is trying to penetrate the system. 
This usually only occurs when exploit code is being used.
The way that the detection used to be performed in the past was that a 
telnet connection (or a similar type) was established with the system, and 
the system would display a banner of the operating system running. This 
was not an accurate way of detecting the operating system, as the system 
administrators could either disable the display of the banner, or have the 
banner display OS information that was untrue.
As  mentioned  before,  the  new  way  of  doing  the  OS  detection  is  by 
analysing the packets sent back from the target system. Thus it is possible 
to not only know what OS is running on the system, but the version as well.
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According to Arkin, the techniques used by Nmap are not sufficient and 
therefore ICMP based OS detection is better. Many OSs have not changed 
the TCP / IP stack in the past versions and service packs, therefore making 
it  difficult  to  differentiate  between  them.  This  is  where  Xprobe2 
(http://www.sys-security.com) uses a different approach to detect the OS. 
Xprobe2 is  also  able  to  often  send and  receive  ICMP messages  as  the 
firewalls don't always block them. This gives the attacker the opportunity 
to view packets sent from a system behind a firewall. This makes Xprobe2 
different  to  Nmap,  even though  Fyodor  has  implemented  these  type  of 
scans  in  the  OS fingerprinting  in  the  later  versions  (as  investigated  in 
version 4.00) of Nmap. These techniques are also discussed.
The following techniques are used to determine the OS on the system.
The FIN probe: A  packet  is  sent  to  a  system that  either  has  the  FIN 
control  flag  set,  or  where  the  SYN and  ACK control  flags  are  not  set. 
According  to  RFC  793  (Postel  1981a),  these  packets  must  be  ignored. 
Packages such as  MS Windows, BSDI, CISCO, HP/UX, MVS, and IRIX send 
a RST packet in return.
IPID  sampling: Most  OSs  increment  the  IPIDs  for  each  consecutive 
packet they send. OpenBSD use random values for the IPID while Linux 
version 2.4.x and up use an IPID value of zero as well as having the DF 
control flag set. MS Windows increments the IPID with a value of 256.
Don't Fragment (DF) bit: Some OSs set this bit while others don't.
TCP  ISN  sampling:  This  looks  at  the  initial  sequence  number.  The 
different OSs can be classified into the following categories.
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Table 1 – ISN values for different OS
ISN Operating System
64k Old Unix systems
Random increments Newer  versions  of  Solaris,  IRIX, 
FreeBSD, Digital UNIX, Cray, etc.
True Random Linux  2.x,  OpenVMS,  newer  AIX, 
etc.
Fixed increment (Time dependant) MS Windows
Constant (same ISN) 3Com  hubs,  Apple  Laserwriter 
printers
TCP Initial Window: The monitoring of the window size of the returned 
packets  is  done.  This  window  size  is  relatively  constant  for  each  OS. 
Interestingly enough, with MS Windows NT the window size used is the 
same as that of OpenBSD and FreeBSD.
ACK value: Some OSs differ as to how this value is set. If a FIN/PSH/URG 
packet is sent, then most OSs will set the ACK value to that of the ISN. 
Unlike MS Windows and printers that don't follow RFC 793, this field will 
have an incremented value of the sequence number.
ICMP Error Message Quenching: Some OSs limit the number of ICMP 
error messages that are sent within a second.
ICMP Message Quoting: Most OSs send only the IP header and 8 bytes 
back, while Sun Solaris returns one extra byte but Linux sends even more 
bytes  back.  Such  OSs  are  HPUX  11.x,  MacOS  7.x-9.x  and  Foundary 
Switches.
ICMP error messages echoing integrity:  Systems have to send back 
part  of the original message with the port unreachable error.  Often the 
headers are messed up. AIX and BSDI send back the total header size to be 
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20 bytes too high, while other OSs have a total header size of 20 bytes less.
AIX and FreeBSD send back a checksum that is either not valid or with a 
value of zero. Many OSs miscalculate the UDP header checksum or set it to 
zero.
Some OSs don't echo the 3-bit flags and Offset field values correctly.
A  program  such  as  Nmap  does  nine  different  tests  on  a  system  and 
depending on the results it receives, it determines the OS. 
Type of Service (TOS): This field is usually set to zero for all OSs. Linux 
has the precedence bits of the TOS field set to 0xC0. ICMP error messages 
are always sent with the default TOS value of 0x0000. The ICMP echo reply 
message should have the same TOS value as the ICMP request message.
TCP Options: The following options are usually sent in all packets used for 
probing:
Window Scale=10; NOP; Max Segment Size = 265; Timestamp; End of Ops;
FreeBSD support all of the above options, while Linux 2.0.X only supports a 
few. Linux version 2.1.X and above support all of these options. The values 
of the options that are returned differ between OSs. Even if the values are 
the same, the order differs. Solaris will return:
 <no op><no op><timestamp><no op><window scale><echoed MSS>
while Linux 2.1.122 will return:
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<echoed MSS><no op><no op><timestamp><no op><window scale>
Exploit Chronology: MS Windows 95, 98 or NT don't have any differences 
in the TCP stack as the TCP stack has not changed during the versions. A 
way  to  be  able  to  determine  the  version  of  the  Microsoft  OS,  is  to  do 
attacks on the system (such as Ping of Death etc.) and carry on with nastier 
attacks, until the system has crashed.  Each version has patched some of 
these loopholes.
Another way is to use a method used by Xprobe2 that monitors the fields 
and reactions that the OS performs when it receives an ICMP message.
SYN Flood Resistance: Some OS are not resistant to SYN floods, as they 
can only handle 8 packets at a time. This is a useful (but not a friendly) tool 
to determine the OSs of a system.
Time-To-Live  (TTL):  This  field  has  a  different  value  for  ICMP  query 
messages and for ICMP query replies.
By combining the above results of the scans performed on a system it can 
be determined what OS and version the system is running.
Xprobe2 uses an Optical Character Recognition (OCR) approach (Arkin et 
al. 2003), which makes use of a matrix based OS fingerprinting. Xprobe2 
monitors if the OS on the target system responds to ICMP Echo Request, 
ICMP  Timestamp  Request,  ICMP  Address  Mask  Request  and  ICMP 
Information  Request  with  different  bits  set.  The  fields  in  the  received 
packets are then observed. Some of the fields are:
● IP TTL field
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● The value in the code field
● Precedence bits
● TOS field
● TOS byte unused bit
● DF bit
● IP packet total length
● IPID
● IP Header Checksum
● UDP Checksum
● ICMP ISN
● Content offset from the ICMP header
The adding the statistical scores of the different tests performed gives a 
total  score  that  is  possible  to  determine  the  OS running  on  the  target 
system. The tests  performed by  Xprobe2 are similar  to  those of  Nmap, 
except that Xprobe2 is only reliable on the reception of ICMP packets.
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The approach Xprobe2 uses differentiates between Linux kernel versions 
by exploiting the fact that versions 2.0.x use 64 as the initial TTL field, 
while versions 2.2.x and 2.4.x use 255 for this field. Linux with a kernel 
version of 2.4.x and higher has an IPID value of zero.
There are other less popular fingerprinting tools available that have been 
investigated.
QueSO is an OS fingerprinting tool that uses some of the techniques that 
Nmap  uses.  It  was  created  by  the  Apostols  and  can  be  found  at 
www.apostols.org/projectz/queso/. Netcraft (www.netcraft.com) is a website 
that surveys webserver platforms as a primary role, and consequently also 
does some basic  OS fingerprinting.  It  fingerprints  in  a  similar  basis  as 
Nmap but it states that the OS fingerprinting might be inaccurate if the 
system has “changed the default configuration of their TCP/IP stack.”
Nessus (www.nessus.org) is a program specifically designed for network 
auditing. It has the ability to do OS fingerprinting, but it uses a plug-in 
from Nmap. From this, it is concluded that Nessus uses the same scanning 
techniques that Nmap does.
P0f (Zalewski 2004) is a passive fingerprinting tool. It does similar checks 
as Nmap does, but instead of sending packets to the target to analyse the 
packets,  it  monitors  the packets  that  are  being received with either  an 
incoming  or  outgoing  connection.  This  type  of  scanning  has  the 
disadvantage that the attacker has to wait for a legitimate connection to be 
established before the OS fingerprinting can be performed. The advantage 
it has compared to Nmap, is that P0f can fingerprint OS behind a firewall 
or  NAT.  Another  advantage  is  that  it  has  an  advanced  masquerade 
detection. The way that P0f is able to perform this type of detection is by 
recording the changes in the TCP/IP packets that come from the same IP 
address.  Zalewski  states  though  that  most  of  the  detections  and 
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identifications performed by P0f are not accurate and are there-for purely 
“amusement value”. He also states that “P0f will never be as precise as 
Nmap”, which is another disadvantage.
Veysset  et.  al. created  the  program  Ring,  from  which  Tod  Beardsley 
(Beardsley  2003)  created  Snacktime.  A  patch  for  Nmap  has  been 
implemented that adds this scanning method. These programs operate on 
the  basis  of  determining  the  retransmission  of  packets  for  the  TCP 
handshake. Three methods are used for this fingerprinting.
The first method is that the attacker has a firewall activated on his machine 
to drop all SYN/ACK packets when the port is open. The attacker sends a 
SYN packet  to  the  target  machine,  to  which  the  target  replies  with  a 
SYN/ACK  packet.  As  the  target  system  is  not  receiving  an 
acknowledgement of  the  reception of  the SYN/ACK packet,  it  retries  to 
send it for a limited number of times, with a different delay between the 
retries.
The second method is that the attacker sends a SYN packet to the target 
system. The target  replies with a SYN/ACK packet.  The attacker replies 
with an ACK packet. The firewall of the attacker's system is enabled and 
then a FIN/ACK packet is sent to the target. The target machine replies 
with a FIN/ACK packet,  which is dropped at  the attacker's  system. The 
attacker  then  monitors  the  number  of  limited  packets  and  the  delays 
between the retries sent by the target system.
The third method has not been fully implemented in the Ring program yet. 
The attacker sends a SYN packet to the target, to which the target replies 
with  a  SYN/ACK packet.  The  attacker  acknowledges  and  then  sends  a 
PSH/ACK packet to the target system. The target system acknowledges and 
then sends a PSH/ACK packet to the attacker. The attacker then enables 
the firewall to block all FIN/ACK packets and then acknowledges with an 
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ACK  packet.  The  target  system  then  sends  FIN/ACK  packets  that  are 
limited in retries and with different delays between them to the attacker's 
system.
These retries and delays are compared with a database to determine the 
OS being used.
From  the  above  investigated  programs,  it  can  be  determined  that  the 
different techniques used for OS fingerprinting are represented by Nmap 
and  Xprobe2.  It  is  believed  that  any  countermeasures  for  these 
fingerprinting tools will be sufficient for the other tools available. 
1.2.5 Summary
Different  port  scanning  techniques,  TCP/IP  and  ICMP  attacks  were 
investigated. The way that OS fingerprinting is achieved was shown and it 
was also determined which fingerprinting tools will be sufficient to do the 
fingerprinting experiments.
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Chapter 2: Tests and Experiments
Various tests were performed to investigate the efficiency of the different 
port  scans  and  operating  system  fingerprinting. These  tests  were 
performed in situations when a firewall  was either  disabled, or enabled , 
with a standard Linux distribution – Suse 10.1. 
2.1. Practical Investigation with IPv4
2.1.1 IPID scan
A practical  investigation is  needed to confirm that  Linux kernel  version 
2.4.x  and  above  is  immune  to  the  IPID  scan.  These  tests  have  been 
performed on Linux with a kernel version 2.4.x (Arkin 2001b). From Arkin's 
tests  the  IPID remained zero.  This  investigation  should  determine  what 
would happen if the zombie system runs on a Microsoft Windows platform, 
or  a  Linux kernel  smaller  than version  2.4,  irrespective of  whether  the 
target is running a Linux kernel version greater than 2.4. It is known that 
Microsoft Windows increments the IPID by a factor of 256. (Fyodor 1998).
The firewall uses the IPtables rules specified in Appendix B.2. From these 
rules it can be seen that all broadcast and multicast packets are dropped. 
The TCP packets are rejected with a TCP RST packet, except those that are 
used for SSH. UDP packets are rejected with a Port Unreachable ICMP 
while all other types of packets are rejected with a Protocol Unreachable 
ICMP.
There  are  various  scenarios  that  have  been  considered.  Four  scenarios 
were  chosen.  The  first  two  scenarios  investigate  and  validate  the 
effectiveness of IPID scans when a Linux system plays the role of zombie 
system, with or without a firewall. The third scenario solidifies the results 
by using a different Linux distribution to the first two scenarios. The last 
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scenario is to test the IPID scan when a Microsoft server plays the role of 
zombie system and Linux plays the role of the target system.
Three  computer  systems  were  set  up  to  demonstrate  the  IPID  scan. 
Professional Hacker's Linux Assault Kit (PHLAK) was used as it contains a 
large  variety  of  hacking  tools.  PHLAK can be found at  http://phlak.org. 
Microsoft Windows XP Professional with service pack 2 was used as this is 
one of the common Microsoft operating systems used at the time of writing, 
and it is not immune to Nmap when it plays the role of zombie system. 
SUSE 10.1 was used as this is a stand-alone Linux system with a kernel 
version that is greater than 2.4.x. The computers configured as follows:
Computer A:
IP Address: 10.0.0.5 
Operating System: Windows XP Professional with Service Pack 2
Computer B: 
IP Address: 10.0.0.6
Operating  System:  Professional  Hacker's  Linux  Assault  Kit  (PHLAK) 
running a Linux kernel version 2.6.9
Computer C: 
IP Address: 10.0.0.7
Operating System: SUSE 10.1 running Linux kernel version 2.6.16.13-4
2.1.1.1  Scenario  1  –  Confirming  if  Linux  2.6.x  is 
immune to Nmap when it is a zombie system
In this scenario, computers A, B and C are considered to be the target, 
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zombie  and  attacker  systems  respectively.  Nmap  was  executed  on 
computer C to scan computer A for open ports via computer B.
The following output was found:
linux:/ # nmap -P0 -p- -sI 10.0.0.6 10.0.0.5
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-06-20 09:18 SAST
Idlescan using zombie 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6:80); Class: Incremental
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.5:
(The 65530 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed|filtered)
PORT     STATE SERVICE
135/tcp  open  msrpc
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds
1025/tcp open  NFS-or-IIS
5000/tcp open  UPnP
MAC Address: 00:50:22:A4:46:FE (Zonet Technology)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 256.225 seconds
As seen from the results, five open ports were detected in the scan. From 
these results, it is clear that a Linux kernel version 2.6.9 is not immune to 
Nmap when acting as a zombie system. It also indicates  that Microsoft 
Windows XP Professional is not immune to Nmap when acting as a target 
system.
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2.1.1.2  Scenario  2  –  Confirming  if  Linux  2.6.x  is 
immune to Nmap when it is a zombie system and it 
has a firewall
In this scenario, computers A, B and C are considered to be the target, 
attacker,  and  zombie  systems,  respectively.  Nmap  was  executed  on 
computer B to scan computer A (which has the firewall disabled) for open 
ports via computer C. 
The following output was found:
linux:/# nmap -P0 -p- -sI 10.0.0.7 10.0.0.5
Starting nmap 3.81 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-06-20 09:41 EDT
Idlescan using zombie 10.0.0.7 (10.0.0.6) port 80 cannot be used because IPID 
sequencability class is: All zeros. Try another proxy.
QUITTING!
This output shown above indicates that a Linux kernel version 2.6.16 and 
higher is immune to being a zombie system.
The same scenario was considered, but this time the firewall was enabled 
on computer C. 
The following output was found:
linux:/# nmap -P0 -p- -sI 10.0.0.7 10.0.0.5
Starting nmap 3.81 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-06-20 09:49 EDT
Idlescan using zombie 10.0.0.7 (10.0.0.6) port 80 cannot be used because it has  
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not returned any of our probes – perhaps it is down or firewalled.
QUITTING!
From the results  shown above the observation is  that  a  zombie system 
running Linux kernel version 2.6.16, with a firewall enabled, is not able to 
find any open ports on the target system.
2.1.1.3 Scenario 3 - Confirming if another Linux OS 
running kernel 2.6.x is immune to Nmap when it is a 
zombie system
In this scenario, computers A, B and C are considered to be the target, 
attacker  and  zombie  systems  respectively.  Nmap  was  executed  on 
computer B to scan computer A for open ports via computer C. Computer 
C's  Operating  system  was  changed  to  PHLAK,  running  a  Linux  kernel 
version 2.6.9. This was done so that tests could be performed on a different 
Linux kernel version.
The following output was found:
linux:/# nmap –vv P0 -p- -sI 10.0.0.5 10.0.0.7
Starting nmap 3.81 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-06-20 10:01 EDT
Idlescan using zombie 10.0.0.7 (10.0.0.6:80); Class: Incremental
Initiating Idlescan against 10.0.0.7
Discovered open port 25/tcp on 10.0.0.7
Discovered open port 21/tcp on 10.0.0.7
Idlescan is unable to obtain meaningful results from proxy 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5). I'm 
sorry it didn't work out.
QUITTING!
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In this scenario, the very verbose mode of Nmap was considered, and  even 
though Nmap considered the scan not to be meaningful, two open ports 
were  found.  This  again  indicates  that  a  system  running  Linux  kernel 
version 2.6.9 cannot be considered immune to Nmap because two open 
ports were found.
2.1.1.4  Scenario  4  -  Confirming  if  Linux  2.6.x  is 
immune to Nmap when it is a target system
In this scenario, computers A, B and C are considered to be the zombie, 
attacker and target systems respectively. Nmap was executed on computer 
B  to  scan  computer  C  (with  the  firewall  disabled)  for  open  port  via 
computer A.  
The following output was found:
linux:/# nmap –vv P0 -p- -sI 10.0.0.5 10.0.0.7
Starting nmap 3.81 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-06-20 10:01 EDT
Idlescan using zombie 10.0.0.7 (10.0.0.6:80); Class: Incremental
Initiating Idlescan against 10.0.0.7
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.0.0.7
WARNING:  Idlescan  has  erroneously  detected  phantom  ports  –  is  the  proxy 
10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5) really idle?
(Continues and Repeats the scanning process)
The results shown above suggest that a system running Linux 2.6.16 is not 
immune as a target to Nmap if the zombie system is running on Microsoft 
Windows XP Professional.
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The same scenario is considered, but this time the firewall on the target 
system is enabled. 
The following output was found:
linux:/# nmap -P0 -p- -sI 10.0.0.5 10.0.0.7
Starting nmap 3.81 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-06-20 10:01 EDT
Idlescan using zombie 10.0.0.7 (10.0.0.6:80); Class: Incremental
(Continues and Repeats scan as no reply is received)
From  the  results  of  this  scan,  no  open  ports  were  found. The  packet 
analysing tool Ethereal  (found at  http://www.ethereal.com) was executed 
the  same  time  when  the  scan  was  done,  and  it  was  observed  that  no 
response was received from the target system.
2.1.1.5  Microsoft  Windows  XP  Professional  IPID 
incremental
While these computer systems were set up, it was decided to monitor the 
packets being sent from the Microsoft Windows XP Professional system. 
HPING(1,2,3),  which  is  a  TCP  pinging  program  developed  by  Antirez 
(http://www.kyuzz.org/antirez/), was used to monitor the response from the 
Microsoft Windows XP Professional system. While Ethereal was running at 
the same time, it was interesting to see that the IPID's of the packets that 
were received from the Microsoft operating system were incrementing by a 
value of one, and not 256 as stated before.
2.1.2 Other port scanning techniques
Other  port  scanning  techniques  were  investigated,  again  taking  into 
consideration that  the standard firewall  that  came with SUSE 10.1 was 
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either enabled or disabled. The system's settings and the outputs of the 
scans are displayed in Appendix C.1.
2.1.2.1 SYN Scan
As seen from the outputs in Appendix C.1, Nmap was able to detect that 
the SSH port was open, irrespective of whether the firewall was enabled or 
not. Without the firewall enabled, ports 111 (rpcbind) and 631 (ipp) were 
also  detected as being open, while port 113 was detected as closed for 
authentication when the firewall was enabled. Recall that  open ports are 
useful for an attacker as these could be vulnerable areas of penetration.
2.1.2.2 UDP Scan
As seen by the output in Appendix C.1, with the firewall disabled, Nmap 
saw four ports open / filtered on system B, being ports 68 (dhcpc), 111 
(rpcbind),  631  (ipp)  and  1024  (udp).  Packets  were  dropped  in  the 
transmission so Nmap had to increase the delay between the packets sent 
to  800 ms.  This  resulted in  the  time period for  the scan  to   be  1  490 
seconds.
Once the firewall was enabled Nmap thought that all the ports were open / 
filtered.  The  time  period  for  the  scan  was  shorter  with  a  time  of  46 
seconds.
2.1.2.3 TCP Scan
As seen from the results from the output in Appendix C.1, the ports that 
were found open when the firewall was disabled were ports 22 (SSH), 111 
(rpcbind) and 631 (ipp). However when the firewall was enabled, ports 22 
(SSH) and 113 (closed for authentication) were found by Nmap.
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2.1.2.4 Null Scan
The outputs in Appendix C.1 indicate that Nmap saw ports 22 (SSH), 111 
(rpcbind) and 631 (ipp) to be open / filtered when the firewall was disabled. 
However  with  the  firewall  enabled Nmap assumed that  all  1  672 ports 
scanned were open / filtered. 
2.1.2.5 ACK scan
It is of interest to see from the output in Appendix C.1 results that with the 
firewall disabled all 1 672 ports scanned were seen unfiltered, while with 
the firewall enabled, ports 22 (SSH) and 113 (authentication) were seen as 
unfiltered.
2.1.2.6 FIN scan
From  the  results  in  Appendix  C.1,  it  is  evident  that  with  the  firewall 
disabled, ports 22 (SSH), 111 (rpcbind) and 631 (ipp) are seen as open / 
filtered, while with the firewall  enabled all the 1 672 scanned ports are 
seen by Nmap as open / filtered.
2.1.2.7 Window scan
Once again the outputs in Appendix C.1 were interesting. With the firewall 
disabled Nmap reported that all 1 672 ports scanned were closed, but with 
the  firewall  enabled,  it  reported  that  ports  22  (SSH)  and  113 
(authentication) were closed.
2.1.2.8 Xmas scan
As observed from the outputs in Appendix C.1, with the firewall disabled 
ports 22 (SSH), 111 (rpcbind) and 631 (ipp) were seen as open / filtered, 
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but with the firewall disabled, all 1672 scanned ports are reported as open 
/ filtered.
2.1.2.9 TCP Maimon scan
As observed from the outputs in Appendix C.1, it  is noted that with the 
firewall disabled, all 1 672 scanned ports are seen as closed, while with the 
firewall enabled, port 22 (SSH) is seen by Nmap as closed.
2.1.2.10 Protocol scan
The IP protocol scan is one that Nmap used to determine the protocols that 
the  target  system  is  compatible  with.  It  is  not  really  a  port  scanning 
technique, but it needs to be investigated to determine if any information 
can be gained from this scan.
Resulting from the outputs in Appendix C.1 it can be seen that without the 
firewall  enabled protocol 1 (icmp) and 6 (tcp) are available,  protocols 2 
(igmp) and 41 (ipv6) are open / filtered and protocol 17 (udp) is filtered. 
With the filter enabled only protocol 1 (icmp) is seen by Nmap.
From the overall outputs given by Nmap, it is concluded that the firewall 
does not always hide which ports are open or closed. Often Nmap reported 
that a specific port was closed (referring specifically to port 22 for SSH 
that was enabled for test purposes) which could give an attacker the idea 
that the port could actually be open. Should a firewall be the solution for 
port scanning?  More development is needed to improve it. The results of 
these experiments have been summarised in Table 2.
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Table 2 - Comparison of the different scanning techniques
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It should also be taken into consideration whether the firewall affects the 
detection of the operating system. Recall that it is crucial for the attacker 
to know the operating system of the target to be able to compromise a the 
target entirely.
A comparison of OS detection is done using Nmap and Xprobe2. 
Two  computer  systems  were  set  up  to  demonstrate  the  scans.  The 
computers used had the following configurations:
Computer A:
IP Address: 10.0.0.5
Operating System: SUSE 10.1 running Linux kernel version 2.6.16.13-4
Computer B: 
IP Address: 10.0.0.6
Operating System: SUSE 10.1 running Linux kernel version 2.6.16.13-4
Opened ports/services: port 22 / SSH
System A was used to do the scans on system B, with the scenario that 
system B has the firewall disabled and enabled respectively.
The system configurations and the outputs are displayed in Appendix C.2.
2.1.3.1 Using Nmap
As seen from the outputs in Appendix C.2, Nmap was able to detect that 
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the SSH port was open, irrespective of whether the firewall was enabled or 
not. Without the firewall enabled, ports 111 (rpcbind) and 631 (ipp) were 
also detected,  while  port  113 was detected as closed for  authentication 
when the firewall was enabled.
In  both  cases  the  Linux  version  was  detected  (not  exactly  to  version 
2.6.16.13-4, using Nmap version 4.00), even though when the firewall was 
enabled on system B it  caused Nmap to determine a greater  variety of 
versions.
In comparison when the firewall was enabled, the time period for the scan 
was more than double compared to when the firewall was disabled.
From the  outputs  in  Appendix  C.2  it  can  be observed  that  the  firewall 
enabled on a system does help against SYN scanning as well as for  OS 
detection, but not in great depth. Nmap was still able to detect that the 
SSH port was open (which is probably one of the most promising ports to 
attack from the attacker's perspective especially if the version of SSH are 
between 1.2.24 and 1.2.31 (McClure et. al. 2005 pgs 255 - 258), as well as 
being able to determine that it was a Linux kernel running on the target.
2.1.3.2 Using Xprobe2
From the outputs in Appendix C.2 it is observed that when the firewall was 
disabled, Xprobe2 detected the OS that was running on system B was Linux 
with a kernel version of 2.4.22 or higher. Xprobe2 was a bit confused when 
the firewall was enabled. Xprobe2 thought the OS was Foundry Networks 
IronWare Version 03.0.01eTc1 on its primary guess, and then it couldn't 
decide between a Linux kernel of version 2.4.21 and higher, or Foundry 
Networks IronWare. There were more guesses that the OS was Foundry 
Networks IronWare.
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Ethereal was used as well, and the difference in packets sent between the 
two systems when the firewall was enabled or disabled were investigated. 
The following differences were found:
● With  the  firewall  disabled,  a  Destination  Unreachable  ICMP  was 
returned from system B, as system A sent the packet to port 65534, 
which  was  obviously  closed.  When  the  firewall  was  enabled,  the 
ICMP message was not sent from system B.
● System A  sent  a  couple  of  TCP SYN packet  to  system B.  In  the 
situation that  the firewall  was disabled,  RST /  ACK packets  were 
returned. When the firewall was enabled, system B simply dropped 
these TCP SYN packets and did not send any ICMP packet back to 
system A.
It was also observed that the TTL field in the TCP had a value of 64. The 
abstracts of the Ethereal outputs can be found in Appendix H.
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2.2. Realisation of Preliminary 
Countermeasures
Port scanning techniques were first investigated with the use of IPv4. A 
comparison of the scans is shown in Table 2. 
The SYN scan is found to be powerful enough to detect port 22 (SSH) as 
open when the firewall is enabled. This is the same as the TCP scan, as the 
SYN scan is part of the TCP three-way handshake.
The ACK scan showed that all the ports are unfiltered when the firewall 
was disabled, but port 22 (SSH) was seen as listening and unfiltered when 
the firewall was enabled.
When the Window scan was performed, it was observed that all the ports 
were seen as closed when the firewall was disabled, but port 22 (SSH) was 
seen as closed when the firewall was enabled. The problem here is that 
even though Nmap detected and showed specifically  that  this  port  was 
closed, it could be an indication to the attacker that a firewall is present, or 
that the port is currently closed, but could be opened in the future.
A  similar  situation  is  observed  in  the  Maimon  scan.  With  the  firewall 
disabled, all the scanned ports are seen as closed, but port 22 (SSH) is seen 
as closed when the firewall is enabled.
From these observations it can be concluded that the most powerful scans 
of Nmap are the SYN, TCP, ACK, Window and Maimon scans, as these will 
show  available  ports  even  if  the  pre-installed  firewall  of  Suse  10.1  is 
activated in the Linux system. A weighted matrix was generated from these 
results and a graph of these results are shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11 – Comparison of the different scanning ratings and their relative 
effectiveness
The results that were found regarding the SSH port was expected given the 
firewalls configurations. This SSH service was the only one enabled on the 
system, and therefore the other services that were found was not expected.
Fyodor  (http://www.insecure.org/nmap/idlescan.html)  suggests  using 
countermeasures  including  a  stateful  firewall  and  egress  filtering. 
According to Fyodor, OpenBSD, Solaris and Linux systems are immune to 
being a zombie system when Nmap performs IPID scans. Linux 2.4.x uses 
peer-specific IPID values as well as zeros the IPID fields in packets with the 
Don't  Fragment  (DF)  bit  set.  OpenBSD  randomises  the  IPID  sequence 
value, but this leads to a problem where the random IPID value cannot be 
repeated in the packet stream. He also states that it might not stop all IPID 
related attacks,  and that  further  investigation should be done for  other 
IPID related attacks. Since Linux has its IPID value set to zero, it is safe 
against any further type of IPID attack.
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In the case where the IPID scans were performed the results showed that a 
system with  a  kernel  version  2.6.9  was  not  immune to  being a  zombie 
system, however it was immune when a kernel version 2.6.16 was used. 
This is irrespective to whether the firewall was enabled or not. 
Xprobe2 does not have any scanning techniques available for IPv6 at this 
stage. Nmap on the other hand has three scanning techniques for IPv6, but 
the only useful scan is the TCP scan. There are no other scans available.
2.2.1 Unique Linux Characteristics
Linux reacts differently to other OS when certain packets are received and 
also  sends  packets  with  unique  properties,  making  it  possible  for 
fingerprinting  in  OS detection.  The  properties  that  have  been  found  in 
scans performed as well as those from Ofir Arkin's paper (Arkin 2001b) are 
stated below.
Linux replies to Echo Request broadcasts as well as Timestamp Requests. 
It does not respond to Information request ICMPs aimed at the broadcast 
address, as well as Address Mask Request ICMP messages.
Fyodor  states  that  the  IPID value  increments  with  a  value  of  one,  but 
kernel version 2.4.x and above keeps this field zero when the DF bit is set 
(Fyodor  1998). This  is  obviously  not  true,  as  seen  in  the  IPID  scan 
performed on a Linux system running a kernel version 2.6.9. The DF bit is 
always set, even if the variable in the ip_no_pmtu_disc file is set.
The TTL values of the Reply ICMP messages are 64 for kernel version 2.0.x, 
but kernel version 2.2.x and up have a TTL value of 255. Again these facts 
were found not to be true in the tests performed with Xprobe2, and that the 
TTL  value  was  64  for  a  kernel  version  2.6.16.  All  the  Request  ICMP 
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messages  have  a  TTL  value  of  64  though,  except  for  the  Destination 
Unreachable ICMP message,  which had a TTL value of  255 (as seen in 
Appendix H).
Another interesting observation seen in Appendix H is that the sequence 
number of the TCP packets that were sent, all have a value of zero (relative 
sequence  number).  This  does  not  validate  as  stated  in  section  1.2.4 
Operating  System Fingerprinting,  which  states  that  it  should  be  a  true 
random value.
Other characteristics in the TCP/IP stack of the replies with Linux version 
2.2.x and 2.4.x are shown in Table 3 (Arkin 2001b).









Precedence not = 0 Not Answering Not = 0x00 Not Answering  Not = 0x00
TOS not = 0 Not Answering Not = 0x00 Not Answering Not = 0x00
Unused = 1 Not Answering 0x1 Not Answering 0x1
Another finding about Linux is that when a Timestamp Request ICMP is 
received and the Code field has a value other than 0, then it will reply with 
a Timestamp Reply ICMP message, with the Code field value of 0.
Another characteristic of Linux is that it quotes more than 8 data bytes in 
the ICMP error messages. It will also send ICMP error messages that are 
up to  576 bytes  in  size.  Twenty  bytes  are  added to  the  quoting of  the 
corrupt packet with a Destination Unreachable message.  This is another 
characteristic of Linux other than that the Precedence is equal to 0xc0, 
which only Linux has. 
Linux's other feature is that the TCP options are returned in the following 
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order:
<echoed MSS><no op><no op><timestamp><no op><window scale>
The above order can be a fingerprint for these Linux systems.
In the tests that were performed against the Linux systems, it was noted 
that  the Destination Unreachable ICMP messages were blocked and the 
TCP  SYN  packets  were  dropped  when  the  firewall  was  disabled.  The 
original installed firewall of Suse 10.1 did make a difference in the port 
scanning and OS detection, but it was not always sufficient.
2.2.2 Preliminary Countermeasures for Linux
The  most  secure  countermeasures  for  port  scanning  is  to  disable  the 
services and ports not in use and to have the latest kernel version installed 
onto the system, preferably version 2.6.16 or above, as this will prevent the 
system being a zombie in the IPID scans.
There are many countermeasures suggested, which will be discussed.
Dr. K (Dr. K 2000) suggests that an Intrusion Detection Software (IDS) be 
used. The best open-source IDS available are SNARE (System iNtrusion 
Analysis  and  Reporting  Environment)  found  at 
www.intersectalliance.com/projects/index.html and  SNORT  found  at 
www.snort.org. These packages log any scanning and penetration attempts, 
as  well  as  what  might  seem  to  be  an  attempt.  Depending  on  the 
configurations,  the  IDS  can  notify  the  system  administrator  about  the 
attempts, and block any traffic from the specific IP address. SNORT is one 
of the best IDSs available as it  updates its signature database from the 
Internet when new attacks are found.
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Other suggestions are that the system is updated with the latest patches. 
This  will  help  in  the prevention of  IP  spoofing,  as  the system could be 
immune to SYN flooding. Another prevention would be that packets can be 
dropped that are oversized, as in the case of the Ping of Death. The system 
administrator  can  then  test  the  system  by  running  scripts  and  tools 
available and then attack it. In this way, the IDS rules and configurations 
can be altered until the desired results are acquired.
There  are  times  when  some  services  are  needed  on  a  system.  It  is 
dangerous  to  have  services  running  that  anybody could  gain  access  to. 
These services should also be made available to those who need them. TCP 
wrappers  gives  the  possibility  of  adding Access  Control  Lists  (ACLs)  to 
these services, so that only some people are able to gain access to them 
(Burgess 2006). With the use of TCP wrappers all communication of the 
different services are logged. Depending on how secure you need a system 
to be, one could deny all traffic to it, and then start allowing only systems 
that require access to it as time progresses. System administrators must 
investigate the log files for possible attacks.
An  internal  network  can  be  protected  with  firewalls.  As  mentioned 
previously,  stateful  firewalls  are  better.  Firewalls  can  also  log  half-open 
connections as well as ICMP messages received.
A  stateful  firewall  with  egress  filtering  is  recommended.  The  firewall 
should be configured with some of the following rules:
● The  firewall  itself  should  not  generate  TTL  Exceeded  ICMP 
messages.
● It  should  not  allow  traffic  directed  to  routers,  unless  it  contains 
routing information.
72
● Traffic directed to the firewall must be blocked.
● Don't  allow  ICMP  request  messages  from  the  Internet  to  the 
protected network.
The above countermeasures are preferable for port scanning and further 
attacks  on  the  system,  but  countermeasures  are  needed  for  OS 
fingerprinting.  Nostromo  (Nostromo  2005)  suggested  patches  and 
programs to fool OS detection scanners such as Nmap and Xprobe2. Some 
of the suggestions are:
IP Personality by Gaël Roualland et. al. It modifies the TCP ISN, the TCP 
initial window size, TCP options and IPID numbers. This patch is outdated.
Stealth  Patch by  Sean  Trifero  et.  al.  This  patch  worked  with  kernel 
versions 2.2.19 to 2.2.22 and version 2.4.19. It discards all  packets that 
have the FIN and SYN flags set.
Nostromo (Nostromo 2005) suggests a few other Linux programs, but these 
are either outdated or do not deceive programs such as Nmap. The above 
patches  change  the  TCP/IP  stack  properties  to  that  of  other  operating 
systems, but if ICMP scans are performed, then this will have no effect on 
fooling the attacker.
Morph by Syn Ack Labs (www.synacklabs.net) (Wang 2004) is another OS 
fingerprint  deceiver.  Morph  alters  the  TCP/IP  packets  to  have  the 
characteristics of another OS. It deceives QueSO, Nmap and Xprobe2, and 
it is being developed to deceive P0f and RING/Snacktime.
Another  interesting  characteristic  of  Linux  is  the  way  it  responds  to 
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incoming traffic directed to port 0, as described by Ste Jones (Jones 2003). 
The following seven tests are performed by OS fingerprinting tools that 
send packets to and from port 0:
● A TCP packet is sent from port 0 to port 0.
● A TCP packet is sent from any port except 0 to port 0.
● A TCP packet is sent from port 0 to an open port.
● A TCP packet is sent from port 0 to a closed port.
● A UDP packet is sent from port 0 to port 0.
● A UDP packet is sent from port 53 to port 0.
● A UDP packet is sent from port 0 to a closed port.
Different OSs reply in different ways to the above tests. The tools that is 
used  to  perform  these  scans  is  gobbler-2.0.1-alpha 
(www.networkpenetration.com).  Linux replies  to  all  the  tests performed. 
The best countermeasure for this is to block all traffic sent to port 0.
Spangler  (Spangler  2003)  and  Beardsley  (Beardsley  2003)  suggest  that 
countermeasures for the Ring / Snacktime fingerprinting are that a firewall 
with filtering is used and that the unused ports are kept closed. A packet 
mangler, which alters the fields in a packet header, should be used to give 
an inaccurate retransmission timeout values. The number of retries should 
also  be  altered  as  well  as  the  delays  between  them.  Ofir  Arkin  (Arkin 
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2001b) suggests the following countermeasures to prevent scans that use 
ICMP messages:
● All  ICMP  Echo  messages  must  be  blocked,  and  hosts  on  the 
protected networks must be configured so that they will not answer 
to ICMP Echo Request messages. This includes ICMP Echo request 
messages that are sent to the Broadcast Address of the connected 
network. Should any Echo ICMP messages be needed to be sent then 
all Echo ICMP messages that contain data must be blocked. This will 
prevent back doors for programs such as LOKI.
● Block Timestamp Request, Information Request and Address Mask 
Request ICMP messages and configure hosts to ignore them. This 
will also prevent Non-Echo Sweeps.
● IP directed broadcasts must be blocked as well, as this will prevent 
Non-Echo ICMP Broadcasts.
● All fields in the ICMP messages must be checked by the firewall, to 
prevent Parameter Problem ICMP messages.
● Block  Destination  Unreachable  ICMP  error  messages  from  the 
protected network to the Internet.
● Packets  that  contain  protocols  that  are  not  supported  must  be 
blocked.
● All  outgoing  Fragment  Reassembly  Time  Exceeded  ICMP  error 
messages must be blocked.
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It  is  concluded  that  there  are  countermeasures  to  port  scanning.  It  is 
possible to keep a network safe when certain traffic is blocked. Yet there is 
still a vulnerability hole in terms of OS fingerprinting. Even though there 
might be patches available, they are outdated and not effective.
IPv6 is  currently  more secure in  terms of  port  scanning techniques,  as 
there is only a TCP scan available with Nmap 4.00, and Xprobe2 does not 
support it. The possibility of other scanning techniques using IPv6 is a topic 
that needs further investigation.
Nmap 4.00 also does not have the possibility of OS fingerprinting for IPv6, 
which makes a system secure from this point of view. OS detection with 
IPv6 is also a topic that needs further investigation.
Preventions to IPv6 port scanning will be developed as the new scanning 
techniques are found. People around the world currently do not use IPv6 
unless they are forced to.  As it  could be years until  the Internet works 
entirely only on IPv6, users will continue to use IPv4. As a result, people 
will have to think of countermeasures to protect their systems in IPv4 from 
being scanned. As stated before, there are many countermeasures for port 
scanning, but countermeasures for OS detection are still lacking.
2.2.3 Summary
The  observations  found  from  the  port  scanning  experiments  were 
discussed. The candidate properties that Linux has in it's TCP/IP packets 
were discussed. Comments were made on the recommended and previous 
countermeasures that were made available. Other recommendations were 
also discussed.
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2.3. Validation of Preliminary Countermeasures
Programs such as IP Personality fool Nmap and Xprobe2 by changing the 
TCP packet fields such as the Initial Window Size. These values could be 
initially set by developers for optimization or sane defaults. It is therefore 
suggested that these fields and properties are left as the default value and 
changes  are  specifically  made  that  have  no  effect  on  the  TCP/IP  stack 
except  those  fields  that  are  unique  to  Linux  and  have  no  effect  on 
communication. The order of impact that the properties of Linux have on 
OS fingerprinting are discussed below, with their respective solution.
Have a firewall implemented. This is probably the most important factor. 
This  will  prevent  packets  with  an unknown purpose being sent  to  your 
system. As stated before, a stateful firewall is recommended.
The factor for fingerprinting Linux and which carries the largest weighting, 
is the Precedence value of the TOS field. If this value could be 0x00, then 
this will be a start in preventing Nmap and Xprobe2 from detecting that 
Linux is the OS. Only IPv4 has a Type of Service field, so IPv6 is immune to 
this.  It therefore does not affect communication over a network, and it can 
be concluded that it is safe to change this field.
It  was suggested previously that  all  ICMP messages should be blocked. 
This is not always needed, as it depends on how secure the requirements 
for the system are. The characteristic of Linux is that when it sends ICMP 
error messages more than 8 bytes of the data are quoted, and an extra 20 
bytes are added. If  only  8 bytes are quoted as done in other operating 
systems, and the extra arbitrary 20 bytes are removed, then it will also help 
with  the  preventing  of  the  OS  fingerprinting.  This  can  be  achieved  by 
altering the code for the TCP/IP stack.
Some OS fingerprinting programs look at the delays between the ICMP 
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reply  messages.  To  prevent  this,  the  ICMP  reply  messages  can  have 
random delays  between them,  but  this  could  have  a  low  priority  for  a 
countermeasure.
It is also recommended that the SYN/ACK retries are altered to prevent 
Ring/Snacktime from fingerprinting the OS. This can be done by altering 
the /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_synack_retries  file.  The default  value is  5,  but 
this  value  should  not  be  higher  than  255.  This  won't  alter  the  delays 
between the retries.
The TCP options are in the format:
<echoed MSS><no op><no op><timestamp><no op><window scale>
The  order  of  the  options  should  not  have  an  effect  on  the  TCP/IP 
communication.  Altering the order of the options will  therefore have no 
effect on Linux. Pirating the options order of another OS could work as a 
countermeasure,  but  this  has  a  very  low  impact  on  the  current 
fingerprinting techniques.
Another  noticeable  characteristic  of  Linux  which  is  only  used  to 
differentiate  between the versions of  the kernel  is  the TTL value.  Even 
though the value of 64 dominates, there are cases where 255 is used. The 
value of 255 might be used for the TTL field as an optimization value as it 
was experienced that packets were lost, but the value of this field has a 
very low impact on the fingerprinting process.
As seen in the tests performed (Appendix H), Linux has a window size of 
6840,  except  for  the  RST/ACK packets  which  has  a  window  size  of  0. 
Altering  this  value  will  change  the  performance  of  the  communication 
across  the  network.  It  therefore  has  a  low  importance  value  for  a 
78
countermeasure.  If  OS  fingerprinting  programs  depended  purely  on 
whether the window size is equal to 6840, then the altering of the default 
value with a value of one will be enough for a countermeasure, which is not 
the case with Nmap.
The OS fingerprinting done through the connection of port 0 is not really a 
threat  for Linux at  this stage, as Microsoft  Windows is an OS that  also 
replied  to  all  seven  tests.  Even  though  this  might  be  the  case,  it  is 
recommended  that  all  traffic  to  port  0  must  be  blocked,  as  this 
fingerprinting  in  conjunction  with another  one  could  identify  the  OS.  A 
typical IPtables configuration is as stated below:
iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 0 -j DROP
iptables -I INPUT -p udp --dport 0 -j DROP
iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --sport 0 -j DROP
iptables -I INPUT -p udp --sport 0 -j DROP
From the above stated countermeasures, it was believed by just having the 
precedence  bits  changed  to  0x00  would  be  sufficient  to  prevent  the 
fingerprinting of Linux. Other fields in the TCP/IP stack can be changed, 
but  these  either  won't  have  much  influence  or  they  could  hamper 
communication. Further investigation can be done once the change in the 
precedence bits has been implemented and the fingerprinting is successful.
2.3.1 Type Of Service
Testing  to  determine  whether  the  TOS  has  an  effect  on  the  OS 
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fingerprinting needs to be performed. Linux default value of the TOS field 
is 0xc0. IPtables are used to alter the outgoing packets. The code is part of 
the script found in Appendix B.3. Test code for the IPtables is needed and 
the following code alters the TOS field:
iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -j TOS --set-tos 0x00
By using the above code the “mangle” table is altered. The TOS field is set 
to 0x00. The rules for the firewall can be seen in Appendix B.3. Tests were 
performed by Nmap and Xprobe2 to determine the effect that this change 
has had on the fingerprinting.
Two  systems  were  used  for  the  tests  performed.  Both  systems  were 
running SUSE 10.1 with the Linux kernel  version 2.6.16.  The attacking 
system's IP address was 10.0.0.5 and the target's IP address was 10.0.0.6 
and it had port 22 (SSH) open.
The firewall is enabled in all these tests, as IPtables sets the rules for the 
firewall.
2.3.1.1 Nmap's Results
When Nmap was run with the TOS field set to 0x00, the following results 
were obtained:
linux:/# nmap -O -vv 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-09-04 02:57 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 02:57
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 0.01s. Mode: Async [#: 2, OK: 1, NX: 0, DR: 0, SF: 0,  
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TR: 1, CN: 0]
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za (10.0.0.6) [1672 ports]  
at 02:57
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.0.0.6
The SYN Stealth Scan took 21.38s to scan 1672 total ports.
For OSScan assuming port 22 is open, 113 is closed, and neither are firewalled
Host pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za (10.0.0.6) appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za (10.0.0.6):
(The 1670 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT    STATE  SERVICE
22/tcp  open   ssh
113/tcp closed auth
MAC Address: 00:0F:FE:31:D9:CF (G-pro Computer)
Device type: general purpose|broadband router
Running: Linux 2.4.X|2.5.X|2.6.X, D-Link embedded
OS details: Linux 2.4.0 - 2.5.20, Linux 2.4.18 - 2.4.20, Linux 2.4.26, Linux 2.4.27 or  











TCP Sequence Prediction: Class=random positive increments
                         Difficulty=3398859 (Good luck!)
IPID Sequence Generation: All zeros
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 23.771 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 3364 (135KB) | Rcvd: 20 (1056B)
The  observation  from  the  above  code  is  that  Nmap  was  not  deceived. 
Tcpdump was executed at  the same time,  and the following output was 
received from it:
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pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za.ssh > pc-wvl-5.cs.ukzn.ac.za.51941: S, cksum 0x66af 
(correct), 3424862189:3424862189(0) ack 561094594 win 5792 
<mss1460,nop,nop,timestamp 129682542 1061109567,nop,wscale 2>
02:58:00.013585 IP (tos 0x0, ttl  64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto: TCP (6), 
length: 40)
From the Tcpdump output it is evident that the TOS field is 0x00.
2.3.1.2 Xprobe2's Results
The following results were observed from Xprobe2:
linux:/# xprobe2 10.0.0.6
Xprobe2  v.0.3  Copyright  (c)  2002-2005  fyodor@o0o.nu,  ofir@sys-security.com, 
meder@o0o.nu
[+] Target is 10.0.0.6
[+] Loading modules.
[+] Following modules are loaded:
[x] [1] ping:icmp_ping  -  ICMP echo discovery module
[x] [2] ping:tcp_ping  -  TCP-based ping discovery module
[x] [3] ping:udp_ping  -  UDP-based ping discovery module
[x] [4] infogather:ttl_calc  -  TCP and UDP based TTL distance calculation
[x] [5] infogather:portscan  -  TCP and UDP PortScanner
[x] [6] fingerprint:icmp_echo  -  ICMP Echo request fingerprinting module
[x] [7] fingerprint:icmp_tstamp  -  ICMP Timestamp request fingerprinting module
[x]  [8]  fingerprint:icmp_amask   -   ICMP  Address  mask  request  fingerprinting 
module
[x]  [9]  fingerprint:icmp_port_unreach  -   ICMP port  unreachable  fingerprinting 
module
[x] [10] fingerprint:tcp_hshake  -  TCP Handshake fingerprinting module
[x] [11] fingerprint:tcp_rst  -  TCP RST fingerprinting module
[x] [12] fingerprint:smb  -  SMB fingerprinting module
[x] [13] fingerprint:snmp  -  SNMPv2c fingerprinting module
[+] 13 modules registered
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[+] Initializing scan engine
[+] Running scan engine
[-] ping:tcp_ping module: no closed/open TCP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module test 
failed
[-] ping:udp_ping module: no closed/open UDP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module 
test failed
[-] No distance calculation. 10.0.0.6 appears to be dead or no ports known
[+] Host: 10.0.0.6 is up (Guess probability: 50%)
[+] Target: 10.0.0.6 is alive. Round-Trip Time: 0.01042 sec
[+] Selected safe Round-Trip Time value is: 0.02083 sec
[-] fingerprint:tcp_hshake Module execution aborted (no open TCP ports known)
[-] fingerprint:smb need either TCP port 139 or 445 to run
[-] fingerprint:snmp: need UDP port 161 open
[+] Primary guess:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 03.0.01eTc1" 
(Guess probability: 100%)
[+] Other guesses:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.21" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.22" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 07.5.04T53" 
(Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 07.5.05KT53" 
(Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare 07.6.01BT51" (Guess  
probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare 07.6.04aT51" (Guess 
probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare 07.7.01eT53" (Guess 
probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.23" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.24" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Cleaning up scan engine
[+] Modules deinitialized
[+] Execution completed.
From the  output,  Xprobe2  guessed  that  the  OS  of  the  target  is  either 
Foundary Networks IronWare or Linux.
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Changing the TOS field did not prevent the OS fingerprinting tools from 
detecting the OS running on the target.
Other  changes  to  the  TCP/IP  packet  are  needed  to  deceive  the  OS 
fingerprinting tools.
2.3.2 ICMP Echo Ignore All
For  the  tests  that  follow,  the  variables  were  altered  that  were  in  the 
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ directory. These are the settings that the Linux kernel is 
currently working on. To alter these variables root access is needed.
The default setting for this variable is zero. Should this variable be non-
zero, then the kernel will ignore all ICMP echo requests. This variable was 
changed with the following statement:
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_all
2.3.2.1 Nmap's Results
The following output was observed from Nmap:
linux:/# nmap -O -vv 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-09-04 03:22 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 03:22
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 0.04s. Mode: Async [#: 2, OK: 1, NX: 0, DR: 0, SF: 0,  
TR: 1, CN: 0]
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za (10.0.0.6) [1672 ports]  
at 03:22
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.0.0.6
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SYN Stealth Scan Timing: About 32.08% done; ETC: 03:23 (0:01:03 remaining)
The SYN Stealth Scan took 67.31s to scan 1672 total ports.
For OSScan assuming port 22 is open, 113 is closed, and neither are firewalled
Host pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za (10.0.0.6) appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za (10.0.0.6):
(The 1670 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT    STATE  SERVICE
22/tcp  open   ssh
113/tcp closed auth
MAC Address: 00:0F:FE:31:D9:CF (G-pro Computer)
Device type: general purpose|broadband router
Running: Linux 2.4.X|2.5.X|2.6.X, D-Link embedded
OS details: Linux 2.4.0 - 2.5.20, Linux 2.4.18 - 2.4.20, Linux 2.4.26, Linux 2.4.27 or  











TCP Sequence Prediction: Class=random positive increments
                         Difficulty=2922364 (Good luck!)
IPID Sequence Generation: All zeros
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 70.019 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 5045 (203KB) | Rcvd: 27 (1350B)
From the output it is evident that Nmap was able to determine that the OS 
running on the target system was Linux.
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2.3.2.2 Xprobe2's Results
Xprobe2 was executed and the following was observed:
linux:/# xprobe2 10.0.0.6
Xprobe2  v.0.3  Copyright  (c)  2002-2005  fyodor@o0o.nu,  ofir@sys-security.com, 
meder@o0o.nu
[+] Target is 10.0.0.6
[+] Loading modules.
[+] Following modules are loaded:
[x] [1] ping:icmp_ping  -  ICMP echo discovery module
[x] [2] ping:tcp_ping  -  TCP-based ping discovery module
[x] [3] ping:udp_ping  -  UDP-based ping discovery module
[x] [4] infogather:ttl_calc  -  TCP and UDP based TTL distance calculation
[x] [5] infogather:portscan  -  TCP and UDP PortScanner
[x] [6] fingerprint:icmp_echo  -  ICMP Echo request fingerprinting module
[x] [7] fingerprint:icmp_tstamp  -  ICMP Timestamp request fingerprinting module
[x]  [8]  fingerprint:icmp_amask   -   ICMP  Address  mask  request  fingerprinting 
module
[x]  [9]  fingerprint:icmp_port_unreach  -   ICMP port  unreachable  fingerprinting 
module
[x] [10] fingerprint:tcp_hshake  -  TCP Handshake fingerprinting module
[x] [11] fingerprint:tcp_rst  -  TCP RST fingerprinting module
[x] [12] fingerprint:smb  -  SMB fingerprinting module
[x] [13] fingerprint:snmp  -  SNMPv2c fingerprinting module
[+] 13 modules registered
[+] Initializing scan engine
[+] Running scan engine
[-] ping:tcp_ping module: no closed/open TCP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module test 
failed
[-] ping:udp_ping module: no closed/open UDP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module 
test failed
[-] No distance calculation. 10.0.0.6 appears to be dead or no ports known
[+] Host: 10.0.0.6 is down (Guess probability: 0%)




Xprobe2 was not able to determine what the OS was as it did not receive 
any  ICMP reply  packets.  Xprobe2 relies  purely  on  the ICMP packets  it 
receives. This is a disadvantage of Xprobe2. Nmap on the other hand was 
able to detect the OS.
With the ICMP packets disabled there is no need to alter the packets in 
terms of the amount of data sent in the ICMP error packet.
2.3.3 IP Default TTL
The impact that the TTL value has on the OS fingerprinting tools has to be 
investigated.  This  is  done  by  altering  the  TTL  value  in  the 
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_default_ttl file. The default value is 64. It was decided 
to modify the TTL value to any random number below 256. The TTL value 
was changed to 128. It was reasoned that it might be a countermeasure to 
have this value a variable number, but it does bring in a problem that this 
could be a vulnerability in detecting Linux that has a variable TTL. It would 
be advisable not to have the TTL value below 64, as this is a reasonable 
number to prevent a packet from getting lost on the Internet.
2.3.3.1 Nmap's Result
The results that Nmap displayed are shown below:
linux:# nmap -O -vv 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-09-04 03:47 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 03:47
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 0.01s. Mode: Async [#: 2, OK: 1, NX: 0, DR: 0, SF: 0,  
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TR: 1, CN: 0]
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za (10.0.0.6) [1672 ports]  
at 03:47
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.0.0.6
The SYN Stealth Scan took 21.38s to scan 1672 total ports.
For OSScan assuming port 22 is open, 113 is closed, and neither are firewalled
Host pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za (10.0.0.6) appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za (10.0.0.6):
(The 1670 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT    STATE  SERVICE
22/tcp  open   ssh
113/tcp closed auth
MAC Address: 00:0F:FE:31:D9:CF (G-pro Computer)
Device type: general purpose|broadband router
Running: Linux 2.4.X|2.5.X|2.6.X, D-Link embedded
OS details: Linux 2.4.0 - 2.5.20, Linux 2.4.18 - 2.4.20, Linux 2.4.26, Linux 2.4.27 or  











TCP Sequence Prediction: Class=random positive increments
                         Difficulty=684854 (Good luck!)
IPID Sequence Generation: All zeros
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 23.758 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 3364 (135KB) | Rcvd: 19 (996B)
Nmap was not deceived by this alteration.
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2.3.3.2 Xprobe2's Results
Xprobe2 was executed to investigate the affect of the alteration on it.
linux:/# xprobe2 10.0.0.6
Xprobe2  v.0.3  Copyright  (c)  2002-2005  fyodor@o0o.nu,  ofir@sys-security.com, 
meder@o0o.nu
[+] Target is 10.0.0.6
[+] Loading modules.
[+] Following modules are loaded:
[x] [1] ping:icmp_ping  -  ICMP echo discovery module
[x] [2] ping:tcp_ping  -  TCP-based ping discovery module
[x] [3] ping:udp_ping  -  UDP-based ping discovery module
[x] [4] infogather:ttl_calc  -  TCP and UDP based TTL distance calculation
[x] [5] infogather:portscan  -  TCP and UDP PortScanner
[x] [6] fingerprint:icmp_echo  -  ICMP Echo request fingerprinting module
[x] [7] fingerprint:icmp_tstamp  -  ICMP Timestamp request fingerprinting module
[x]  [8]  fingerprint:icmp_amask   -   ICMP  Address  mask  request  fingerprinting 
module
[x]  [9]  fingerprint:icmp_port_unreach  -   ICMP port  unreachable  fingerprinting 
module
[x] [10] fingerprint:tcp_hshake  -  TCP Handshake fingerprinting module
[x] [11] fingerprint:tcp_rst  -  TCP RST fingerprinting module
[x] [12] fingerprint:smb  -  SMB fingerprinting module
[x] [13] fingerprint:snmp  -  SNMPv2c fingerprinting module
[+] 13 modules registered
[+] Initializing scan engine
[+] Running scan engine
[-] ping:tcp_ping module: no closed/open TCP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module test 
failed
[-] ping:udp_ping module: no closed/open UDP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module 
test failed
[-] No distance calculation. 10.0.0.6 appears to be dead or no ports known
[+] Host: 10.0.0.6 is up (Guess probability: 50%)
[+] Target: 10.0.0.6 is alive. Round-Trip Time: 0.00026 sec
[+] Selected safe Round-Trip Time value is: 0.00051 sec
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[-] fingerprint:tcp_hshake Module execution aborted (no open TCP ports known)
[-] fingerprint:smb need either TCP port 139 or 445 to run
[-] fingerprint:snmp: need UDP port 161 open
[+] Primary guess:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 03.0.01eTc1" 
(Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Other guesses:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.6.0" (Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.6.1" (Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.6.2" (Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.6.3" (Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.6.4" (Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.6.5" (Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.6.6" (Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.6.7" (Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.6.8" (Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Cleaning up scan engine
[+] Modules deinitialized
[+] Execution completed.
The results show that Xprobe2 was effected in some way. Its primary guess 
was still Foudary IronWare, but with the other tests it performed it guessed 
the OS of the target to be Linux, with an 83% probability.  Interestingly 
enough, it was found that when the TTL value was set to 255, Xprobe2 
gave a different result, but Nmap was not effected.
The following results were found from Xprobe2.
linux:/# xprobe2 10.0.0.6
Xprobe2  v.0.3  Copyright  (c)  2002-2005  fyodor@o0o.nu,  ofir@sys-security.com, 
meder@o0o.nu
[+] Target is 10.0.0.6
[+] Loading modules.
[+] Following modules are loaded:
90
[x] [1] ping:icmp_ping  -  ICMP echo discovery module
[x] [2] ping:tcp_ping  -  TCP-based ping discovery module
[x] [3] ping:udp_ping  -  UDP-based ping discovery module
[x] [4] infogather:ttl_calc  -  TCP and UDP based TTL distance calculation
[x] [5] infogather:portscan  -  TCP and UDP PortScanner
[x] [6] fingerprint:icmp_echo  -  ICMP Echo request fingerprinting module
[x] [7] fingerprint:icmp_tstamp  -  ICMP Timestamp request fingerprinting module
[x]  [8]  fingerprint:icmp_amask   -   ICMP  Address  mask  request  fingerprinting 
module
[x]  [9]  fingerprint:icmp_port_unreach  -   ICMP port  unreachable  fingerprinting 
module
[x] [10] fingerprint:tcp_hshake  -  TCP Handshake fingerprinting module
[x] [11] fingerprint:tcp_rst  -  TCP RST fingerprinting module
[x] [12] fingerprint:smb  -  SMB fingerprinting module
[x] [13] fingerprint:snmp  -  SNMPv2c fingerprinting module
[+] 13 modules registered
[+] Initializing scan engine
[+] Running scan engine
[-] ping:tcp_ping module: no closed/open TCP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module test 
failed
[-] ping:udp_ping module: no closed/open UDP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module 
test failed
[-] No distance calculation. 10.0.0.6 appears to be dead or no ports known
[+] Host: 10.0.0.6 is up (Guess probability: 50%)
[+] Target: 10.0.0.6 is alive. Round-Trip Time: 0.00362 sec
[+] Selected safe Round-Trip Time value is: 0.00724 sec
[-] fingerprint:tcp_hshake Module execution aborted (no open TCP ports known)
[-] fingerprint:smb need either TCP port 139 or 445 to run
[-] fingerprint:snmp: need UDP port 161 open
[+] Primary guess:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.5" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Other guesses:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.2.1" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.2.5" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.2.20" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.2.24" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.16" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "NetBSD 2.0" (Guess probability: 91%)
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[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.2.0" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.2.4" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.2.19" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Cleaning up scan engine
[+] Modules deinitialized
[+] Execution completed. 
From the results Xprobe2's primary guess was that the target's OS was 
Linux. The other guesses were that the OS of the target is Linux and in one 
situation that it was NETBSD 2.0. This shows that the TTL value has some 
effect on Xprobe2, but it does not fully deceive it.
2.3.4 TCP Window Scaling
TCP  window  scaling  is  defined  according  to  RFC  1323.  The 
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_window_scaling file determines if the kernel follows 
these definitions or not.  The default  value is 1 which is to follow these 
definitions. The value in this file was set to 0.
Investigation was done on how this change affected Nmap and Xprobe2.
2.3.4.1 Nmap's Output
Nmap gave the following output:
linux:/# nmap -O -vv 146.2 30.94.108
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-09-04 04:06 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 04:06
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 0.01s. Mode: Async [#: 2, OK: 1, NX: 0, DR: 0, SF: 0,  
TR: 1, CN: 0]
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Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za (10.0.0.6) [1672 ports]  
at 04:06
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.0.0.6
The SYN Stealth Scan took 21.39s to scan 1672 total ports.
For OSScan assuming port 22 is open, 113 is closed, and neither are firewalled
Host pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za (10.0.0.6) appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za (10.0.0.6):
(The 1670 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT    STATE  SERVICE
22/tcp  open   ssh
113/tcp closed auth
MAC Address: 00:0F:FE:31:D9:CF (G-pro Computer)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 2.4.X|2.5.X|2.6.X











TCP Sequence Prediction: Class=random positive increments
                         Difficulty=2656454 (Good luck!)
IPID Sequence Generation: All zeros
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 23.785 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 3364 (135KB) | Rcvd: 18 (904B)
This alteration had some effect on Nmap. Nmap was still able to determine 
that  Linux  was  running  on  the  target  system,  but  with  fewer  kernel 




Xprobe2 gave the following results:
linux:/# xprobe2 10.0.0.6
Xprobe2  v.0.3  Copyright  (c)  2002-2005  fyodor@o0o.nu,  ofir@sys-security.com, 
meder@o0o.nu
[+] Target is 10.0.0.6
[+] Loading modules.
[+] Following modules are loaded:
[x] [1] ping:icmp_ping  -  ICMP echo discovery module
[x] [2] ping:tcp_ping  -  TCP-based ping discovery module
[x] [3] ping:udp_ping  -  UDP-based ping discovery module
[x] [4] infogather:ttl_calc  -  TCP and UDP based TTL distance calculation
[x] [5] infogather:portscan  -  TCP and UDP PortScanner
[x] [6] fingerprint:icmp_echo  -  ICMP Echo request fingerprinting module
[x] [7] fingerprint:icmp_tstamp  -  ICMP Timestamp request fingerprinting module
[x]  [8]  fingerprint:icmp_amask   -   ICMP  Address  mask  request  fingerprinting 
module
[x]  [9]  fingerprint:icmp_port_unreach  -   ICMP port  unreachable  fingerprinting 
module
[x] [10] fingerprint:tcp_hshake  -  TCP Handshake fingerprinting module
[x] [11] fingerprint:tcp_rst  -  TCP RST fingerprinting module
[x] [12] fingerprint:smb  -  SMB fingerprinting module
[x] [13] fingerprint:snmp  -  SNMPv2c fingerprinting module
[+] 13 modules registered
[+] Initializing scan engine
[+] Running scan engine
[-] ping:tcp_ping module: no closed/open TCP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module test 
failed
[-] ping:udp_ping module: no closed/open UDP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module 
test failed
[-] No distance calculation. 10.0.0.6 appears to be dead or no ports known
[+] Host: 10.0.0.6 is up (Guess probability: 50%)
[+] Target: 10.0.0.6 is alive. Round-Trip Time: 0.00027 sec
[+] Selected safe Round-Trip Time value is: 0.00054 sec
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[-] fingerprint:tcp_hshake Module execution aborted (no open TCP ports known)
[-] fingerprint:smb need either TCP port 139 or 445 to run
[-] fingerprint:snmp: need UDP port 161 open
[+] Primary guess:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 03.0.01eTc1" 
(Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Other guesses:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 07.5.05KT53" 
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare 07.6.01BT51" (Guess  
probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare 07.6.04aT51" (Guess 
probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare 07.7.01eT53" (Guess 
probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.25" (Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.24" (Guess probability: 83%)
[+]  Host  10.0.0.6 Running OS:  "HP JetDirect  ROM H.07.15 EEPROM H.08.20"  
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+]  Host  10.0.0.6  Running  OS:  "HP JetDirect  ROM G.08.21 EEPROM G.08.21" 
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+]  Host  10.0.0.6  Running  OS:  "HP JetDirect  ROM G.08.08 EEPROM G.08.04" 
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Cleaning up scan engine
[+] Modules deinitialized
[+] Execution completed.
From  the  output  it  is  seen  that  Xprobe2  thought  the  target's  OS  was 
between Foundary IronWare, Linux and HP JetDirect ROM. This has had 
the greatest effect on Xprobe2. It was then decided to have the TTL value 
altered to 128 while the tcp_window_scaling file is set to 0. 
linux:/# xprobe2 10.0.0.6
Xprobe2  v.0.3  Copyright  (c)  2002-2005  fyodor@o0o.nu,  ofir@sys-security.com, 
meder@o0o.nu
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[+] Target is 10.0.0.6
[+] Loading modules.
[+] Following modules are loaded:
[x] [1] ping:icmp_ping  -  ICMP echo discovery module
[x] [2] ping:tcp_ping  -  TCP-based ping discovery module
[x] [3] ping:udp_ping  -  UDP-based ping discovery module
[x] [4] infogather:ttl_calc  -  TCP and UDP based TTL distance calculation
[x] [5] infogather:portscan  -  TCP and UDP PortScanner
[x] [6] fingerprint:icmp_echo  -  ICMP Echo request fingerprinting module
[x] [7] fingerprint:icmp_tstamp  -  ICMP Timestamp request fingerprinting module
[x]  [8]  fingerprint:icmp_amask   -   ICMP  Address  mask  request  fingerprinting 
module
[x]  [9]  fingerprint:icmp_port_unreach  -   ICMP port  unreachable  fingerprinting 
module
[x] [10] fingerprint:tcp_hshake  -  TCP Handshake fingerprinting module
[x] [11] fingerprint:tcp_rst  -  TCP RST fingerprinting module
[x] [12] fingerprint:smb  -  SMB fingerprinting module
[x] [13] fingerprint:snmp  -  SNMPv2c fingerprinting module
[+] 13 modules registered
[+] Initializing scan engine
[+] Running scan engine
[-] ping:tcp_ping module: no closed/open TCP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module test 
failed
[-] ping:udp_ping module: no closed/open UDP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module 
test failed
[-] No distance calculation. 10.0.0.6 appears to be dead or no ports known
[+] Host: 10.0.0.6 is up (Guess probability: 50%)
[+] Target: 10.0.0.6 is alive. Round-Trip Time: 0.00029 sec
[+] Selected safe Round-Trip Time value is: 0.00059 sec
[-] fingerprint:tcp_hshake Module execution aborted (no open TCP ports known)
[-] fingerprint:smb need either TCP port 139 or 445 to run
[-] fingerprint:snmp: need UDP port 161 open
[+] Primary guess:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 03.0.01eTc1" 
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Other guesses:
[+]  Host  10.0.0.6  Running  OS:  "HP  JetDirect  ROM A.03.17  EEPROM A.04.09"  
(Guess probability: 83%)
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[+]  Host  10.0.0.6  Running  OS:  "HP  JetDirect  ROM A.05.03  EEPROM A.05.05"  
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+]  Host  10.0.0.6  Running  OS:  "HP  JetDirect  ROM F.08.01  EEPROM F.08.05" 
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+]  Host  10.0.0.6  Running  OS:  "HP  JetDirect  ROM F.08.08  EEPROM F.08.05" 
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+]  Host  10.0.0.6  Running  OS:  "HP  JetDirect  ROM F.08.08  EEPROM F.08.20" 
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+]  Host  10.0.0.6  Running  OS:  "HP JetDirect  ROM G.05.34 EEPROM G.05.35" 
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+]  Host  10.0.0.6  Running  OS:  "HP JetDirect  ROM G.06.00 EEPROM G.06.00" 
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+]  Host  10.0.0.6  Running  OS:  "HP JetDirect  ROM G.07.02 EEPROM G.07.17" 
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+]  Host  10.0.0.6  Running  OS:  "HP JetDirect  ROM G.07.02 EEPROM G.07.20" 
(Guess probability: 83%)
[+] Cleaning up scan engine
[+] Modules deinitialized
[+] Execution completed.
Here  Xprobe2  guessed  that  the  OS  of  the  target  was  either  Foundary 
IronWare or HP JetDirect ROM, with no mention of Linux while Nmap had 
no change in its output.
From the above tests it was established that if the Linux kernel was not 
following RFC 1323, then it was able to deceive Xprobe2 but not Nmap. 
Causing the kernel not to follow RFC 1323 can result in the communication 
not being optimised, so it is recommended that this value is kept as it is.
As Xprobe2 was deceived when Nmap was not, it can be said that Nmap is 
a more powerful tool than Xprobe2 when it comes to OS fingerprinting. It is 
more difficult to deceive Nmap than Xprobe2.
The reason why Nmap is a better OS fingerprinting tool is due to the fact 
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that  it  has  1681  different  fingerprints  of  tests  performed  on  OS  in  its 
database (nmap-os-fingerprint). This database is community maintained. It 
makes it very difficult to deceive Nmap, as Fyodor has 172 fingerprints for 
Linux with different alterations done to the TCP/IP stack. As Xprobe2 is 
deceived more easily, more focus is needed to investigate countermeasures 
for Nmap instead of Xprobe2.
2.3.5 Timestamps
All the settings that were changed were reset manually, but the TOS field 
was kept to 0x00. It was then decided to disable the TCP timestamps in the 
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_timestamps file. 
With this change in the TCP/IP stack, only Nmap's results were observed.
2.3.5.1 Nmap's Results
Nmap showed the following output:
linux:/# nmap -O -vv 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-09-05 15:45 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za [1 port] at 15:45
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za [1672 ports] at 15:45
Discovered open port 22/tcp on  pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za
SYN Stealth Scan Timing: About 32.08% done; ETC: 15:46 (0:01:03 remaining)
The SYN Stealth Scan took 67.31s to scan 1672 total ports.
For OSScan assuming port 22 is open, 113 is closed, and neither are firewalled
Host pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za:
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(The 1670 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT    STATE  SERVICE
22/tcp  open   ssh
113/tcp closed auth
MAC Address: 00:30:18:66:7A:0B (Jetway Information Co.)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 2.4.X|2.5.X
OS  details:  Linux  2.4.0  -  2.5.20  w/o  tcp_timestamps,  Linux  2.4.22  (x86) 











TCP Sequence Prediction: Class=random positive increments
                         Difficulty=3944583 (Good luck!)
IPID Sequence Generation: All zeros
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 82.684 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 5045 (203KB) | Rcvd: 27 (1254B)
From these results, it can be seen that Nmap still detects Linux, but thinks 
that a patch from grsecurity has been installed. This is an example of the 
vast number of fingerprints that Nmap has. It is observed that the window 
size has changed to 16D0. This suggests that the window size be changed 
to another value to deceive Nmap.
2.3.6 Other modifications of the TCP/IP stack
Modifying  the  Window  size  and  MSS  field  of  the  TCP/IP  stack  were 
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considered, but this would be ineffective, as Fyodor could just add these 
fingerprints to the Nmap database, unless the alterations mimic another 
OS. No matter what changes are made to the TCP/IP stack, it would have 
no effect on Nmap, except if one would want to make the TCP/IP stack the 
same as that of another OS. Modifying the TCP/IP stack to be the same as 
that  of  another  OS  creates  the  problem  that  the  system  could  have 
vulnerabilities or problems equivalent to that of  the other OS. An example 
is that if the IPID bit is not set to zero, and the DF bit is not set, then the 
system could be vulnerable to IPID scans.
It can therefore be concluded that the modifications of the TCP/IP stack 
will be useful to a degree, but it would not be the best countermeasure for 
OS fingerprinting.
It is suggested that the ICMP packets discussed in section  2.2.1  Unique 
Linux Characteristics are  blocked as this  will  prevent  OS fingerprinting 
through a firewall or a system. Tools that operate similarly to Xprobe2 and 
that are reliable on ICMP messages will not be able to fingerprint the OS of 
a target system successfully.
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Chapter 3: Countermeasures
Based on the results of tests to validate the preliminary countermeasures in 
Section 2.3, it was decided that another approach should be investigated 
and tested in addition – the active detection of OS fingerprinting tools. The 
main difference between this technique and the others is that if the target 
can  detect  an  OS  fingerprinting  attempt,  it  could  respond  in  a  more 
intelligent  way  while  maintaining  'normal'  networking  functionality  for 
other communication. 
Once this approach has been investigated, the final set of countermeasures 
is presented. This includes altering the TCP/IP stack, as well as the afore-
mentioned approach of detecting scans performed on a system. This final 
list of countermeasures make a system as secure as possible against OS 
fingerprinting.
3.1 OS Fingerprinting Tools Detection
According to McClure et. al. (McClure  et al. 2005), OS fingerprinting can 
only be prevented by modifying the unique TCP/IP stack fingerprint, but 
this will “affect the functionality of the operating system.” As this is not the 
desired option, the task is therefore to try and prevent a scan from Nmap, 
without modifying the TCP/IP stack.
3.1.1 Detecting Nmap
The database of P0f  (Zalewski 2004)  was investigated, and it was noted 
that Nmap itself has a fingerprint because of the unique way it sends the 
probing packets to a target system. It was then thought to use the same 
tool against the attacker that is used on the target. By this it is meant that 
one should monitor the packets being received and identify if they come 
from Nmap. Should the packets come from Nmap then the system should 
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either drop them or respond appropriately.
As Nmap is not able to determine the OS if it cannot find at least one open 
port, a system could react to all probes from Nmap as if the port is closed. 
Evgeniy  Polyakov  used  the  fact  that  Nmap has  a  unique  signature  and 
combined  this  with  IPtables,  to  design  the  OSF  (Operating  System 
Fingerprinting)  module.  OSF  can  be  downloaded  from 
http://tservice.net.ru/~s0mbre/archive/osf/.  The  OS  fingerprints  can  be 
downloaded  from  http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/etc/pf.os. 
Evgeniy Polyakov states that this is the best countermeasure for active OS 
fingerprinting  tools  such  as  Nmap.  This  won't  prevent  passive  OS 
fingerprinting  tools,  but  a  user  from  the  target  system  would  have  to 
connect to the attacker's machine first. The task is rather to block active 
OS fingerprinting tools.
The  procedure  to  get  OSF  working  is  really  involved  and  somewhat 
complicated for first time users. The Makefile is first edited and the path of 
the IPtables source files is specified. Once this is done, the source code is 
built that generates the libipt_osf.ko kernel module. The library file is then 
also compiled which generates the libipt_osf.so shared library. The kernel 
module  is  then  installed  and  the  pf.os  file  is  loaded  into  the 
/proc/sys/net/osf path. Once this has been done, it can be implemented with 
Iptables. The installation procedure is described in Appendix D.
Nmap has the fingerprints presented below. The order of the fingerprints 
are as  follows:
<Window Size>:<Initial TTL>:<Don't Fragment bit>:<Overall SYN packet 
size>: <Options in Order if used>: Nmap scan or OS 
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1024:64:0:40: Nmap SYN scan 1
2048:64:0:40: Nmap SYN scan 2
3072:64:0:40: Nmap SYN scan 3
4096:64:0:40: Nmap SYN scan 4
1024:64:0:60:W10,N,M265,T: Nmap OS detection probe 1
2048:64:0:60:W10,N,M265,T: Nmap OS detection probe 2
3072:64:0:60:W10,N,M265,T: Nmap OS detection probe 3
4096:64:0:60:W10,N,M265,T: Nmap OS detection probe 4
NAST, another OS fingerprinting tool has got the following fingerprint:
32767:64:0:40: NAST SYN scan
Due to the fact that Windows 2003 has a similar fingerprint to Nmap, it is 
suggested that the statement for the detecting of Nmap is placed at the 
end of the IPtables list, therefore allowing communication from Windows 
2003. The main options used are --log and --ttl.
The statement used for the blocking of Nmap packets is:
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iptables -I INPUT -p tcp -m osf --genre Nmap --log 2 --ttl 2 -j REJECT
The above statement rejects all TCP packets coming in from Nmap.
The firewall settings are shown in Appendix B.3, which were used once the 
OSF module was loaded. When Nmap was used to fingerprint the OS of the 
target system, the following output was observed:
linux:/# nmap -O -vv  10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-09-15 23:48 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za [1 port] at 23:48
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za [1672 ports] at 23:48
Increasing  send  delay  for  pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za from  0  to  5  due  to 
max_successful_tryno increase to 4
Increasing  send  delay  for  pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za from  5  to  10  due  to 
max_successful_tryno increase to 5
Increasing  send  delay  for  pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za from  10  to  20  due  to 
max_successful_tryno increase to 6
Increasing  send  delay  for  pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za from  20  to  40  due  to 
max_successful_tryno increase to 7
Increasing  send  delay  for  pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za from  40  to  80  due  to 
max_successful_tryno increase to 8
Increasing  send  delay  for  pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za from  80  to  160  due  to 
max_successful_tryno increase to 9
Increasing send delay for pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za from 160 to 320 due to 11 out of  
12 dropped probes since last increase.
SYN Stealth Scan Timing: About 2.82% done; ETC: 00:06 (0:17:22 remaining)
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Increasing send delay for pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za from 320 to 640 due to 11 out of  
11 dropped probes since last increase.
Increasing send delay for pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za from 640 to 1000 due to 11 out of  
19 dropped probes since last increase.
SYN Stealth Scan Timing: About 65.20% done; ETC: 00:15 (0:09:32 remaining)
The SYN Stealth Scan took 1668.84s to scan 1672 total ports.
Warning:  OS detection will be MUCH less reliable because we did not find at least 
1 open and 1 closed TCP port
Host pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za appears to be up ... good.
All 1672 scanned ports on pc-wvl-6.cs.ukzn.ac.za are: filtered
MAC Address: 00:30:18:66:7A:0B (Jetway Information Co.)








Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1690.096 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 1851 (76.1KB) | Rcvd: 1673 (114KB)
As it can be seen from the above output, Nmap was not able to determine 
the OS running on the target system as it was not able to find an open port. 
The file /var/log/messages was investigated, and the following was seen:
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Sep  15  11:48:13  linux-xegw  kernel:  ipt_osf:  Windows  [.NET::Windows  .NET 
Enterprise Server] : 10.0.0.5:57418 -> 10.0.0.6:716 hops=206
Sep 15 11:48:13 linux-xegw kernel: ipt_osf: NMAP [syn scan:2:NMAP syn scan (2)]  
: 10.0.0.5:57418 -> 10.0.0.6:716 hops=15
OSF first  thought  that  it  was  receiving  packets  from a  Windows  .NET 
Enterprise Server,  and then it  found that  it  was receiving packets  from 
Nmap.  With  the  '-j  REJECT'  option,  the  system  will  send  ICMP  error 
messages to the attacking system, if ICMP messages are not disabled. It is 
therefore better to have the line:
iptables -I INPUT -p tcp -m osf --genre Nmap --log 2 --ttl 2 -j DROP
Vmstat was executed when the OSF module was installed and removed, 
and the following was shown respectively:
procs -----------memory---------- ---swap-- -----io---- --system-- ----cpu----
 r  b   swpd   free   buff        cache   si   so    bi     bo   in       cs us sy id wa
 2  0      0 400708  47268 451152    0    0   122    31  279   320  8  1 88  3
procs -----------memory---------- ---swap-- -----io---- --system-- ----cpu----
 r  b   swpd   free   buff       cache   si   so    bi      bo   in       cs us sy id wa
 1  0      0 421140  43220 436220    0    0   148    34  278   351 10  1 86  3
From this it is seen that with the OSF module installed, less free memory 
was  available,  but  this  could  also  be  due  to  other  programs  that  are 
running. The time that was spent running kernel code (in system time) does 
not differ.
It  can  be  concluded  that  OSF  solves  the  problem  of  active  OS 
fingerprinting by Nmap as well as port scanning, and is therefore the best 
countermeasure  found.  As the target  system logs the IP address of  the 
system  performing  the  scans,  the  system  administrator  can  block  any 
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further packets received from that system.
3.1.2 Detecting Other OS Fingerprinting Tools
Investigation was done to see how other OS fingerprinting tools reacted to 
this modification on the target system. A set of OS fingerprinting tools was 
tested to determine performance against the target. 
Xprobe2 was tested with the OSF module enabled on the target system, 
and the following output was received:
linux:/# xprobe2 10.0.0.6
Xprobe2  v.0.3  Copyright  (c)  2002-2005  fyodor@o0o.nu,  ofir@sys-security.com, 
meder@o0o.nu
[+] Target is 10.0.0.6
[+] Loading modules.
[+] Following modules are loaded:
[x] [1] ping:icmp_ping  -  ICMP echo discovery module
[x] [2] ping:tcp_ping  -  TCP-based ping discovery module
[x] [3] ping:udp_ping  -  UDP-based ping discovery module
[x] [4] infogather:ttl_calc  -  TCP and UDP based TTL distance calculation
[x] [5] infogather:portscan  -  TCP and UDP PortScanner
[x] [6] fingerprint:icmp_echo  -  ICMP Echo request fingerprinting module
[x] [7] fingerprint:icmp_tstamp  -  ICMP Timestamp request fingerprinting module
[x]  [8]  fingerprint:icmp_amask   -   ICMP  Address  mask  request  fingerprinting 
module
[x]  [9]  fingerprint:icmp_port_unreach   -   ICMP port  unreachable  fingerprinting 
module
[x] [10] fingerprint:tcp_hshake  -  TCP Handshake fingerprinting module
[x] [11] fingerprint:tcp_rst  -  TCP RST fingerprinting module
[x] [12] fingerprint:smb  -  SMB fingerprinting module
[x] [13] fingerprint:snmp  -  SNMPv2c fingerprinting module
[+] 13 modules registered
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[+] Initializing scan engine
[+] Running scan engine
[-] ping:tcp_ping module: no closed/open TCP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module test 
failed
[-] ping:udp_ping module: no closed/open UDP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module 
test failed
[-] No distance calculation. 10.0.0.6 appears to be dead or no ports known
[+] Host: 10.0.0.6 is up (Guess probability: 50%)
[+] Target: 10.0.0.6 is alive. Round-Trip Time: 0.00024 sec
[+] Selected safe Round-Trip Time value is: 0.00049 sec
[-] icmp_port_unreach::build_DNS_reply(): gethostbyname() failed! Using static ip 
for www.securityfocus.com in UDP probe
[-] fingerprint:tcp_hshake Module execution aborted (no open TCP ports known)
[-] fingerprint:smb need either TCP port 139 or 445 to run
[-] fingerprint:snmp: need UDP port 161 open
[+] Primary guess:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 03.0.01eTc1" 
(Guess probability: 100%)
[+] Other guesses:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.21" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.22" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 07.5.04T53" 
(Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 07.5.05KT53" 
(Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare 07.6.01BT51" (Guess 
probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare 07.6.04aT51" (Guess 
probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare 07.7.01eT53" (Guess 
probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.23" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.24" (Guess probability: 91%)
From the above results it  is  seen that Xprobe2 was not effected by the 
installation of the OSF module on the target system. This was expected as 
Xprobe2 mainly gets its results from returned ICMP messages.
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QueSo was tested and it gave the following output:
linux:/# queso 10.0.0.6:22
10.0.0.6:22   * Standard Solaris 2.x, Linux 2.2.??? 2.4.???, MacOS
This output appeared even if OSF was not loaded. QueSo was not able to 
determine the exact OS running on the target system.
It  was  then  decided  that  SAINT  (Security  Administrator's  Integrated 
Network Tool) must be used to determine how secure the target is (found 
at  www.wwdsi.com/saint). The following output was seen when OSF was 
not loaded:
linux:/# saint 10.0.0.6
> bin/udp_scan: are we talking to a dead host or network?
>
10.0.0.6:
   Services:
      auth
      SSH
The OSF module was then loaded, and the following output was observed 
from SAINT:
linux:/# saint 10.0.0.6
> > bin/udp_scan: are we talking to a dead host or network?
As seen above, when OSF was loaded, SAINT was not able to detect even 
open ports from the target. 
Strobe  (http://linux.maruhn.com/sec/strobe.html)  was  also  tested.  Strobe 
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was not able to detect any open ports on the target system when a general 
port scanning test was performed. The target system's /var/log/messages 
file gave the following:
Jul 13 11:53:02 linux-g5ii sshd[12819]: Did not receive identification string from 
10.0.0.5
The following output was given the Strobe did a scan specifically on port 22 
(SSH).
linux:/# strobe 10.0.0.6:22
strobe 1.05 © 1995 – 1999 Julian Assange <proff@iq.org>
attempting port=22 host=10.0.0.6
10.0.0.6 22 ssh #SSH Remote Login Protocol
-> SSH-1.99-OpenSSH-4.2\n
The file /var/log/messages showed the following:
Jul 13 11:48:07 linux-g5ii sshd[11989]: Did not receive identification string from 
10.0.0.5
This proves that strobe is not as good as Nmap in doing general port scans 
and open ports are not known. Strobe was able to identify that port 22 was 
open and the service that was running on it.
McClure  et.  al. highly  recommends  a  Microsoft  Windows  based  port 
scanner  and  OS  fingerprinter,  NetworkActiv  Port  Scanner.  This  OS 
fingerprinting  tool  uses  the  same  principle  as  Xprobe2,  in  that  ICMP 
packets are sent to the target. With the target allowing ICMP messages, 
NetworkActiv  Port  Scanner  reported  the  following  OS  running  on  the 
target:
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Primary guess(es) with 100% Match:
 MacOSX
 Linux kernel 2.0.29
 Linux kernel 2.2.10
 Linux kernel 2.2.14-20000612
 Linux kernel 2.2.16C32III
 Linux kernel 2.2.19-3cl
 Linux kernel 2.2.20
 Linux kernel 2.4.2-2
 Linux kernel 2.4.7-10
 Linux kernel 2.4.9-6
 Linux kernel 2.4.18











Secondary guess(es) with 0% Match:
Unknown
All  ICMP messages were then rejected,  and NetworkActiv  Port  Scanner 
reported the following OS on the target:
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Primary guess(es) with 100% Match:
 MacOSX
 Linux kernel 2.0.29
 Linux kernel 2.2.10
 Linux kernel 2.2.14-20000612
 Linux kernel 2.2.16C32III
 Linux kernel 2.2.19-3cl
 Linux kernel 2.2.20
 Linux kernel 2.4.7-10
 Linux kernel 2.4.9-6
 Linux kernel 2.4.18







Secondary guess(es) with 66% Match:
 Windows ME - on Ethernet
 Windows 2000 Professional - Stock/SP1/SP2
 Windows 2000 Professional - Stock/SP1/SP2 on Ethernet
 Windows 2000 Professional - SP3 on Ethernet
 Windows 2000 Professional - SP3
 Windows XP Home Edition - on Ethernet
 Windows XP Professional - on Ethernet
 Windows XP Professional




 Netopia R5200-K v4.3.8
 Cisco 3620 WAN Router
 Cisco 6509/7200 Router
 Cisco GSR 12016
The result of the above output indicates that NetworkActiv Port Scanner is 
not as specific as Nmap, and was not able to pin-point the OS running on 
the target.
This again indicates that Nmap is a better OS fingerprinting tool. With the 
above tests performed, it shows that OSF block packets from Nmap but not 
other OS scanning tools. OSF also has the advantage that should a new 
type  of  OS  fingerprinting  tool  become  available,  its  fingerprint  can  be 
added to OSF's database.
The attacker might be able to realise that he is being countered, when he is 
trying to scan ports of a system with Nmap and the results show that the 
ports are all closed, especially, for example, when the attacker is able to 
connect to a web server at the same IP address with a web browser. This is 
a disadvantage of  the current  version of  the OSF module,  and this will 
result in a cycle of improvements that will be made by the developers of the 
OSF module and Nmap.
The only way Nmap can do an OS fingerprint of a system, is when the data 
length of the packet is changed. This is a weakness of the OSF module. To 
counteract this vulnerability, the OSF module should increase the TCP/IP 
analysis of more fields compared to the few fields currently observed.
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3.2 Final Countermeasures
Looking at the overview of all the preliminary countermeasures discussed, 
it is suggested that a stateful firewall be used to prevent OS fingerprinting. 
In Linux, this is possible by using IPtables. The different features of the 
required firewall configuration are discussed, as well as how to implement 
this configuration with the use of IPtables.
Different systems will have different firewall configurations of the settings 
needed, depending on what the system is to be used for. For example. a 
system  could  be  a  PC,  firewall,  router,  gateway,  back-end  server,  or  a 
combination of one or more of the above. The IPtables rules should then be 
captured in a parametrised shell script that is executed when the system 
boots and every time the system takes on a different role.
3.2.1 Type of Service Field
This is one of the major fields that will help prevent OS fingerprinting, not 
only  by  active,  but  also  by  passive  OS  fingerprinting  tools.  Nmap  and 
Xprobe2 first look at this field to determine if the OS is Linux or not. To 
modify the default value of 0xC0 to 0x00, as other operating systems have 
it, the following IPtables statement can be used:
iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -j TOS --set-tos 0x00
The above statement could have the '-A POSTROUTING' option as well, but 
is mainly used for routers. This statement also works for standalone PCs, 
but the following statement will also work:
iptables -t mangle -I OUTPUT -j TOS --set-tos 0x00
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This statement modifies the packet's TOS field as it is leaving the system. 
There  are  different  variants  of  the  above  statement  that  can  be  used 
depending on the use of the system.
3.2.2 OS Fingerprinting Tools Detection
This  is  achieved  with  the  use  of  the  OSF module.  The  installation  and 
loading of this module are performed with the steps shown in Appendix D.
The Nmap packets are blocked with the statement:
iptables -I INPUT -p tcp -m osf --genre Nmap --log 2  --ttl 2 -j DROP
In case a new OS fingerprinting tool becomes available and OSF is not able 
to drop the packets from this tool, then the new tools fingerprint can be 
included in the OSF database. To do this, edit the pf.os file and add the new 
fingerprint in the format:
<Window Size>:<Initial TTL>:<Don't Fragment bit>:<Overall SYN packet 
size>: <Options in Order if used>:       OS Fingerprinting Tool's Name
It is advised that the IPtables statement is placed at the end of the table, to 
allow communication with Microsoft Windows system, or any other OS that 
might have a similar fingerprint as that of the OS fingerprinting tool.
The system administrator  can  therefore  view the  /var/log/messages  file, 
and monitor any scans performed against the system. The IP addresses are 
also logged so all communication from these IP addresses can be blocked.
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3.2.3 Port 0 Disabled
All packets that are received that have a source port or a destination port 
of zero, must be dropped. This will prevent OS fingerprinting from tools 
that monitor how a system reacts when these ports are used.
The best option is to drop all TCP and UDP packets that are received with 
these conditions with the use of IPtables. The IPtables statements that are 
suggested are below:
iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 0 -j DROP
iptables -I INPUT -p udp --dport 0 -j DROP
iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --sport 0 -j DROP
iptables -I INPUT -p udp --sport 0 -j DROP
3.2.4 Block ICMP messages
As many OS fingerprinting tools use ICMP messages to bypass the firewall 
and to analyse a system, it is suggested that all replies and broadcasting 
ICMP messages that are going out, are to be blocked. ICMP messages that 
are coming in might be helpful to establish if an error has occurred on the 
network.
This can be done by placing these rules in the /etc/sysctrl.conf file.  The 
following  lines  must  be  inserted  into  this  file  which  will  then  set  the 





The  above  statements  drop  all  ICMP  echo,  broadcast  and  bogus  error 
messages.  They  assist  in  preventing  information  being  sent  in  ICMP 
messages that will allow OS fingerprinting.
Due to the fact that the necessary ICMP messages must be blocked, it is 
therefore  suggested that  the  '-j  DROP'  option  is  used  instead of  the  '-j 
REJECT' option, as these usually send ICMP error messages. This will also 
prevent Traceroutes of a system.
The blocking of needed ICMP messages can also be done with the use of 
IPtables.  The  following  line  will  drop  respectively  all  Echo  Reply, 
Timestamp Reply and Information Reply ICMP messages that  are going 
out.
iptables -p icmp --icmp-type 0 -I OUTPUT -j DROP
iptables -p icmp --icmp-type 14 -I OUTPUT -j DROP
iptables -p icmp --icmp-type 16 -I OUTPUT -j DROP
This  line  can  be  inserted  into  the  same  script  that  the  other  IPtables 
statements are in. This statement is probably the most effective, as it won't 
allow ICMP Reply messages out of the system, but it would allow Request 
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ICMP message to be sent.
3.2.5 Conclusion
The most effective ways to prevent OS fingerprinting on a Linux system 
have just been discussed. Recall that they are:
● Modification of the Type of Service field.
● The installation of the OSF module. 
● Disabling port 0 communication. 
● Blocking certain ICMP messages.
We will now conclude the findings from this project.
Recall that the first contact with a target system is through port scanning. 
This activity involves searching for open ports as well as determining the 
operating  system  running  on  the  target.  The  supplying  of  inaccurate 
information at this stage of the attack, could be useful to prevent the target 
system from being compromised any further.
IPv4 and OS fingerprinting were investigated and tests were performed to 
determine how secure the default installation of Suse 10.1 Linux operating 
system can be configured. It was found that the default installation of Suse 
10.1 Linux was not that secure in terms of port scanning and active OS 
fingerprinting.
IPv6 was investigated and it was found that this is a solution, as Nmap does 
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not support OS fingerprinting in IPv6 at this stage. Since IPv6 is not going 
to be used worldwide for some time, it was then decided to investigate OS 
fingerprinting in IPv4.
It was initially thought that modifying the TCP/IP stack will prevent active 
OS  fingerprinting  after  the  techniques  for  OS  fingerprinting  were 
investigated. A number of OS fingerprinting tools were investigated, such 
as Nmap, Xprobe2, Strobe, SAINT, QueSo and NetworkActive Port Scanner 
and it was concluded that the best tools available are Nmap and Xprobe2. 
Xprobe2 was relatively easy to deceive, and it relied on the ICMP messages 
it received from the target system. Nmap on the other hand was not that 
easy  to  deceive,  due  to  the  fact  that  it  has  such  a  large  database  of 
fingerprints,  and should an alteration be made to the TCP/IP stack, this 
modified fingerprint could simply be added to Nmap's database. The fields 
in the TCP/IP stack that was modified to try and deceive Nmap were the 
TOS field, the IP TTL value, the TCP Window Scaling and the timestamps.
Other techniques to deceive OS fingerprinting tools, especially Nmap, were 
investigated.  It  was then decided that  the technique that  is  being used 
against the target system is also to be used against the attacker. This is 
done by using the fingerprint of Nmap to identify any packets coming from 
it. All packets that are received from Nmap are simply dropped. This does 
not  only  prevent  OS fingerprinting  against  the  system but  against  port 
scanning as well.
This countermeasure is taken to be the best because when any new types 
of OS fingerprinting tools become available, it's fingerprint then can simply 
be added to the database.  There were some OS fingerprinting and port 
scanning tool such as QueSo that was able to perform a fingerprint of the 
target's OS.
In the cases that Nmap performed a scan against a target system, it was 
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noted that it could not pin-point the OS running on the target. The attacker 
should be able to identify that the target system has detected a scan that is 
being  performed against  it  and  is  blocking  the  scan.  It  should  also  be 
obvious to the attacker that a module such as OSF is present when it is 
known that a system has an open port, and a scan cannot be performed. It 
was found that with the installation of the OSF module, the CPU was not 
affected with processing overhead.
Nmap can, however, do an OS fingerprint of a system when the data length 
of  the  packet  is  changed.  This  is  a  weakness  of  the  OSF  module.  To 
counteract this vulnerability,  the OSF module should increase the TCP/IP 
analysis of more fields compared to the few fields currently observed.
An attacker will first try to perform a normal Nmap scan, and only when 
s/he identifies that a module such as OSF is blocking the packets, will the 
data length of the scanning packets be changed. The OSF module can be 
extended so that when it detects an Nmap scan, it replies with a fingerprint 
of either another OS or another network component, such as a printer or a 
router. It can be suggested that workstations return a printer's fingerprint, 
the  attacker  might  become suspicious  if  a  public  web server  returns  a 
fingerprint of a printer, and will be able to know that the attacks are being 
counteracted.  Therefore  it  is  suggested  that  servers  connected  to  the 
Internet  return  the  fingerprint  of  another  OS.  There  are  programs and 
modules that could do this, but this could be added to the OSF module.
Other countermeasures were also investigated, and it was found that the 
TOS field  in  the Linux TCP stack  should be  set  to  0x00 instead of  the 
default 0xC0, which is mostly unique to Linux. Other suggestions are that 
all packets with a source or destination port of zero be dropped, and that 
certain ICMP messages leaving the system be blocked. The firewall to the 
network should also monitor the packets coming in and going out of the 
network.  Packets  must  have  legitimate  fields  and  the  source  and 
destination addresses must be valid for the respective network.
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With the above suggested countermeasures,  it  can be concluded that  if 
they are implemented on a system, it will make a system considerably more 
secure against active OS fingerprinting using currently known techniques.
3.2.6 Future Work
Nmap could be improved by sending a fingerprint of another OS to the 
target system. The OSF module will then recognise that a system running a 
legitimate OS, is trying to connect to it and probably accept the connection 
if these settings are configured in the firewall rules.
A cycle will occur, in that the OSF module will be improved to counteract 
Nmap, while Nmap will be improved to bypass the OSF module.
An investigation of OS fingerprinting of IPv6 packets will also determine if 
it has a weakness, resulting that patches and other countermeasures will 
be needed to be developed.
The OSF module can be extended to have a database that is community 
maintained as Nmap's database is. For a better detection of fingerprinting 
tools, the OSF module needs to monitor more fields in the TCP/IP stack, so 
that fingerprinting tools will not be able to deceive it. An added feature to 
the OSF module would be that should it detect an OS fingerprinting tool 
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Appendices
Appendix A – Protocols
Appendix A.1 Format of the TCP Header
The TCP header contains information about the packet. It has the format 
shown in Figure A.1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 30 31 32




























Figure A.1 – TCP Header
The purpose of each field is as  follows:
Source Port (16 bits): This is the source port number.
Destination Port (16 bits): This is the destination port number.
Sequence Number (32 bits): The sequence number will  be present in 
this field, unless a SYN is present. Should a SYN be present, then this field 
will contain the initial sequence number (ISN). The first data packet that is 
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sent will have this field with a value of ISN+1.
Acknowledgement Number (32 bits): If the ACK control flag is set, this 
field will  contain the sequence number that the sender of the packet is 
expecting to receive next. This number is always sent once a connection is 
established.
Data Offset (4 bits): This value indicates how many 32 bits words the 
header contains. This gives an indication as to where the data begins.
Reserved (6-bits): This field is reserved for future use and should always 
be zero.
Control Bits (6 bits):
URG: Urgent Pointer field
ACK: Acknowledgement field
PSH: Push Function
RST: Reset the connection
SYN: Synchronise sequence numbers
FIN: No more data from sender
Window (16 bits): This field indicates the number of data octets, starting 
with the one indicated in the acknowledgement field, that the sender of the 
packet is willing to receive.
Checksum (16 bits): The checksum is the one's complement of the sum of 
all 16 bit words in the header and data of the TCP as well as of the 96 bit 
pseudo  header.  The  pseudo  header  consists  of  the  source  address,  the 





Zero Protocol TCP Length
Figure A.2 – The Pseudo Header
The  TCP  length  is  the  TCP  header  length  and  the  data  length,  but 
excluding the 12 octets of the pseudo header.
Urgent Pointer (16 bits): This field contains the value of a positive offset 
from the sequence number of this packet. The urgent field is only taken 
into account if the urgent control flag is set.
Options (variable length): The options are at the end of the header, and 
are a multiple of 8 bits. There are two formats that the option field could 
be:
i) a single octet of option-kind, or,
ii)  an  octet  of  option-kind  and  an  octet  of  option-length  and  the 
octets  of  the  actual  option-data.  Option-length  takes  into  account 
the entire option field.
Padding (variable length): The padding, which consists of zeroes, is used 
to ensure that both the TCP header ends and the data begins on a 32-bit 
boundary.
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Appendix A.2 Format of the IPv4 Header
The IPv4 header is shown in Figure A.3.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Version IHL Type of Service Total Length
Identification Flags Fragment Offset




Figure A.3 – Header of IPv4 packet
The purpose of each field is the following:
Version (4 bits): This indicates the version of IP being used, i.e., version 
4.
IHL (4 bits): Internet Header Length is the length of the header in words 
of 32 bits. The minimum value for this field is five.
Type of Service (8 bits): This sets the priority of the packet. The trade off 
is between low-delay, high-reliability, and high-throughput. These bits are 
set for the following conditions:
Bits 0 – 2 : This is used for the Precedence. The 




110 : Internetwork Control
101 : CRITIC / ECP





Bit 3 : 0 = Normal Delay; 1 = Low Delay
Bit 4 : 0 = Normal Throughput; 1 = High 
Throughput
Bit 5 : 0 = Normal Reliability; 1 = High Reliability
Bits 6 – 7 : Reserved for future use.
It must be noted that usually two of the three trade offs are set and that the 
Network control precedence  is only used within a network.
Total Length (16 bits): This is the length of the packet (including the 
header) measured in bytes. The field can have a value of 65 535 bytes, 
which  is  impractical  to  send across  a  network.  It  is  recommended that 
before a sender sends a packet that is larger than 576 bytes it must be 
determined that the receiver will be able to receive that size packet. The 
value of 576 bytes is chosen as to allow a packet with 512 bytes of data and 
64 bytes for the header to be sent.
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Identification (16 bits): This field differentiates between the fragmented 
packets that will be assembled at the receiver.
Flags (3 bits): The bits are the control flags for the following:
Bit 0: reserved and must always be zero.
Bit 1: (DF) 0 = May Fragment; 1 = Don't Fragment
Bit 2: (MF) 0 = Last Fragment; 1 = More Fragments
Fragment Offset (13 bits): This field indicates where in the packet the 
fragment belongs. It is measured in units of 8 bytes.
Time to Live (8 bits): The Time to Live field indicates the life span of the 
packet. Each time the packet goes through a gateway or a router, this field 
is decremented. The packet is discarded when this field becomes zero. An 
estimation for this field is one unit for every second that the packet should 
survive.
Protocol (8 bits):  This indicates the protocol used in the data portion of 
the packet. An example of a protocol value used in this field is determined 
by differentiating between the TCP and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).
Header Checksum (16 bits):  This is a checksum of the header only. As 
the fields in the header are changed this field is recomputed at every point 
on the network where the header is processed. The checksum is calculated 
the same way that the checksum of the TCP packet is calculated.
Source Address (32 bits): The address of the source of the packet.
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Destination Address (32 bits): The address where the packet must be 
delivered.
Options (variable length): This field has two cases that effects its format. 
The first is where a single byte of the option-type is used; the second where 
a byte with the option-type is used as well  as a byte that describes the 
option length (which contains the size of the option-type, option length and 
the option data) and also a byte for the actual option data.
The option-type byte has three fields. One bit indicates a copied flag, two 
bits indicate the option class and five bits indicate the option number. If the 
copied flag bit  is  set,  then this option is  copied to all  fragments where 
fragmentation has been implemented.
The option classes for the option type byte are:
0 = control
1 = reserved
2 = debugging and measurement
3 = reserved for future use
The following set of internet options have been defined; 
Class Number Length Description
0 0 - This indicates the end of the Option list. It is 
only one byte in size. It is used at the end of 
all  the options that could be used and when 
the end of the options do not coincide with the 
end of the internet header. It can be copied, 
introduced or deleted on fragmentation.
0 1 - This  indicates  no  operation  and  is  also  one 
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Class Number Length Description
byte in size. It is used between options as a 
boundary.  It  may  be  copied,  introduced  or 
deleted on fragmentation.
0 2 11 This indicates that the packets carry Security, 
Compartmentation,  User  Group  (TCC),  and 
Handling  Restriction  Codes  compatible  with 
the  Department  of  Defence  (DoD) 
requirements. This field is described later.  It 
must be copied on fragmentation and appears 
mostly once in a packet.
0 3 var This indicates Loose Source Routing, which is 
used  to  route  the  packets  depending  on 
information supplied by the source. It must be 
copied on fragmentation, and appears mostly 
once in a packet.
0 9 var This indicates strict source routing, which also 
routes  packets  depending  on  information 
supplied by the source. It must be copied on 
fragmentation, and appears mostly once in a 
packet.
0 7 var This indicates the record route which is used 
to  trace  the  route  a  packet  takes.  It  is  not 
copied on fragmentation and goes only in the 
first  fragment.  It  appears  mostly  once  in  a 
packet.
0 8 4 This is used to carry the stream identification 
in  networks  that  don't  support  the  stream 
concept.  It  must be copied on fragmentation 
and appears mostly once in a packet.
2 4 var This indicates the Internet Timestamp. It has a 
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Class Number Length Description
maximum length of 40 bits. The value of the 
timestamp  is  in  milliseconds  since  midnight 
UT. If the UT is not known for some reason, 
then  any  timestamp  can  be  used,  provided 
that the highest bit is set, to indicate that it is 
not  a  standard  value.  A  large  enough  data 
space  is  needed  to  be  able  to  hold  all  the 
timestamps.  If  the  timestamps  exceed  the 
available space, then no more are inserted and 
the  overflow  counter  is  incremented.  The 
timestamp is not copied on fragmentation and 
is only in the first fragment. It appears at most 
once only in a packet.
The  Security  field  is  16  bits  in  length,  and  specifies  sixteen  levels  of 









0011010111100010- Reserved for future use
1001101011110001- Reserved for future use
0100110101111000- Reserved for future use
0010010 10111101- Reserved for future use
0001001101011110- Reserved for future use
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1000100110101111- Reserved for future use
1100010011010110- Reserved for future use
1110001001101011- Reserved for future use
The Compartments field is also 16 bits in length and has an all zero value if 
the information that is sent is not compartmented. Other values for this 
field can be obtained from the Defence Intelligence Agency.
The Handling Restriction field is 16 bits in length of which the values are 
digraphs  (Defence  Intelligence  Agency  Manual  (DIAM)  65-19,  Standard 
Security Markings).
The Transmission Control Code (TCC) field is 24 bits in length and provides 
a way set apart from the traffic and identifies controlled communities of 
interest among subscribers. These values are trigraphs, and are available 
from HQ DCA Code 530.
Padding (variable length): Zeroes are padded in the header to make it 
end on a 32 bit boundary.
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Appendix  A.3  Internet  Control  Message  Protocol 
(ICMP)
Most of the information in this appendix has been taken from RFC 792 
(Postel 1981c), which deals with the Internet Control Message Protocol.
A.3.1 Time Exceeded Message
This message is sent when the TTL value equals zero or there is an error in 
the  fragmentation  process,  and  the  packet  has  not  arrived  at  it's 
destination. The format of the Time Exceeded Message ICMP is shown in 
Figure A.4.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Type Code Checksum
Unused
Internet Header + 64 bits of Original Datagram
Figure A.4 – Time Exceeded Message ICMP
The fields of the Time Exceeded Message ICMP has the following functions.
Type (8 bits): The value of this field is 11.
Code  (8  bits): The  code  has  the  following  values  for  the  respective 
message:
0 = Time to live exceeded in transit
1 = Fragment reassembly time exceeded
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Code 0 is usually received from a gateway, while code 1 is usually received 
from a host.
Checksum (16 bits): The value of this field is the one's complement of the 
one's complement sum of the ICMP message starting with the ICMP Type 
field. For the calculation of the checksum, the checksum field is taken to be 
zero.
Internet Header + 64 bits of Data Datagram: Should the higher level 
protocol use a port number, it is then taken as part of the first 64 data bits 
of the original packet's data.
A.3.2 Parameter Problem Message
The  Parameter  Problem  Message  ICMP  is  sent  a  datagram  is  being 
processed and a problem is detected and the packet is discarded.
The format of the Parameter Problem Message ICMP is shown in Figure 
A.5.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Type Code Checksum
Pointer Unused
Internet Header + 64 bits of Original Data Datagram
Figure A.5 – Parameter Problem Message ICMP
Type (8 bits): The value of this field is 12.
137
Code  (8  bits): The  code  has  the  following  values  for  the  respective 
message:
0 = Pointer indicates the error
Code 0 is usually received from either a host or a gateway.
Checksum (16 bits): The value of this field is the one's complement of the 
one's complement sum of the ICMP message starting with the ICMP Type 
field. For the calculation of the checksum, the checksum field is taken to be 
zero.
Pointer (8 bits): Should the code of the message be equal to 0, then this 
field points to the byte that caused the error.
Internet Header + 64 bits of Data Datagram: Should the higher level 
protocol use a port number, it is then taken as part of the first 64 data bits 
of the original packet's data.
A.3.3 Source Quench Message
A Source Quench Message is usually sent when a gateway's buffer is full 
and it cannot queue any more packets to be forwarded.
The format of the Source Quench Message ICMP is shown in Figure A.6.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Type Code Checksum
Unused
Internet Header + 64 bits of Original Data Datagram
Figure A.6 – Source Quench Message ICMP
The fields in the Source Quench Message ICMP has the following functions.
Type (8 bits): The value of this field is 4.
Code (8 bits): The value of this field is 0,which is usually received either 
from a host or a gateway.
Checksum (16 bits): The value of this field is the one's complement of the 
one's complement sum of the ICMP message starting with the ICMP Type 
field. For the calculation of the checksum, the checksum field is taken to be 
zero.
Pointer (8 bits): Should the code of the message be equal to 0, then this 
field points to the byte that caused the error.
Internet Header + 64 bits of Data Datagram: Should the higher level 
protocol use a port number, it is then taken as part of the first 64 data bits 
of the original packet's data.
A.3.4 Redirect Message
This message is sent to a host when a gateway finds that there is a shorter 
path via another gateway that the packets can be sent to it's destination.
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The format of the Redirect Message ICMP is shown in Figure A.7.
The fields of the Redirect Message ICMP have the following functions.
Type (8 bits): The value of this field is 5.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Type Code Checksum
Gateway Internet Address
Internet Header + 64 bits of Original Data Datagram
Figure A.7 – Redirect Message ICMP
Code  (8  bits): The  code  has  the  following  values  for  the  respective 
message:
0 = Redirect datagrams for the network
1 = Redirect datagrams for the host
2 = Redirect datagrams for the type of service and network
3 = redirect datagrams for the type of service and host
Code 0, 1, 2 and 3 is usually received from a gateway.
Checksum (16 bits): The value of this field is the one's complement of the 
one's complement sum of the ICMP message starting with the ICMP Type 
field. For the calculation of the checksum, the checksum field is taken to be 
zero.
Gateway Internet Address (32 bits): This field contains the address of 
the gateway that the original datagram's data should be sent to.
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Internet Header + 64 bits of Data Datagram: Should the higher level 
protocol use a port number, it is then taken as part of the first 64 data bits 
of the original packet's data.
A.3.5 Timestamp or Timestamp Reply Message
The Timestamp and Timestamp Reply messages can be used to determine 
the time it takes for the packets to travel in the network.
The format of the Timestamp and Timestamp Reply message ICMPs are 
shown in Figure A.8.






Figure A.8 – Timestamp and Timestamp Reply Message ICMP
The fields in the Timestamp and Timestamp Reply Message ICMP has the 
following functions.
Type (8 bits): The value of this field is 13 for the timestamp messages and 
14 for the timestamp reply messages.
Code (8 bits): The code field has a value of 0 for both type of messages 
and are usually sent by either a host or a gateway.
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Checksum (16 bits): The value of this field is the one's complement of the 
one's complement sum of the ICMP message starting with the ICMP Type 
field. For the calculation of the checksum, the checksum field is taken to be 
zero.
Identifier (16 bits): Should the code be equal to zero, then an identifier 
to aid the matching request and reply messages may be zero. Otherwise, 
the Identifier field of the Echo Reply message must be the same as that in 
the Echo Request message field.
Sequence Number (16 bits): Should the code be equal to zero, then an 
identifier to aid the matching request and reply messages may be zero. 
Otherwise, the Sequence Number field of the Echo Reply message must be 
the same as that in the Echo Request message field.
Originate Timestamp (32 bits): This is the time, in milliseconds (since 
midnight UT) that the sender sent the Echo message.
Receive Timestamp (32 bits): This  is  the time,  in  milliseconds (since 
midnight UT) the received received the Echo message.
Transmit Timestamp (32 bits): This is the time, in milliseconds (since 
midnight  UT)  the  receiver  of  the  Echo  message  sends  the  Echo  Reply 
message back to the sender of the Echo message.
Should the timestamps not be accurate as the UT is not available, then any 
time  can  be  used  for  the  timestamp,  but  the  high  order  bits  of  the 
timestamp must be set to indicate that it is a non-standard value.
A.3.6 Information Request and Information Reply Message
The  information  request  messages  are  sent  by  a  host  to  find  out  the 
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number of the network it is physically connected to. 
The Information Request and Information Reply Message ICMPs have the 
format shown in Figure A.8.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Type Code Checksum
Identifier Sequence Number
Figure A.8 – Information Request and Information Reply Message
The fields of the Information Request and Information Reply messages have 
the following functions.
Type (8 bits): The value of  this  field is 15 for  the information request 
messages and 16 for the information reply messages.
Code (8 bits): The code field has a value of 0 for both type of messages 
and are usually sent by either a host or a gateway.
Checksum (16 bits): The value of this field is the one's complement of the 
one's complement sum of the ICMP message starting with the ICMP Type 
field. For the calculation of the checksum, the checksum field is taken to be 
zero.
Identifier (16 bits): Should the code be equal to zero, then an identifier 
to aid the matching request and reply messages may be zero. Otherwise, 
the Identifier field of the Echo Reply message must be the same as that in 
the Echo Request message field.
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Sequence Number (16 bits): Should the code be equal to zero, then an 
identifier to aid the matching request and reply messages may be zero. 
Otherwise, the Sequence Number field of the Echo Reply message must be 
the same as that in the Echo Request message field.
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Appendix A.4 Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)
Most of the information in this appendix, has been taken from RFC 2460 
(Deering & Hinden 1998), which deals with the Internet protocol version 6.
A.4.1 Format of the IPv6 Header
The IPv6 Header is shown in Figure A.9. The purpose of each field is as the 
following.
Version (4 bits): This specifies the Internet Protocol version (i.e. 6)
Traffic  Class  (8  bits): This  field  is  used  to  identify  between different 
classes and priorities of the packet. If a node supports this field, then it 
should alter it as needed, otherwise ignore it. If the sender cannot support 
this field, then it should be set to zero.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Version Traffic Class Flow Label









Figure A.9 – IPv6 Header
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Flow Label (20 bits): This field is used by the source to label sequences of 
packets,  therefore  requesting that  special  handling  is  done by the IPv6 
routers. Hosts and routers that do not support this field are to be set to 
zero at the source, or leave unchanged when forwarding the packet and 
ignore it when receiving the packet.
Payload Length (16 bits): This specifies the length of the payload. This is 
an indication of the rest of the packet following the IPv6 header in terms of 
bytes.
Next  Header  (8  bits): This  field  identifies  the  type  of  header  to 
immediately follow the IPv6 header.
Hop Limit (8 bits):  This field's value decrements by one each time the 
packet  is  processed  by  a  node.  The  packet  is  dropped  when  a  node 
identifies that the value in this field is equal to zero.
Source Address (128 bits): The address of  the original  sender of  the 
packet.
Destination Address (128 bits):  The address that the packet is to be 
delivered to.
A.4.1.1 IPv6 Extension Headers
With IPv6 additional headers can be added that are placed between the 
IPv6 header and that of the header of the layer above it. The number of 
headers that are used and the type of header used are determined by the 
Next Header field's value. These extension headers are not processed by 
any of the nodes that the packet travels along with until the packet has 
reached the destination address. The destination node then processes the 
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extension headers in the order that they appear.
The only extension header that can be processed by the nodes along which 
the packet travels is the Hop-by-Hop Option header. This Extension header 
follows the IPv6 header. The next header field will have a value of zero if 
this extension header is being used.
Should  any  node  not  be  able  to  recognise  the  Next  Header  value,  the 
packet is immediately discarded, and an ICMP Parameter Problem message 
is sent back to the source of the packet with the ICMP Code value of 1. This 
means that a unrecognised Next Header type has been encountered. The 
ICMP pointer field will contain the offset of the unrecognised value.
The order of the headers are as follows:
● IPv6 header
● Hop-by-Hop Option header
● Destination  Options  header,  which  is  processed  by  the  first 






● Encapsulating Security Payload header
● Destination Options header, that contains options for only the final 
destination
● Upper-layer header
Most the headers appear once, except for the destination header which 
could  only  appear  at  most  twice.  Nodes  should  be  able  to  process  the 
extension  headers  in  any  order  if  needed,  but  the  Hop-by-Hop  header 
should be first. Even though the nodes are able to process the extension 
headers in any order, it is recommended that the source puts them in the 
above order. These headers will be dealt with in further detail.
Before these extension headers are further analysed, it must be noted that 
the  Hop-by-Hop Option  header  and the  Destination  Option header  both 
carry different type-length-value (TLV) encoded options. The format is 8 
bits for the identifier of the Option Type field, 8 bits for the Option Data 
Length (which is measured in bytes), and a variable length field for the 
Option Data.  The highest two order bits of the Option Type specifies  the 
action to be taken when an IPv6 node does not recognise the Option Type. 
These two bits have the following meanings:
00 :  skip  over  this  option and continue processing the  
header.
01 : discard the packet
10 : discard the packet and send an ICMP Parameter 
Problem with a code 2 message to the packet's source 
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address,  indicating the unrecognised Option Type.
11 : discard the packet and should the packet's 
destination address not have been a multicast address, 
send an ICMP Parameter Problem with a Code 2 
message to the packet's source address, indicating the 
unrecognised Option Type.
The third highest bit of the Option Type indicates if the Option Data of the 
option can change the en-route of the packet's final destination. Should the 
Authentication header be present and any option that might change the en-
route, then the entire Option Data field must be treated as all zero bytes 
when verifying the packet's authentication. This third bit has the respective 
meanings:
0 : Option Data does not change en-route
1 : Option Data may change en-route
A.4.1.1.1 Hop-by-Hop Option Header
This header is used to carry information that must be viewed by every node 
that has interaction with the packet. It is identified by a Next header value 
of  zero  in  the  IPv6 header.  The Hop-by-Hop option  header  has  got  the 
format as shown in Figure A.10.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Header Hdr. Ext. Len.
Options
Figure A.10 – Hop-by-Hop Option Header
The fields in the header have the following functions:
Next Header (8 bits): This field identifies the type of header that will 
follow the Hop-by-Hop option header.
Hdr. Ext. Len. (8 bits): This field indicates the length of the Hop-by-Hop 
option header, not including the first 8 bytes. The value of this field is in 
units of eight bytes.
Options  (variable  length): The  length  of  this  field  is  so  that  it  is  a 
multiple of 8 bytes. It contains at least one TLV-encoded option.
A.4.1.1.2 Routing Header
This header indicates the nodes that the packet must be forwarded by to its 
destination. This header is identified by having the Next Header field of the 
previous header as a value of 43. The routing header has the format as 
shown in Figure A.11.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Next Header Hdr. Ext. Len. Routing Type Segments Left
type-specific data
Figure A.11 – The Routing Header's format
The fields in the Routing Header has the following functions:
Next Header (8 bits): This identifies the the type of header that follows 
the Routing Header.
Hdr. Ext. Len. (8 bits): This indicates the length of the Routing Header in 
terms of 8 bytes in length. This excludes the first 8 bytes.
Routing Type (8 bits): This field indicates a particular Routing  header 
variant.
Segment Left (8 bits): This indicates the number of route segments or 
nodes that are remaining before the packet has reached it's destination.
type-specific data (variable length):  The format of this field depends on 
the Routing Type field. Its length is so that Routing Header is a multiple of 
8 bytes.
Certain conditions occur when a received packet is being processed,and it 
is found that there is an unrecognised Routing Type value. This depends on 
the Segments Left field.  If the Segments Left field is zero, the node must 
ignore  the  Routing  header  and  proceed  to  the  next  header,  which  is 
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identified in the Next Header field of the Routing Header. If the Segments 
Left value is not zero, the node must discard the packet and send an ICMP 
Parameter Problem, Code 0, message back to the sender.
The Type 0 Routing header has the format shown in Figure A.12.
The fields in the Type 0 Routing header have the following functions:
Next Header (8 bits): This field indicates the type of  header that will 
follow the Type 0 Routing header.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32


















Figure A.12 – Type 0 Routing Header
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Hdr. Ext. Len. (8 bits): This is the length of the Routing header in units of 
8 bytes. This does not include the first 8 bytes. For the Type 0 Routing 
header, the Header Extension Length field is equal to twice the number of 
addresses in the header.
Routing Type (8 bits): In this case this field is equal to zero.
Segment Left (8 bits): This indicates the number of route segments or 
nodes that  remain before the packet has reached it's destination.
Reserved (32 bits): This field is initialised to zero for transmission, but 
ignored on reception.
Address [1..n] (vectored 128 bits): These addresses are numbered from 
1 to n.
Multicasting addresses must not appear in a Type 0 Routing header or in 
the destination address field of the IPv6 header.  The Routing header is not 
processed by a node unless it has reached  the destination address. When it 
has reached that node, the destination address is swapped with the next 
address in the Routing header.
A.4.1.1.3 Fragment Header
The fragment header is used when a packet larger than what would fit in 
the path MTU to the destination, is  sent. This is  performed only by the 
source nodes, and not the routers as in IPv4. This header is identified by 
the Next header field of the previous header with a value of 44. It has the 
format shown in Figure A.13.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Next Header Reserved Fragment Offset Res M
Identification
Figure A.13 – Fragment Header
The fields in the Fragment header have the following functions:
Next Header (8 bits): This identifies the type of header that follows the 
Fragment Header.
Reserved  (8  bits): This  field  is  reserved.  it  is  initialised  to  zero  on 
transmission and ignored on reception.
Fragment Offset (13 bits): This field indicates the offset in units of 8 
bytes  that  the  data  follows  after  this  header,  from  the  start  of  the 
Fragmentable Part of the original packet.
Res (2 bits): These two bits are reserved. They are initialised to zero for 
transmission and ignored on reception.
M flag (1 bit): This is an indication if more fragments are being sent. If it 
is set to 1, then more fragments are being sent, and if it is set to 0, then 
this is the last fragment.
Identification (32 bits): This is the identification number that is given to 
the fragments that come from the same packet that was fragmented. This 
field is needed so that fragments from other packets are not mixed.
The fragmented packets consist of a header that has the IPv6 header as 
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well as any extended headers that the nodes will process. The fragmented 
part of the packet consists of the data as well as any headers that are only 
needed at the destination node.
A.4.1.1.4 Authentication Header
Most of the information in this appendix has been taken from RFC 2402 
(Kent & Atkinson 1998a), which deals with the Authentication Header.
The Authentication Header provides data origin authentication for the IPv6 
packet. The header is identified by the Next Header field of the previous 
header that has a value of 51. The Authentication Header has the format 
shown in Figure A.14.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Next Header Payload Len. Reserved






Figure A.14 – Authentication Header
The fields in the Authentication Header have the following functions:
Next Header (8 bits): This identifies the the type of header that follows 
the Authentication Header.
Payload Len. (8 bits): This field specifies the length of the Authentication 
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Header in units of 4 bytes, after which 2 of these bytes are subtracted.
Reserved (16 bits): This field is for future use, and should be set to zero.
Security Parameter Index (32 bits): The value of this field is determined 
by the combination of the destination address as well as the Authentication 
Header, which identifies the Security Association of the packet. The value 
from 0 to 255 is reserved by IANA. This field should never be zero.
Sequence Number (32 bits): The value of this field increments for each 
packet that is sent.
Authentication Data (variable length): This field contains the Integrity 
Check Value (ICV) of the packet. It must be a multiple of 32 bits in length 
for IPv4 and 64 bits for IPv6. The ICV is computed from the IP header, the 
Authentication Header, as well as from the upper layer protocols.
A.4.1.1.5 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Header
Most of the information in this appendix has been taken from RFC 2406 
(Kent & Atkinson 1998b), which deals with the ESP Header.
The ESP header is used for data origin authentication, confidentiality and 
connectionless integrity. This header is identified by the Next Header field 
of the previous header, with a value of 50. The ESP Header is shown in 
Figure A.15.
The fields in the ESP packet have the following functions.
Security Parameter Index (32 bits): The value of this field is determined 
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by the combination of the destination address as well as the Authentication 
Header, which identifies the Security Association of the packet. The value 
from 0 to 255 are reserved by IANA. This field should never be zero.
Sequence Number (32 bits): The value of this field increments for each 
packet that is sent.
Payload  Data  (variable  length):  This  field  contains  the  Initialisation 
Vector  (IV)  that  is  needed  when  the  encryption  algorithm  needs 
cryptographic synchronisation data.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32





Padding (0 – 255 bytes)




Figure A.15 – ESP Header
Padding (0 – 255 bytes): The padding is needed to fill the plain text so 
that  block sizes of  the cipher blocks can be multiples of  the block size 
needed.  It  is  also  used  so  that  the  cipher  text  can  end  on  a  4  bytes 
boundary,  as well  as to conceal  the actual  length of  the payload.  If  the 
encryption algorithm does not specify the padding contents, but padding is 








the following values increment from the previous one. This technique is not 
only simple, but it also helps against the “cut and paste” attacks as the 
receiver can check the padding when doing the decryption.
Pad Length (8 bits): This field indicates the padding size of the previous 
field.
Next Header (8 bits): This identifies the the type of header that follows 
the ESP Header.
Authentication Data (variable length): This field contains an ICV of the 
ESP header, excluding the Authentication Data field. Due to the fact that 
the encryption is not done on the Authentication Data field, the detection of 
bogus packets is possible before the receiver has performed any decryption 
of the packet, therefore preventing Denial of Services (DoS) attacks.
A.4.1.1.6 Destination Option Header
The Destination Option  header  carries  optional  information  that  is  only 
processed by the destination node. This header is identified by the Next 
Header field of the previous header that has a value of 60. The Destination 
Option header has the format shown in Figure A.16.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Next Header Hdr. Ext. Len.
Options
Figure A.16 – Destination Option Header
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The fields in the Destination Option header have the following functions:
Next Header (8 bits): This identifies the the type of header that follows 
the Destination Options Header.
Hdr.  Ext.  Len.  (8  bits): This  indicates  the  length  of  the  Destination 
Options Header in terms of  8 bytes in length.  This excludes the first  8 
bytes.
Options  (variable  length): The  length  of  this  field  is  so  that  the 
Destination Options header is a multiple of 8 bytes. It contains at least one 
TVL-encoded option.
A.4.1.1.7 Upper-Layer Header
These are  headers  that  are  used by  upper-layer  protocols.  The  pseudo-
header shown in Figure A.17 is used for TCP and UDP in IPv6.











Figure A.17 – Pseudo-header
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The fields in the Pseudo-header have the following functions.
Source Address (128 bits): This field has the source address of the TCP 
packet.
Destination Address (128 bits): This field has the destination address of 
the TCP packet.
Upper-Layer Packet Length (32 bits): This contains the length of the 
upper layer packet. Some upper-layer protocols  contain the length of the 
protocol in the packet.
Next Header (8 bits): This identifies the the type of header that follows 
the pseudo-header.
A.4.1.1.8 No Next Header
This is indicated by the previous header that has the Next Header field 
with a value of 59.
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Appendix A.5 Internet Control Message Protocol for 
IPv6 (ICMPv6)
Most of the information in this appendix, has been taken from RFC 2463 
(Contra & Deering 1998), which deals with the Internet Control Message 
Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6).
As ICMP is taken as part of the IP, it is therefore different for Ipv6. IPv6 
nodes used ICMPv6 messages when the packets are processed and errors 
are encountered. It has a Next Header value of 58.
There are error messages and informational messages. The error messages 
have message Types from 0 to 127 and the informational messages have 
message Types from 128 to 255.
ICMPv6 have the following processing rules:
● If the error message type is unknown, it must be passed to the upper 
layer.
● Should  the  information  message  type  be  unknown,  then  it  is 
discarded.
● The error message contains as much of the original packet without 
making the packet exceed the minimum MTU.
● Should the IP need to pass the error message to the upper layers, 
the protocol type is taken from the original package.
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● An ICMP message should not be sent when the following is received:
○ An ICMPv6 message
○ A packet that has an Ipv6 multicast destination address or is sent 
as a link-layer multicast.
○ A packet that is sent as a link-layer broadcast
○ Should a packet contain a source address that does not identify a 
single node.
● To preserve bandwidth, the ICMPv6 error messages must be sent at 
a limited rate. Ways to accomplish this is:
○ To limit the about of error messages in a given time period.
○ To limit the rate that error messages are sent by a fraction of the 
available bandwidth.
The six different ICMPv6 message formats are discussed below.
A.5.1 Destination Unreachable Error Message
The Destination Unreachable error message is sent when a packet cannot 
be sent to the destination address. This excludes the reason of congestion.
The format of  the Destination Unreachable  message is shown in Figure 
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A.18.




As much of the packet that will fit in the ICMP packet, without 
exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU.
.
Figure A.18 – Destination Unreachable Error Message
The  fields  in  the  Destination  Unreachable  message  have  the  following 
functions:
Type (8 bits): The value of this field is 1.
Code (8 bits): The value of this field has the following meanings:
0 = No route to destination
1 = Communication with Destination administratively prohibited
2 = This value is not yet assigned
3 = Address unreachable
4 = Port unreachable
Checksum (16  bits): This  field  is  the  one's  complement  of  the  one's 
complement sum of the entire ICMPv6 message starting with the Type field 
and ending with the pseudo header. For the calculation of the checksum, 
the checksum field is taken to be zero.
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Unused (32 bits): This field is unused for all code values and the sender 
should set the value of this field to zero. The receiver should ignore this 
field.
A.5.2 Packet Too Big Error Message
The Packet Too Big message is sent when the packet is larger than the 
MTU of a node's outgoing link.
The format of the Packet Too Big message is shown in Figure A.19.




As much of the packet that will fit in the ICMP packet, without 
exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU.
.
Figure A.19 – Packet Too Big Error Message
The fields in the Packet Too Big message have the following functions:
Type (8 bits): The value of this field is 2.
Code (8 bits): The value of this field is set to zero by the sender. This field 
is ignored by the receiver.
Checksum (16  bits): This  field  is  the  one's  complement  of  the  one's 
complement sum of the entire ICMPv6 message starting with the Type field 
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and ending with the pseudo header. For the calculation of the checksum, 
the checksum field is taken to be zero.
MTU (32 bits): The Maximum Transmission Unit of the next-hop link.
A.5.3 Time Exceed Error Message
This message is sent when the Hop Limit field has reached zero and the 
packet is discarded.
The format of the Time Exceed Error Message is shown in Figure A.20.




As much of the packet that will fit in the ICMP packet, without 
exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU.
.
Figure A.20 – Time Exceed Error Message
The functions of the Time Exceed message fields are explained below.
Type (8 bits): The value of this field is 3.
Code (8 bits): The value of this field has the following meanings.
0 = Hop limit exceeded in the transit
1 = Fragment reassembly time exceed
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Checksum (16  bits): This  field  is  the  one's  complement  of  the  one's 
complement sum of the entire ICMPv6 message starting with the Type field 
and ending with the pseudo header. For the calculation of the checksum, 
the checksum field is taken to be zero.
Unused (32 bits): This field is unused for all code values and the sender 
should set the value of this field to zero. The receiver should ignore this 
field.
A.5.4 Parameter Problem Error Message
This error is sent when an IPv6 node detects an error in the IPv6 header or 
extension headers, and the packet is discarded.
The format of the Parameter Problem error message is shown in Figure 
A.21.




As much of the packet that will fit in the ICMP packet, without 
exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU.
.
Figure A.21 – Parameter Problem Error Message
The fields  of  the Parameter  Problem Error  Message have the  following 
functions:
Type (8 bits): The value of this field is 4.
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Code (8 bits): The value of this field has the following meanings:
0 = An error in the header field detected
1 = Unrecognised Next Header type
2 = Unrecognised Ipv6 option
Checksum (16  bits): This  field  is  the  one's  complement  of  the  one's 
complement sum of the entire ICMPv6 message starting with the Type field 
and ending with the pseudo header. For the calculation of the checksum, 
the checksum field is taken to be zero.
Pointer (32 bits): This field identifies the offset in bytes in the packet in 
which the error was detected.
A.5.5  Echo  Request  and  Echo  Reply  Informational 
Message
The use of this message is for diagnostic purposes. If a node receives an 
Echo Request ICMPv6, then it should return an Echo Reply ICMPv6.
The format of the Echo Request and Echo Reply informational message is 
shown in Figure A.22.






Figure A.22 – Echo Request and Echo Reply Information Message
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Type (8 bits): The value of this field is 128 for an Echo Request message, 
and 129 for Echo Reply message.
Code (8 bits): The value of this field is set to zero by the sender.
Checksum (16  bits): This  field  is  the  one's  complement  of  the  one's 
complement sum of the entire ICMPv6 message starting with the Type field 
and ending with the pseudo header. For the calculation of the checksum, 
the checksum field is taken to be zero.
Identifier (16 bits): Should the code be equal to zero, then an identifier 
to aid the matching request and reply messages may be zero. Otherwise, 
the Identifier field of the Echo Reply message must be the same as that in 
the Echo Request message field.
Sequence Number (16 bits): Should the code be equal to zero, then an 
sequence number to aid the matching request and reply messages may be 
zero. Otherwise the Sequence Number of the Echo Reply message must be 
the same as that in the Echo Request message field.
Data (variable length): This field contains zero or more bytes of data. The 
Echo Reply message will have the same data as that in the Echo Request 
message.
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Appendix B – Scripts for firewalls
Appendix B.1 – Settings when firewall is disabled
#!/bin/sh
echo "***Initialising No Firewall Rules***";





/sbin/iptables --table nat --flush;
echo "   - Delete all chains";
/sbin/iptables --delete-chain;
/sbin/iptables --table nat --delete-chain;
echo "   - Prevent SYN flood attacks";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies;
echo "   - Prevent spoofing source address verification";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter;
echo "   - Disable response to broadcasts - we don't want to become a smurf 
amp";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts;
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echo "   - Enable ICMP redirect acceptance";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_redirects;
echo "   - Enable bad error message protection";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses;
echo "   - Log spoofed packets, source routed packets, redirect packets";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/log_martians;
echo "   - Enable ICMP echo reply";
echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_all;
echo "   - Modify TOS value of all outgoing packets to 0xc0";
/sbin/iptables -t mangle -I OUTPUT -j TOS --set-tos 0xc0;
echo "***Done***";
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Appendix B.2 – Settings when firewall is enabled
#!/bin/sh
echo "***Initialising Suse 10.1 Firewall Rules***";





/sbin/iptables --table nat --flush;
echo "   - Delete all chains";
/sbin/iptables --delete-chain;
/sbin/iptables --table nat --delete-chain;
echo "   - Set default chain policies";
/sbin/iptables --policy INPUT DROP;
/sbin/iptables --policy OUTPUT DROP;




echo "   - Prevent SYN flood attacks";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies;
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echo "   - Prevent spoofing source address verification";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter;
echo "   - Disable response to broadcasts - we don't want to become a smurf 
amp";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts;
echo "   - Enable ICMP redirect acceptance";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_redirects;
echo "   - Enable bad error message protection";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses;
echo "   - Log spoofed packets, source routed packets, redirect packets";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/log_martians;
echo "   - Enable ICMP echo reply";
echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_all;
echo "   - Modify TOS value of all outgoing packets to 0xc0";
/sbin/iptables -t mangle -I OUTPUT -j TOS --set-tos 0xc0;
echo "   - Adding Pre-defined Firewall Rules from Suse 10.1";
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT;
/sbin/iptables  -A  INPUT  -m  state  --state  RELATED,ESTABLISHED  -j 
ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -j input_ext; 
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/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -j input_ext; 
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -m limit --limit 3/min -j LOG --log-prefix "SFW2-IN-
ILL-TARGET " --log-tcp-options --log-ip-options; 
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -j DROP; 
/sbin/iptables -A FORWARD -m limit --limit 3/min -j LOG --log-prefix "SFW2-
FWD-ILL-ROUTING " --log-tcp-options --log-ip-options; 
/sbin/iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A OUTPUT -m state --state NEW,RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j 
ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A OUTPUT -m limit --limit 3/min -j LOG --log-prefix "SFW2-
OUT-ERROR " --log-tcp-options --log-ip-options; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -m pkttype --pkt-type broadcast -j DROP;
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p icmp -m icmp --icmp-type 4 -j ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p icmp -m icmp --icmp-type 8 -j ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p icmp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 
-m icmp --icmp-type 0 -j ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p icmp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 
-m icmp --icmp-type 3 -j ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p icmp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 
-m icmp --icmp-type 11 -j ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p icmp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 
-m icmp --icmp-type 12 -j ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p icmp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 
-m icmp --icmp-type 14 -j ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p icmp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 
-m icmp --icmp-type 18 -j ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p icmp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 
-m icmp --icmp-type 3/2 -j ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p icmp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 
-m icmp --icmp-type 5 -j ACCEPT; 
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/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p tcp -m limit --limit 3/min -m tcp --dport 22 --
tcp-flags FIN,SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j LOG --log-prefix "SFW2-INext-ACC-TCP " 
--log-tcp-options --log-ip-options; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p tcp -m tcp --dport 113 -m state --state NEW -j 
reject_func; 
/sbin/iptables  -A  input_ext  -m  limit  --limit  3/min  -m  pkttype  --pkt-type 
multicast -j LOG --log-prefix "SFW2-INext-DROP-DEFLT " --log-tcp-options --
log-ip-options; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -m pkttype --pkt-type multicast -j DROP; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p tcp -m limit --limit 3/min -m tcp --tcp-flags 
FIN,SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j  LOG --log-prefix "SFW2-INext-DROP-DEFLT " --
log-tcp-options --log-ip-options; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p icmp -m limit --limit 3/min -j LOG --log-prefix 
"SFW2-INext-DROP-DEFLT " --log-tcp-options --log-ip-options; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -p udp -m limit --limit 3/min -j LOG --log-prefix 
"SFW2-INext-DROP-DEFLT " --log-tcp-options --log-ip-options; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -m limit --limit 3/min -m state --state INVALID -j 
LOG --log-prefix "SFW2-INext-DROP-DEFLT-INV " --log-tcp-options --log-ip-
options; 
/sbin/iptables -A input_ext -j DROP; 
/sbin/iptables -A reject_func -p tcp -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset;
/sbin/iptables  -A  reject_func  -p  udp  -j  REJECT  --reject-with  icmp-port-
unreachable;




Appendix B.3 – Suggested Additions to firewalls
#!/bin/sh
echo "***Initialising Suggested Firewall Rules***";
echo "   - Prevent SYN flood attacks";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies;
echo "   - Prevent spoofing source address verification";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter;
echo "   - Disable response to broadcasts - we don't want to become a smurf 
amp";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts;
echo "   - Disable ICMP redirect acceptance";
echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_redirects;
echo "   - Enable bad error message protection";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses;
echo "   - Log spoofed packets, source routed packets, redirect packets";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/log_martians;
echo "   - Disable ICMP echo reply";
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_all;
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echo "   - Drop outgoing ICMP";
/sbin/iptables -p icmp --icmp-type any -I OUTPUT -j DROP;
echo "   - Modify TOS value of all outgoing packets to 0x00";
/sbin/iptables -t mangle -I OUTPUT -j TOS --set-tos 0x00;
echo "   - Drop all packets with port 0";
/sbin/iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 0 -j DROP;
/sbin/iptables -I INPUT -p udp --dport 0 -j DROP;
/sbin/iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --sport 0 -j DROP;
/sbin/iptables -I INPUT -p udp --sport 0 -j DROP;
echo "   - Initiating OSF module";
/sbin/insmod /home/user/osf/ipt_osf.ko;
/home/user/osf/load /home/user/osf/pf.os /proc/sys/net/ipv4/osf;
/sbin/iptables -I INPUT -p tcp -m osf --genre Nmap --log 2  --ttl 2 -j DROP;
echo "***Done***";
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Appendix C – Results of Tests and Experiments with 
IPv4
Appendix  C.1  –  Output  of  the  Port  Scanning 
techniques
SYN Scan
The  firewall  was  disabled  and  the  following  output  was  received  from 
Nmap:
linux-:/# nmap -sS -vv  10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:32 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:32
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 11:32
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.0.0.6
Discovered open port 111/tcp on 10.0.0.6
Discovered open port 631/tcp on 10.0.0.6
The SYN Stealth Scan took 1.81s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1669 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT    STATE SERVICE
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22/tcp  open  ssh
111/tcp open  rpcbind
631/tcp open  ipp
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 16.560 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 1680 (67.2KB) | Rcvd: 1673 (77KB)
The firewall was then enabled on system B and the following output was 
observed.
linux:/# nmap -sS -vv  10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:13 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:13
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 11:13
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.0.0.6
The SYN Stealth Scan took 21.39s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1670 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT    STATE  SERVICE
22/tcp  open   ssh
113/tcp closed auth
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
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Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 35.297 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 3347 (134KB) | Rcvd: 7 (318B)
UDP Scan
The following output was given by Nmap when the firewall was disabled:
linux:/# nmap -sU -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:33 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:33
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating UDP Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1482 ports] at 11:33
Increasing  send  delay  for  10.0.0.6  from  0  to  50  due  to  max_successful_tryno 
increase to 4
Increasing send delay for 10.0.0.6 from 50 to 100 due to max_successful_tryno 
increase to 5
Increasing send delay for 10.0.0.6 from 100 to 200 due to max_successful_tryno  
increase to 6
Increasing send delay for 10.0.0.6 from 200 to 400 due to 11 out of 11 dropped 
probes since last increase.
Increasing send delay for 10.0.0.6 from 400 to 800 due to 11 out of 11 dropped 
probes since last increase.
UDP Scan Timing: About 3.21% done; ETC: 11:49 (0:15:25 remaining)
UDP Scan Timing: About 67.46% done; ETC: 11:57 (0:07:42 remaining)
The UDP Scan took 1476.42s to scan 1482 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
179
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1478 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT     STATE         SERVICE
68/udp   open|filtered dhcpc
111/udp  open|filtered rpcbind
631/udp  open|filtered unknown
1024/udp open|filtered unknown
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1490.257 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 1934 (54.2KB) | Rcvd: 1483 (83KB)
The following output was observed when the firewall was enabled:
linux:/# nmap -sU -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:14 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:14
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating UDP Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1482 ports] at 11:15
The UDP Scan took 31.91s to scan 1482 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
All 1482 scanned ports on 10.0.0.6 are: open|filtered
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 45.705 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 2965 (83KB) | Rcvd: 1 (42B)
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TCP Scan
With the firewall disabled, the following output was given by Nmap:
linux:/# nmap -sT -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:59 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:59
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating Connect() Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 11:59
Discovered open port 631/tcp on 10.0.0.6
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.0.0.6
Discovered open port 111/tcp on 10.0.0.6
The Connect() Scan took 2.55s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1669 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT    STATE SERVICE
22/tcp  open  ssh
111/tcp open  rpcbind
631/tcp open  ipp
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 16.882 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 1 (42B) | Rcvd: 1 (42B)
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When the firewall was disabled, the following output was observed.
linux:/# nmap -sT -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:16 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:16
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating Connect() Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 11:16
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.0.0.6
The Connect() Scan took 30.89s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1670 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT    STATE  SERVICE
22/tcp  open   ssh
113/tcp closed auth
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 44.588 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 1 (42B) | Rcvd: 1 (42B)
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Null Scan
The following output was observed when the firewall was disabled:
linux:/# nmap -sN -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 12:00 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 12:00
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating NULL Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 12:00
The NULL Scan took 1.54s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1669 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT    STATE         SERVICE
22/tcp  open|filtered ssh
111/tcp open|filtered rpcbind
631/tcp open|filtered ipp
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 15.802 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 1676 (67KB) | Rcvd: 1670 (76.8KB)
The following was observed when the firewall was enabled:
linux:/# nmap -sN -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
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Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:17 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:17
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating NULL Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 11:18
The NULL Scan took 35.86s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
All 1672 scanned ports on 10.0.0.6 are: open|filtered
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 49.631 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 3345 (134KB) | Rcvd: 1 (42B)
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ACK Scan
With the firewall disabled the following output was given by Nmap:
linux:/# nmap -sA -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 12:01 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 12:01
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating ACK Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 12:01
The ACK Scan took 1.06s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
All 1672 scanned ports on 10.0.0.6 are: UNfiltered
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 15.474 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 1673 (66.9KB) | Rcvd: 1673 (77KB)
On the contrary, when the firewall was enabled, the following output was 
observed:
linux:/# nmap -sA -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:19 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:19
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
185
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating ACK Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 11:19
The ACK Scan took 22.04s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1670 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT    STATE      SERVICE
22/tcp  UNfiltered ssh
113/tcp UNfiltered auth
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 35.982 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 3347 (134KB) | Rcvd: 7 (318B)
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FIN Scan
With the firewall disabled the following output was given by Nmap:
linux:/# nmap -sF -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 12:02 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 12:02
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating FIN Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 12:03
The FIN Scan took 2.70s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1669 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT    STATE         SERVICE
22/tcp  open|filtered ssh
111/tcp open|filtered rpcbind
631/tcp open|filtered ipp
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 17.011 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 1685 (67.4KB) | Rcvd: 1670 (76.8KB)
With the firewall enabled the following output was observed:
linux:/# nmap -sF -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
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Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:20 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:20
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating FIN Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 11:20
The FIN Scan took 35.89s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
All 1672 scanned ports on 10.0.0.6 are: open|filtered
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 49.662 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 3345 (134KB) | Rcvd: 1 (42B)
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Window Scan
The following output was seen when the firewall was disabled:
linux:/# nmap -sW -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 12:03 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 12:03
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.04s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating Window Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 12:04
The Window Scan took 0.85s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
All 1672 scanned ports on 10.0.0.6 are: closed
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 15.698 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 1673 (66.9KB) | Rcvd: 1673 (77KB)
When the firewall was enabled the following output was observed:
linux:/# nmap -sW -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:22 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:22
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
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TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating Window Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 11:22
The Window Scan took 22.01s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1670 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT    STATE  SERVICE
22/tcp  closed ssh
113/tcp closed auth
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 35.861 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 3347 (134KB) | Rcvd: 7 (318B)
190
Xmas Scan
The  following  output  was  received  from  Nmap  when  the  firewall  was 
disabled:
linux:/# nmap -sX -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 12:04 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 12:04
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating XMAS Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 12:05
The XMAS Scan took 1.95s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1669 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT    STATE         SERVICE
22/tcp  open|filtered ssh
111/tcp open|filtered rpcbind
631/tcp open|filtered ipp
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 16.268 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 1676 (67KB) | Rcvd: 1670 (76.8KB)
The following output was observed when the firewall was enabled:
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linux:/# nmap -sX -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:23 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:23
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating XMAS Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 11:23
The XMAS Scan took 35.83s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
All 1672 scanned ports on 10.0.0.6 are: open|filtered
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 49.682 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 3345 (134KB) | Rcvd: 1 (42B)
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TCP Maimon Scan
With the firewall disabled, the following output was received from Nmap:
linux:/# nmap -sM -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 12:05 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 12:05
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating Maimon Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 12:06
The Maimon Scan took 0.86s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
All 1672 scanned ports on 10.0.0.6 are: closed
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 15.159 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 1673 (66.9KB) | Rcvd: 1673 (77KB)
With the firewall disabled the following output was observed:
linux:/# nmap -sM -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:25 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:25
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
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TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating Maimon Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 11:25
The Maimon Scan took 22.24s to scan 1672 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1671 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: open|filtered)
PORT   STATE  SERVICE
22/tcp closed ssh
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 36.180 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 3348 (134KB) | Rcvd: 6 (272B)
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Protocol Scan
The following output was received when the firewall was disabled:
linux:/# nmap -sO -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 12:06 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 12:06
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.01s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating IPProto Scan against 10.0.0.6 [256 ports] at 12:06
Increasing  send  delay  for  10.0.0.6  from  0  to  5  due  to  max_successful_tryno 
increase to 4
Increasing  send  delay  for  10.0.0.6  from  5  to  10  due  to  max_successful_tryno 
increase to 5
Increasing  send  delay  for  10.0.0.6  from 10 to  20 due  to  max_successful_tryno  
increase to 6
Increasing  send  delay  for  10.0.0.6  from 20 to  40 due  to  max_successful_tryno  
increase to 7
Increasing  send  delay  for  10.0.0.6  from 40 to  80 due  to  max_successful_tryno  
increase to 8
Increasing send delay for 10.0.0.6 from 80 to 160 due to max_successful_tryno 
increase to 9
Increasing send delay for 10.0.0.6 from 160 to 320 due to 11 out of 12 dropped 
probes since last increase.
IPProto Scan Timing: About 18.43% done; ETC: 12:09 (0:02:14 remaining)
Increasing send delay for 10.0.0.6 from 320 to 640 due to 11 out of 11 dropped 
probes since last increase.
Increasing send delay for 10.0.0.6 from 640 to 1000 due to 11 out of 19 dropped  
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probes since last increase.
Discovered open port 6/ip on 10.0.0.6
Discovered open port 1/ip on 10.0.0.6
IPProto Scan Timing: About 67.22% done; ETC: 12:11 (0:01:20 remaining)
The IPProto Scan took 274.10s to scan 256 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting protocols on 10.0.0.6:
(The 251 protocols scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PROTOCOL STATE         SERVICE
1        open          icmp
2        open|filtered igmp
6        open          tcp
17       filtered      udp
41       open|filtered ipv6
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 287.904 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 433 (8718B) | Rcvd: 257 (12.3KB)
With the firewall enabled the following output was observed:
linux:/# nmap -sO -vv --dns_servers 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:26 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:26
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating IPProto Scan against 10.0.0.6 [256 ports] at 11:26
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Discovered open port 1/ip on 10.0.0.6
The IPProto Scan took 6.45s to scan 256 total ports.
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting protocols on 10.0.0.6:
(The 255 protocols scanned but not shown below are in state: open|filtered)
PROTOCOL STATE SERVICE
1        open  icmp
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 20.264 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 512 (10.3KB) | Rcvd: 2 (88B)
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Appendix C.2 – OS Detection
Nmap's Results
Two  computer  systems  were  set  up  to  demonstrate  the  scans.  The 
computers used had the following configurations:
Computer A:
IP Address: 10.0.0.5
Operating System: SUSE 10.1 running Linux kernel version 2.6.16.13-4
Computer B: 
IP Address: 10.0.0.6
Operating System: SUSE 10.1 running Linux kernel version 2.6.16.13-4
Opened ports/services: port 22 / SSH
System A was used to do the scans on system B, with the scenario that 
system B has the firewall disabled and enabled respectively. The following 
results were observed in the scans.
Firstly, the firewall is disabled. Nmap's output was the following:
linux:/# nmap -O -vv  10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:07 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:07
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
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TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 11:07
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.0.0.6
Discovered open port 631/tcp on 10.0.0.6
Discovered open port 111/tcp on 10.0.0.6
The SYN Stealth Scan took 0.48s to scan 1672 total ports.
For OSScan assuming port 22 is open, 1 is closed, and neither are firewalled
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1669 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT    STATE SERVICE
22/tcp  open  ssh
111/tcp open  rpcbind
631/tcp open  ipp
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 2.4.X|2.5.X|2.6.X













TCP Sequence Prediction: Class=random positive increments
                         Difficulty=3719540 (Good luck!)
IPID Sequence Generation: All zeros
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 16.292 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 1688 (68.1KB) | Rcvd: 1686 (78KB)
 
The firewall on system B then was enabled and the following output was 
observed:
linux:/# nmap -O -vv  10.0.0.6
Starting Nmap 4.00 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-07-17 11:05 SAST
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1 port] at 11:05
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.01s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 13.00s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 0, DR: 1, SF: 0,  
TR: 3, CN: 0]
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against 10.0.0.6 [1672 ports] at 11:05
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.0.0.6
The SYN Stealth Scan took 21.38s to scan 1672 total ports.
For OSScan assuming port 22 is open, 113 is closed, and neither are firewalled
Host 10.0.0.6 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.6:
(The 1670 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT    STATE  SERVICE
22/tcp  open   ssh
113/tcp closed auth
MAC Address: 00:0E:A6:73:E7:25 (Asustek Computer)
Device type: general purpose|broadband router
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Running: Linux 2.4.X|2.5.X|2.6.X, D-Link embedded
OS details: Linux 2.4.0 - 2.5.20, Linux 2.4.18 - 2.4.20, Linux 2.4.26, Linux 2.4.27 or  











TCP Sequence Prediction: Class=random positive increments
                         Difficulty=3778067 (Good luck!)
IPID Sequence Generation: All zeros
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 37.469 seconds
               Raw packets sent: 3364 (135KB) | Rcvd: 18 (936B)
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Xprobe2's Results
Two  computer  systems  were  set  up  to  demonstrate  the  scans.  The 
computers used had the following configurations:
Computer A:
IP Address: 10.0.0.5
Operating System: SUSE 10.1 running Linux kernel version 2.6.16.13-4
Computer B: 
IP Address: 10.0.0.6
Operating System: SUSE 10.1 running Linux kernel version 2.6.16.13-4
Opened ports/services: port 22 / SSH
System A was used to do the scans on system B, with the scenario that 
system B has the firewall disabled and enabled respectively. The following 
results were observed in the scans.
Firstly, the firewall is disabled. Xprobe2's output was the following:
linux:/# xprobe2 10.0.0.6
Xprobe2  v.0.3  Copyright  (c)  2002-2005  fyodor@o0o.nu,  ofir@sys-security.com, 
meder@o0o.nu
[+] Target is 10.0.0.6
[+] Loading modules.
[+] Following modules are loaded:
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[x] [1] ping:icmp_ping  -  ICMP echo discovery module
[x] [2] ping:tcp_ping  -  TCP-based ping discovery module
[x] [3] ping:udp_ping  -  UDP-based ping discovery module
[x] [4] infogather:ttl_calc  -  TCP and UDP based TTL distance calculation
[x] [5] infogather:portscan  -  TCP and UDP PortScanner
[x] [6] fingerprint:icmp_echo  -  ICMP Echo request fingerprinting module
[x] [7] fingerprint:icmp_tstamp  -  ICMP Timestamp request fingerprinting module
[x]  [8]  fingerprint:icmp_amask   -   ICMP  Address  mask  request  fingerprinting 
module
[x]  [9]  fingerprint:icmp_port_unreach  -   ICMP port  unreachable  fingerprinting 
module
[x] [10] fingerprint:tcp_hshake  -  TCP Handshake fingerprinting module
[x] [11] fingerprint:tcp_rst  -  TCP RST fingerprinting module
[x] [12] fingerprint:smb  -  SMB fingerprinting module
[x] [13] fingerprint:snmp  -  SNMPv2c fingerprinting module
[+] 13 modules registered
[+] Initializing scan engine
[+] Running scan engine
[-] ping:tcp_ping module: no closed/open TCP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module test 
failed
[-] ping:udp_ping module: no closed/open UDP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module 
test failed
[-] No distance calculation. 10.0.0.6 appears to be dead or no ports known
[+] Host: 10.0.0.6 is up (Guess probability: 50%)
[+] Target: 10.0.0.6 is alive. Round-Trip Time: 0.00032 sec
[+] Selected safe Round-Trip Time value is: 0.00063 sec
[-] icmp_port_unreach::build_DNS_reply(): gethostbyname() failed! Using static ip 
for www.securityfocus.com in UDP probe
[-] fingerprint:tcp_hshake Module execution aborted (no open TCP ports known)
[-] fingerprint:smb need either TCP port 139 or 445 to run
[-] fingerprint:snmp: need UDP port 161 open
[+] Primary guess:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.22" (Guess probability: 100%)
[+] Other guesses:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.23" (Guess probability: 100%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.21" (Guess probability: 100%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.20" (Guess probability: 100%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.19" (Guess probability: 100%)
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[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.24" (Guess probability: 100%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.25" (Guess probability: 100%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.26" (Guess probability: 100%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.27" (Guess probability: 100%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.28" (Guess probability: 100%)
[+] Cleaning up scan engine
[+] Modules deinitialized
[+] Execution completed.
The firewall on system B then was enabled and the following output was 
observed:
linux:/# xprobe2 10.0.0.6
Xprobe2  v.0.3  Copyright  (c)  2002-2005  fyodor@o0o.nu,  ofir@sys-security.com, 
meder@o0o.nu
[+] Target is 10.0.0.6
[+] Loading modules.
[+] Following modules are loaded:
[x] [1] ping:icmp_ping  -  ICMP echo discovery module
[x] [2] ping:tcp_ping  -  TCP-based ping discovery module
[x] [3] ping:udp_ping  -  UDP-based ping discovery module
[x] [4] infogather:ttl_calc  -  TCP and UDP based TTL distance calculation
[x] [5] infogather:portscan  -  TCP and UDP PortScanner
[x] [6] fingerprint:icmp_echo  -  ICMP Echo request fingerprinting module
[x] [7] fingerprint:icmp_tstamp  -  ICMP Timestamp request fingerprinting module
[x]  [8]  fingerprint:icmp_amask   -   ICMP  Address  mask  request  fingerprinting 
module
[x]  [9]  fingerprint:icmp_port_unreach  -   ICMP port  unreachable  fingerprinting 
module
[x] [10] fingerprint:tcp_hshake  -  TCP Handshake fingerprinting module
[x] [11] fingerprint:tcp_rst  -  TCP RST fingerprinting module
[x] [12] fingerprint:smb  -  SMB fingerprinting module
[x] [13] fingerprint:snmp  -  SNMPv2c fingerprinting module
[+] 13 modules registered
[+] Initializing scan engine
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[+] Running scan engine
[-] ping:tcp_ping module: no closed/open TCP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module test 
failed
[-] ping:udp_ping module: no closed/open UDP ports known on 10.0.0.6. Module 
test failed
[-] No distance calculation. 10.0.0.6 appears to be dead or no ports known
[+] Host: 10.0.0.6 is up (Guess probability: 50%)
[+] Target: 10.0.0.6 is alive. Round-Trip Time: 0.00202 sec
[+] Selected safe Round-Trip Time value is: 0.00405 sec
[-] icmp_port_unreach::build_DNS_reply(): gethostbyname() failed! Using static ip 
for www.securityfocus.com in UDP probe
[-] fingerprint:tcp_hshake Module execution aborted (no open TCP ports known)
[-] fingerprint:smb need either TCP port 139 or 445 to run
[-] fingerprint:snmp: need UDP port 161 open
[+] Primary guess:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 03.0.01eTc1" 
(Guess probability: 100%)
[+] Other guesses:
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.21" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.22" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 07.5.04T53" 
(Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare Version 07.5.05KT53" 
(Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare 07.6.01BT51" (Guess  
probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare 07.6.04aT51" (Guess 
probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Foundry Networks IronWare 07.7.01eT53" (Guess 
probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.23" (Guess probability: 91%)
[+] Host 10.0.0.6 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.24" (Guess probability: 91%)




Appendix D – Installation of the OSF Module
The procedure of installing the OSF module is with the following steps:
1. Make sure that a C compiler is installed on the system. The one that 
is configured by the OSF module is GCC (GNU C Compiler).
2. Make sure that the Linux source files are on the system. These files 
are found in the /usr/src/linux/ directory, which needs to be available.
3. The IPtables source files are also needed, especially the iptables.h 
file  and  the  libiptc/  directory.  If  these  are  not  available  on  the 
system, they should be downloaded and saved in a directory on it. 
For description purposes it is going to be assumed that a copy of the 
source files are in the /home/user/iptables directory.
4. The  OSF  source  files  must  also  be  available  on  the  system.  For 
description purposes, it is going to be assumed that it is saved in the 
/home/user/osf direcory.
5. While in the /home/user/osf directory, edit the Makefile file with an 





● iptables_version=$(shell(/sbin/iptables -V | awk {'print $$2'} | cut 
-c 2-))
Becomes
iptables_version=$(shell(/usr/sbin/iptables -V | awk {'print $$2'} | 
cut -c 2-))
This is not a standard modification on all distributions. A search 
should be performed for the directory that  IPtables executable 
file is stored in. This can be done with the command:
which iptables
● Errors can occur when trying to compile the OSF module. This is 
due to the fact that OSF compilation uses different information 
for  version fields than that  of  IPtables.  It  has  been found that 
errors occurred in the compilation are solved with the following 
alterations.
○ KDIR:= /lib/modules/$(shell uname -r)/build
Becomes
KDIR:= /lib/modules/<kernel version>/build






Where <IPtables version> is determined by the statement:
iptables -V
An  example  of  the  IPtables  version  is  1.3.5,  so  <IPtables 
version> will equal to '1.3.5' without the quotes.
6. Save the Makefile file, and exit the editor.
7. Another adjustment that must be made if errors should occur, is to 
edit  the  libpit_osf.c  file,  and  modify  the  following  line  under  the 




The above changes must include the period, comma and quotation 
marks.
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8. Run the command 'make', which will generate the ipt_osf.ko kernel 
module.
9. Run the command 'make lib', which will build the libipt_osf.so shared 
library.
10.Copy the OSF shared library to the directory that IPtables is found 
in. This is done with the statement:
cp ./libipt_osf.so <directory of iptables>
Where <directory of iptables> is found with the command:
which iptables
11.Run 'make bin', which will build the application to load fingerprints 
and  obtain  information  relative  to  matched  packets.  These 
applications are:
● load – This allows one to load the fingerprints database into the 
module.
OSF has the 'load' tool with it allowing one to load and 
flushthe  fingerprint  table.  It  has  also  the  following  
options availablewith it:
● --log x
This logs the operating system even if it doesn't match the 
desired one. The variables for x are:
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○ 0 : log  all  matched  and  unknown 
entries.
○ 1 : log only the first matching entry.
○ 2 : log all matched entries.
● --ttl x
This option determines if the OS fingerprinting should rely 
on the TTL field of the IP stack. The options available are:
○ 0 : This  is  the  true  IP  and  TTL 
comparison, and mostly works  for 
LANs.
○ 1 : Checks if the TTL is less than the 
fingerprint one, which works  for 
global addresses.
○ 2 : Do  not  compare  TTL  at  all.  This 
option was developed when  Nmap's 
TTL value was variable. It allows one to 
detect Nmap, but can produce false results.
● --netlink




This option is only valid for Linux kernel version 2.6.14 and 
above,  and  will  also  log  all  events  through  netlink 
connector.
● osfd  –  This  is  the  netlink  deamon  that  listens  for  incoming 
matched packets over the netlink.
● ucon_osf -  This is the netlink deamon that listens for incoming 
matched packets using the connector module. This is not being 
used for the investigations done so far.
12.Run the following command to install the OSF module:
insmod ./ipt_osf.ko
13.Load the OSF database into the kernel with the following statement:
./load ./pf.os /proc/sys/net/ipv4/osf
The Nmap packets are blocked with the statement:
iptables -I INPUT -p tcp -m osf --genre Nmap --log 2  --ttl 2 -j DROP
Should the error:
iptables:match 'osf' v(I'm v1.3.5).
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occur,  then  it  means  that  the  OSF database  has  not  been  updated.  To 
correct this repeat step 10.
In case a new OS fingerprinting tool becomes available and OSF is not able 
to drop the packets from this tool, then the new tools fingerprint can be 
included in the OSF database. To do this, edit the pf.os file and add the new 
fingerprint in the format:
<Window Size>:<Initial TTL>:<Don't Fragment bit>:<Overall SYN packet 
size>: <Options in Order if used>: OS Fingerprinting Tool's Name
Repeat step 13 again after the new fingerprint has been added.
The  script  that  is  written  to  load  the  OSF module  and  to  block  Nmap 
packets has to have steps 12 and 13 in it, as well as the IPtables statement 
to drop the packets. It is advised that the IPtables statement is placed at 
the  end  of  the  table,  to  allow  communication  with  Microsoft  Windows 
system, or any other OS that might have a similar fingerprint as that of the 
OS fingerprinting tool.
212
Appendix E – Summary of Nmap Options
This summary is from the Nmap manual pages.
Syntax: nmap [Scan Type] [Option] <host of network #1, ... #N>
Target Specifications
-iL <targets_filename> Input from list
-iR <numhosts> Choose  random  targets.  numhosts  
specifies  the  number  of  IPs  that  
Nmap must generate.
--exclude <host1,host2...> Exclude these hosts from scanning
--excludefile <excludefile> Excludes hosts in the specified file  
from being scanned.  The hosts  are  
separated from a TAB delimiter, or by 
a new line.
Host Discovery
-sL List / DNS scan
-sP Ping scan
-P0 Don't ping
-PS [portlist] SYN ping. E.g. -PS22,23,25
-PA [portlist] TCP Acknowledge ping




-PM Address Mask ping
-PR ARP ping
-n No DNS resolution
-R Do DNS resolution
--system_dns Use system DNS resolver (Used for  
IPv6 scans)









-sX Xmas scan (FIN,PSH and URG flags  
are set)
-sM TCP Maimon scan
--scanflags Custom  TCP  scan  e.g.  
URGACKPSHRSTSYNFIN will set all  
the control flags
-sI <zombiehost:port> Idle scan
-sO Protocol scan
-b <ftp relay host> FTP bounce
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Port Specifications and Scan Order
-p <port_ranges> Port ranges to scan
-F Fast scan mode
-r don't randomise port scan
Services and Version Detection
-sV Version detection
--allports Don't exclude any ports from version 
detection
--version-intensity <intensity> Set  the  intensity  of  the  version  
detection
--version-light Enable light mode
--version-all Try every single port
--version-trace Trace version scan activity
Operating System (OS) Detection
-O Operating system detection
--osscan-limit Limit  OS  detection  to  promising  
targets
--osscan-guess Guess from the OS detection results
--fuzzy Same as –osscan-guess
Timing and Performance
--min-hostgroup <numhosts> Adjust minimum parallel group size
--max-hostgroup <numhosts> Adjust maximum parallel group size
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--min-parallelism <numhosts> Adjust minimum probe parallelization
--max-parallelism <numhosts> Adjust  maximum  probe  
parallelization
--min_rtt_timeout <time> Adjust minimum probe timeouts (time 
is in milliseconds)
--max_rtt_timeout <time> Adjust maximum probe timeouts
--initial_rtt_timeout <time> Adjust initial probe timeouts
--max-retries <numtries> specify  the  maximum  number  of  
portscan probe transmissions
--host-timeout <time> Give up on slow target hosts
--scan-delay <time> Delay between probes
--max_scan-delay <time> Adjust  maximum  delay  between  
probes
-T Paranoid Serial scan and 300 seconds wait
-T Sneaky Serial scan and 15 seconds wait
-T Polite Serial scan and 0.4 second wait
-T Normal Parallel scan
-T Aggressive Parallel  scan  and  300  seconds  
timeout and 1.25 seconds per probe
-T Insane Parallel scan and 75 seconds timeout 
and 0.3 seconds per probe
Firewall / IDS Evasion and Spoofing
-f Fragmentation
--mtu Using the specified MTU
-D <decoy1, decoy2, ME, ...> Cloak a scan with decoys
-S <IP_Address> Spoof source address
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-e <interface> Use specified interface
--source-port <portnumber> Spoof source port number
-g <portnumber> Same as –source-port <portnumber>
--data-length <number> Append random data to send packets
--ttl <value> Set IP time-to-live field
--randomize_hosts Randomize hosts
--spoof-mac <macinfo> Spoof MAC address (macinfo can be 
MAC address, prefix or vendor name)
--badsum Send  packet  with  bogus  TCP/UDP  
checksums
Output
-oN <filename> Normal output to filename
-oX <filename> XML output to filename
-oS <filename> Script Kiddie Output to filename
-oG <filename> Grepable output to filename
-oA <basename> Output  to  all  formats  with  the  
basename.*
-v Increase verbosity level
-d [level] increases or sets debugging level
--packet-trace Trace  packet  and  data  sent  and  
received
--iflist List interfaces and routers
--append-output Append  to  output  file  instead  of  
overwriting it
--resume <filename> Resume aborted scan
--stylesheet <path or URL> Set XSL stylesheet to transform XML 
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output
--webxml load stylesheet from insecure.org
--no_stylesheet omit XSL stylesheet declaration from 
XML
Miscellaneous Options
-6 Enable IPv6 scanning
-A Aggressive scan options
--datadir <directoryname> Specify  custom  Nmap  data  file  
location
--send_eth use raw ethernet sending
--send_ip send at raw IP level
--privileged Assume  that  the  user  is  fully  
privileged
--interactive Start in interactive mode
-V Print version number
--version Same as -V
-h Print help summary page
--help Same as -h
Runtime Interaction
The following keys can be used to change running conditions when Nmap 
is running:
v / V Increase / Decrease the verbosity
d / D Increase  /  Decrease  the debugging  
level
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p / P Turn on / off packet tracing
? Print  a  runtime  interaction  help  
screen
Anything else Prints out status messages
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Appendix F – Summary of Xprobe version 2's Options
This is a summary of Xprobe2's manual pages.
Syntax: xprobe2 [Option] <host>
Options
-v be verbose
-r display  route  to  target  (an  output
similar to traceroute, displaying the 
route that the packet travelled)
-p <proto:portnum:state> Specify  the  port  number,  protocol
and  state.  E.g.  tcp:23:open;
UDP:53:CLOSED  .  portnum  are  
values between 1 and 65535.
-c <configfile> Use  <configfile>  to  read  the
xprobe2.conf  configuration file  from
a different location.
-h Prints the help of Xprobe
-o <fname> Log everything to the file <fname>.
The default output is to stderr.
-t <time_sec> Set the round trip or initial  receive
time-out time. The default time is 10 
seconds.
-s <send_delay> Set the delay between the sending of 
the  packets.  <send_delay>  is  in
terms of milliseconds.
-d <debuglv> Specify the debugging level.
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-D <modnum> Disable  the  module  number
<modnum>
-M <modnum> Enable  the  module  number
<modnum>
-L Display the available modules
-m <numofmatches> Display  the  number  of  matches  to  
print.
-T <portspec> Enable TCP port scan for specified  
port(s). E.g. -T21-23,53,110
-U <portspec> Enable UDP port scan for specified  
port(s). E.g. -U23-23,53,110
-f Force  fixed  round-trip  time  (-t  
option)
-F Generate  signature.  Use  the  -o  
option to save to a file.
-X Generate XML output and save it to 
<logfile>  specified  with  the  -o  
option.
-B Forces TCP handshake module to be 
able to guess open TCP ports.
-A Analyse the packets gathered during 
the  port  scanning,  to  be  able  to  
detect  suspicious  traffic,  such  as  
transparent  proxies  and  firewalls.  
This option is to be used with the -T 
option.
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Appendix G – Information analysed by Ethereal
The following information is given by Ethereal on sending or receiving a 
TCP packet:
Frame number sent or received and it's size
Arrival Time: Date and Time
Time delta from previous packet
Time since reference or first frame
Frame Number
Packet Length
Protocols in frame (e.g. eth:ip:tcp)




Internet Protocol, Source Address and Destination Address
Version: (e.g. 4)
Header length: (e.g. 20)
Differentiated Services Field: (e.g. Default or ECN)
0000 00 . . = Differentiated Services Codepoint
. . . .  . . 0 . = ENC-Capable Transport (ECT)
. . . .  . . . 0 = ECN-CE
    Total Length : 40
    Identification
Flags
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* . . . = Reserved bit (* is either set or unset)
. * . . = Don't fragment (* is either set or unset)
. . * . = More fragments (* is either set or unset)
    Fragment offset
    Time to live
    Protocol: (e.g. TCP)
Header checksum: [Indication whether it is correct or not]
Source Address
Destination Address
Transmission Control Protocol, Source Port and Destination Port, Sequence 
Number, Acknowledgement Number and Length
Source port
Destination port
Sequence number (relative sequence number)
Header Length
Flags (* is either set or unset)
* . . .  . . . . = Congestion Window Reduced (CWR)
. * . .  . . . . = ECN-Echo
. . * .  . . . . = Urgent
. . . *  . . . . = Acknowledgement
. . . .  * . . . = Push
. . . .  . . * . = Syn
. . . .  . . . * = Fin
Window size
Checksum: [Indication whether it is correct or not]
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Appendix H – Abstracts of Ethereal with the Xprobe2 
tests performed under IPv4
With Firewall Disabled
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      4 6.400527    10.0.0.5              10.0.0.6              ICMP     Echo (ping) request
Frame 4 (98 bytes on wire, 98 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:32:20.166447000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.000017000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 6.400527000 seconds
    Frame Number: 4
    Packet Length: 98 bytes
    Capture Length: 98 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp:data
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
        0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 84
    Identification: 0x8191 (33169)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
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        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0xe50d [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 8 (Echo (ping) request)
    Code: 0 
    Checksum: 0x22b1 [correct]
    Identifier: 0x8191
    Sequence number: 0x0000
    Data (56 bytes)
0000  00 30 18 66 7a 0b 00 0e a6 73 e7 25 08 00 45 00   .0.fz....s.%..E.
0010  00 54 81 91 00 00 40 01 e5 0d 0a 00 00 05 0a 00   .T....@.........
0020  00 06 08 00 22 b1 81 91 00 00 44 dc a3 04 00 02   ....".....D.....
0030  80 d7 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15   ................
0040  16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25   .......... !"#$%
0050  26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35   &'()*+,-./012345
0060  36 37                                             67
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      5 6.400668    10.0.0.6              10.0.0.5              ICMP     Echo (ping) reply
Frame 5 (98 bytes on wire, 98 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:32:20.166588000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.000141000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 6.400668000 seconds
    Frame Number: 5
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    Packet Length: 98 bytes
    Capture Length: 98 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp:data
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
        0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 84
    Identification: 0x0de1 (3553)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0x58be [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 0 (Echo (ping) reply)
    Code: 0 
    Checksum: 0x2ab1 [correct]
    Identifier: 0x8191
    Sequence number: 0x0000 (Sequence number = 0)
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    Data (56 bytes)
0000  00 0e a6 73 e7 25 00 30 18 66 7a 0b 08 00 45 00   ...s.%.0.fz...E.
0010  00 54 0d e1 00 00 40 01 58 be 0a 00 00 06 0a 00   .T....@.X.......
0020  00 05 00 00 2a b1 81 91 00 00 44 dc a3 04 00 02   ....*.....D.....
0030  80 d7 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15   ................
0040  16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25   .......... !"#$%
0050  26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35   &'()*+,-./012345
0060  36 37                                             67
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      6 6.434253    10.0.0.5              10.0.0.6              ICMP     Echo (ping) request
Frame 6 (98 bytes on wire, 98 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:32:20.200173000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.033585000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 6.434253000 seconds
    Frame Number: 6
    Packet Length: 98 bytes
    Capture Length: 98 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp:data
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x06 (DSCP 0x01: Unknown DSCP; ECN: 0x02)
        0000 01.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Unknown (0x01)
        .... ..1. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 1
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 84
    Identification: 0x634d (25421)
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    Flags: 0x04 (Don't Fragment)
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .1.. = Don't fragment: Set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0xc34b [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 8 (Echo (ping) request)
    Code: 123 
    Checksum: 0x9567 [correct]
    Identifier: 0x8191
    Sequence number: 0x0001
    Data (56 bytes)
0000  00 30 18 66 7a 0b 00 0e a6 73 e7 25 08 00 45 06   .0.fz....s.%..E.
0010  00 54 63 4d 40 00 40 01 c3 4b 0a 00 00 05 0a 00   .TcM@.@..K......
0020  00 06 08 7b 95 67 81 91 00 01 44 dc a3 04 00 03   ...{.g....D.....
0030  0d a4 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15   ................
0040  16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25   .......... !"#$%
0050  26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35   &'()*+,-./012345
0060  36 37                                             67
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      7 6.434444    10.0.0.6              10.0.0.5              ICMP     Echo (ping) reply
Frame 7 (98 bytes on wire, 98 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:32:20.200364000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.000191000 seconds
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    Time since reference or first frame: 6.434444000 seconds
    Frame Number: 7
    Packet Length: 98 bytes
    Capture Length: 98 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp:data
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x06 (DSCP 0x01: Unknown DSCP; ECN: 0x02)
        0000 01.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Unknown (0x01)
        .... ..1. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 1
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 84
    Identification: 0x0de2 (3554)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0x58b7 [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 0 (Echo (ping) reply)
    Code: 123 
    Checksum: 0x9d67 [correct]
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    Identifier: 0x8191
    Sequence number: 0x0001 (Sequence number = 1 => incremented)
    Data (56 bytes)
0000  00 0e a6 73 e7 25 00 30 18 66 7a 0b 08 00 45 06   ...s.%.0.fz...E.
0010  00 54 0d e2 00 00 40 01 58 b7 0a 00 00 06 0a 00   .T....@.X.......
0020  00 05 00 7b 9d 67 81 91 00 01 44 dc a3 04 00 03   ...{.g....D.....
0030  0d a4 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15   ................
0040  16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25   .......... !"#$%
0050  26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35   &'()*+,-./012345
0060  36 37                                             67
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      8 6.460577    10.0.0.5              10.0.0.6              ICMP     Timestamp request
Frame 8 (54 bytes on wire, 54 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:32:20.226497000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.026133000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 6.460577000 seconds
    Frame Number: 8
    Packet Length: 54 bytes
    Capture Length: 54 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
        0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
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    Total Length: 40
    Identification: 0x8191 (33169)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0xe539 [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 13 (Timestamp request)
    Code: 0 
    Checksum: 0xfce2 [correct]
    Identifier: 0x8191
    Sequence number: 0x0000
    Originate timestamp: 226440
    Receive timestamp: 0
    Transmit timestamp: 0
0000  00 30 18 66 7a 0b 00 0e a6 73 e7 25 08 00 45 00   .0.fz....s.%..E.
0010  00 28 81 91 00 00 40 01 e5 39 0a 00 00 05 0a 00   .(....@..9......
0020  00 06 0d 00 fc e2 81 91 00 00 00 03 74 88 00 00   ............t...
0030  00 00 00 00 00 00                                 ......
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      9 6.460749    10.0.0.6              10.0.0.5              ICMP     Timestamp reply
Frame 9 (60 bytes on wire, 60 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:32:20.226669000
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    Time delta from previous packet: 0.000172000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 6.460749000 seconds
    Frame Number: 9
    Packet Length: 60 bytes
    Capture Length: 60 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
    Trailer: 000000000000
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
        0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 40
    Identification: 0x0de3 (3555)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0x58e8 [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 14 (Timestamp reply)
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    Code: 0 
    Checksum: 0x1464 [correct]
    Identifier: 0x8191
    Sequence number: 0x0000
    Originate timestamp: 226440
    Receive timestamp: 56651871
    Transmit timestamp: 56651871
0000  00 0e a6 73 e7 25 00 30 18 66 7a 0b 08 00 45 00   ...s.%.0.fz...E.
0010  00 28 0d e3 00 00 40 01 58 e8 0a 00 00 06 0a 00   .(....@.X.......
0020  00 05 0e 00 14 64 81 91 00 00 00 03 74 88 03 60   .....d......t..`
0030  70 5f 03 60 70 5f 00 00 00 00 00 00               p_.`p_......
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
     10 6.484581    10.0.0.5              10.0.0.6              ICMP     Address mask request
Frame 10 (46 bytes on wire, 46 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:32:20.250501000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.023832000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 6.484581000 seconds
    Frame Number: 10
    Packet Length: 46 bytes
    Capture Length: 46 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
        0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
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        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 32
    Identification: 0x8191 (33169)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0xe541 [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 17 (Address mask request)
    Code: 0 
    Checksum: 0x6d6e [correct]
    Identifier: 0x8191
    Sequence number: 0x0000
    Address mask: 0.0.0.0 (0x00000000)
0000  00 30 18 66 7a 0b 00 0e a6 73 e7 25 08 00 45 00   .0.fz....s.%..E.
0010  00 20 81 91 00 00 40 01 e5 41 0a 00 00 05 0a 00   . ....@..A......
0020  00 06 11 00 6d 6e 81 91 00 00 00 00 00 00         ....mn........
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
     12 7.270227    10.0.0.6              10.0.0.5              ICMP     Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
Frame 12 (146 bytes on wire, 146 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:32:21.036147000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.000187000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 7.270227000 seconds
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    Frame Number: 12
    Packet Length: 146 bytes
    Capture Length: 146 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp:ip:udp:dns
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0xc0 (DSCP 0x30: Class Selector 6; ECN: 0x00)
        1100 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Class Selector 6 (0x30)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 132
    Identification: 0x0de4 (3556)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0x57cb [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 3 (Destination unreachable)
    Code: 3 (Port unreachable)
    Checksum: 0x116d [correct]
    Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
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        Version: 4
        Header length: 20 bytes
        Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
            0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
            .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
            .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
        Total Length: 104
        Identification: 0x0001 (1)
        Flags: 0x04 (Don't Fragment)
            0... = Reserved bit: Not set
            .1.. = Don't fragment: Set
            ..0. = More fragments: Not set
        Fragment offset: 0
        Time to live: 255
        Protocol: UDP (0x11)
        Header checksum: 0x6779 [correct]
            Good: True
            Bad : False
        Source: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
        Destination: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: domain (53), Dst Port: 65534 (65534)
        Source port: domain (53)
        Destination port: 65534 (65534)
        Length: 84
        Checksum: 0x5010 [correct]
    Domain Name System (response)
        Transaction ID: 0xbcfd
        Flags: 0x81b0 (Standard query response, No error)
            1... .... .... .... = Response: Message is a response
            .000 0... .... .... = Opcode: Standard query (0)
            .... .0.. .... .... = Authoritative: Server is not an authority for domain
            .... ..0. .... .... = Truncated: Message is not truncated
            .... ...1 .... .... = Recursion desired: Do query recursively
            .... .... 1... .... = Recursion available: Server can do recursive queries
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            .... .... .0.. .... = Z: reserved (0)
            .... .... ..1. .... = Answer authenticated: Answer/authority portion was authenticated by the server
            .... .... .... 0000 = Reply code: No error (0)
        Questions: 1
        Answer RRs: 1
        Authority RRs: 0
        Additional RRs: 0
        Queries
            www.securityfocus.com: type A, class IN
                Name: www.securityfocus.com
                Type: A (Host address)
                Class: IN (0x0001)
        Answers
            www.securityfocus.com: type A, class IN, addr 205.206.231.10
                Name: www.securityfocus.com
                Type: A (Host address)
                Class: IN (0x0001)
                Time to live: -12 hours, -56 minutes, -12 seconds
                Data length: 1024
                Addr: 205.206.231.10
0000  00 0e a6 73 e7 25 00 30 18 66 7a 0b 08 00 45 c0   ...s.%.0.fz...E.
0010  00 84 0d e4 00 00 40 01 57 cb 0a 00 00 06 0a 00   ......@.W.......
0020  00 05 03 03 11 6d 00 00 00 00 45 00 00 68 00 01   .....m....E..h..
0030  40 00 ff 11 67 79 0a 00 00 05 0a 00 00 06 00 35   @...gy.........5
0040  ff fe 00 54 50 10 bc fd 81 b0 00 01 00 01 00 00   ...TP...........
0050  00 00 03 77 77 77 0d 73 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 66   ...www.securityf
0060  6f 63 75 73 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 03 77 77   ocus.com......ww
0070  77 0d 73 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 66 6f 63 75 73 03   w.securityfocus.
0080  63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 ff ff 4a 14 04 00 cd ce   com.......J.....
0090  e7 0a                                             ..
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
     13 7.301929    10.0.0.5              10.0.0.6              TCP      17026 > 65535 [SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0  
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Win=6840 Len=0
Frame 13 (54 bytes on wire, 54 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:32:21.067849000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.031702000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 7.301929000 seconds
    Frame Number: 13
    Packet Length: 54 bytes
    Capture Length: 54 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:tcp
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x10 (DSCP 0x04: Unknown DSCP; ECN: 0x00)
        0001 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Unknown (0x04)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 40
    Identification: 0xe116 (57622)
    Flags: 0x04 (Don't Fragment)
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .1.. = Don't fragment: Set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: TCP (0x06)
    Header checksum: 0x459f [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
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    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 17026 (17026), Dst Port: 65535 (65535), Seq: 0, Ack: 0, Len: 0
    Source port: 17026 (17026)
    Destination port: 65535 (65535)
    Sequence number: 0    (relative sequence number)
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Flags: 0x0002 (SYN)
        0... .... = Congestion Window Reduced (CWR): Not set
        .0.. .... = ECN-Echo: Not set
        ..0. .... = Urgent: Not set
        ...0 .... = Acknowledgment: Not set
        .... 0... = Push: Not set
        .... .0.. = Reset: Not set
        .... ..1. = Syn: Set
        .... ...0 = Fin: Not set
    Window size: 6840 (Window size = 6840)
    Checksum: 0x2071 [correct]
0000  00 30 18 66 7a 0b 00 0e a6 73 e7 25 08 00 45 10   .0.fz....s.%..E.
0010  00 28 e1 16 40 00 40 06 45 9f 0a 00 00 05 0a 00   .(..@.@.E.......
0020  00 06 42 82 ff ff 40 3e dd ee 00 00 00 00 50 02   ..B...@>......P.
0030  1a b8 20 71 00 00                                 .. q..
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
     14 7.302124    10.0.0.6              10.0.0.5              TCP      65535 > 17026 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=0 
Win=0 Len=0
Frame 14 (60 bytes on wire, 60 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:32:21.068044000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.000195000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 7.302124000 seconds
    Frame Number: 14
    Packet Length: 60 bytes
    Capture Length: 60 bytes
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    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:tcp
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
    Trailer: 000000000000
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x10 (DSCP 0x04: Unknown DSCP; ECN: 0x00)
        0001 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Unknown (0x04)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 40
    Identification: 0x0000 (0)
    Flags: 0x04 (Don't Fragment)
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .1.. = Don't fragment: Set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: TCP (0x06)
    Header checksum: 0x26b6 [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 65535 (65535), Dst Port: 17026 (17026), Seq: 0, Ack: 0, Len: 0
    Source port: 65535 (65535)
    Destination port: 17026 (17026)
    Sequence number: 0    (relative sequence number)
    Acknowledgement number: 0    (relative ack number)
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Flags: 0x0014 (RST, ACK)
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        0... .... = Congestion Window Reduced (CWR): Not set
        .0.. .... = ECN-Echo: Not set
        ..0. .... = Urgent: Not set
        ...1 .... = Acknowledgment: Set
        .... 0... = Push: Not set
        .... .1.. = Reset: Set
        .... ..0. = Syn: Not set
        .... ...0 = Fin: Not set
    Window size: 0 (Window size = 0)
    Checksum: 0x3b16 [correct]
    SEQ/ACK analysis
        This is an ACK to the segment in frame: 13
        The RTT to ACK the segment was: 0.000195000 seconds
0000  00 0e a6 73 e7 25 00 30 18 66 7a 0b 08 00 45 10   ...s.%.0.fz...E.
0010  00 28 00 00 40 00 40 06 26 b6 0a 00 00 06 0a 00   .(..@.@.&.......
0020  00 05 ff ff 42 82 00 00 00 00 40 3e dd ef 50 14   ....B.....@>..P.
0030  00 00 3b 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00               ..;.........
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
     15 7.302204    10.0.0.5              10.0.0.6              TCP      24472 > 65535 [SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0  
Win=6840 Len=0
Frame 15 (54 bytes on wire, 54 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:32:21.068124000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.000080000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 7.302204000 seconds
    Frame Number: 15
    Packet Length: 54 bytes
    Capture Length: 54 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:tcp
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
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    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x10 (DSCP 0x04: Unknown DSCP; ECN: 0x00)
        0001 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Unknown (0x04)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 40
    Identification: 0xd837 (55351)
    Flags: 0x04 (Don't Fragment)
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .1.. = Don't fragment: Set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: TCP (0x06)
    Header checksum: 0x4e7e [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 24472 (24472), Dst Port: 65535 (65535), Seq: 0, Ack: 0, Len: 0
    Source port: 24472 (24472)
    Destination port: 65535 (65535)
    Sequence number: 0    (relative sequence number)
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Flags: 0x0002 (SYN)
        0... .... = Congestion Window Reduced (CWR): Not set
        .0.. .... = ECN-Echo: Not set
        ..0. .... = Urgent: Not set
        ...0 .... = Acknowledgment: Not set
        .... 0... = Push: Not set
        .... .0.. = Reset: Not set
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        .... ..1. = Syn: Set
        .... ...0 = Fin: Not set
    Window size: 6840 (Window size = 6840)
    Checksum: 0xb6c8 [correct]
0000  00 30 18 66 7a 0b 00 0e a6 73 e7 25 08 00 45 10   .0.fz....s.%..E.
0010  00 28 d8 37 40 00 40 06 4e 7e 0a 00 00 05 0a 00   .(.7@.@.N~......
0020  00 06 5f 98 ff ff 16 c6 53 f9 00 00 00 00 50 02   .._.....S.....P.
0030  1a b8 b6 c8 00 00                                 ......
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
     16 7.302302    10.0.0.6              10.0.0.5              TCP      65535 > 24472 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=0 
Win=0 Len=0
Frame 16 (60 bytes on wire, 60 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:32:21.068222000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.000098000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 7.302302000 seconds
    Frame Number: 16
    Packet Length: 60 bytes
    Capture Length: 60 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:tcp
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
    Trailer: 000000000000
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x10 (DSCP 0x04: Unknown DSCP; ECN: 0x00)
        0001 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Unknown (0x04)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
243
    Total Length: 40
    Identification: 0x0000 (0)
    Flags: 0x04 (Don't Fragment)
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .1.. = Don't fragment: Set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: TCP (0x06)
    Header checksum: 0x26b6 [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 65535 (65535), Dst Port: 24472 (24472), Seq: 0, Ack: 0, Len: 0
    Source port: 65535 (65535)
    Destination port: 24472 (24472)
    Sequence number: 0    (relative sequence number)
    Acknowledgement number: 0    (relative ack number)
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Flags: 0x0014 (RST, ACK)
        0... .... = Congestion Window Reduced (CWR): Not set
        .0.. .... = ECN-Echo: Not set
        ..0. .... = Urgent: Not set
        ...1 .... = Acknowledgment: Set
        .... 0... = Push: Not set
        .... .1.. = Reset: Set
        .... ..0. = Syn: Not set
        .... ...0 = Fin: Not set
    Window size: 0 (Window size = 0)
    Checksum: 0xd16d [correct]
    SEQ/ACK analysis
        This is an ACK to the segment in frame: 15
        The RTT to ACK the segment was: 0.000098000 seconds
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0000  00 0e a6 73 e7 25 00 30 18 66 7a 0b 08 00 45 10   ...s.%.0.fz...E.
0010  00 28 00 00 40 00 40 06 26 b6 0a 00 00 06 0a 00   .(..@.@.&.......
0020  00 05 ff ff 5f 98 00 00 00 00 16 c6 53 fa 50 14   ...._.......S.P.
0030  00 00 d1 6d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00               ...m........
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With Firewall Enabled
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      1 0.000000    10.0.0.5              10.0.0.6              ICMP     Echo (ping) request
Frame 1 (98 bytes on wire, 98 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:33:33.771341000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.000000000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 0.000000000 seconds
    Frame Number: 1
    Packet Length: 98 bytes
    Capture Length: 98 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp:data
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
        0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 84
    Identification: 0xaabf (43711)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
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    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0xbbdf [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 8 (Echo (ping) request)
    Code: 0 
    Checksum: 0xb557 [correct]
    Identifier: 0xaabf
    Sequence number: 0x0000
    Data (56 bytes)
0000  00 30 18 66 7a 0b 00 0e a6 73 e7 25 08 00 45 00   .0.fz....s.%..E.
0010  00 54 aa bf 00 00 40 01 bb df 0a 00 00 05 0a 00   .T....@.........
0020  00 06 08 00 b5 57 aa bf 00 00 44 dc a3 4d 00 0b   .....W....D..M..
0030  c4 b0 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15   ................
0040  16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25   .......... !"#$%
0050  26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35   &'()*+,-./012345
0060  36 37                                             67
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      2 0.000244    10.0.0.6              10.0.0.5              ICMP     Echo (ping) reply
Frame 2 (98 bytes on wire, 98 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:33:33.771585000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.000244000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 0.000244000 seconds
    Frame Number: 2
    Packet Length: 98 bytes
    Capture Length: 98 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp:data
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
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    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
        0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 84
    Identification: 0x0de5 (3557)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0x58ba [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 0 (Echo (ping) reply)
    Code: 0 
    Checksum: 0xbd57 [correct]
    Identifier: 0xaabf
    Sequence number: 0x0000
    Data (56 bytes)
0000  00 0e a6 73 e7 25 00 30 18 66 7a 0b 08 00 45 00   ...s.%.0.fz...E.
0010  00 54 0d e5 00 00 40 01 58 ba 0a 00 00 06 0a 00   .T....@.X.......
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0020  00 05 00 00 bd 57 aa bf 00 00 44 dc a3 4d 00 0b   .....W....D..M..
0030  c4 b0 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15   ................
0040  16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25   .......... !"#$%
0050  26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35   &'()*+,-./012345
0060  36 37                                             67
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      3 0.030562    10.0.0.5              10.0.0.6              ICMP     Echo (ping) request
Frame 3 (98 bytes on wire, 98 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:33:33.801903000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.030318000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 0.030562000 seconds
    Frame Number: 3
    Packet Length: 98 bytes
    Capture Length: 98 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp:data
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x06 (DSCP 0x01: Unknown DSCP; ECN: 0x02)
        0000 01.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Unknown (0x01)
        .... ..1. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 1
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 84
    Identification: 0x0ead (3757)
    Flags: 0x04 (Don't Fragment)
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .1.. = Don't fragment: Set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
249
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0x17ec [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 8 (Echo (ping) request)
    Code: 123 
    Checksum: 0x3d66 [correct]
    Identifier: 0xaabf
    Sequence number: 0x0001
    Data (56 bytes)
0000  00 30 18 66 7a 0b 00 0e a6 73 e7 25 08 00 45 06   .0.fz....s.%..E.
0010  00 54 0e ad 40 00 40 01 17 ec 0a 00 00 05 0a 00   .T..@.@.........
0020  00 06 08 7b 3d 66 aa bf 00 01 44 dc a3 4d 00 0c   ...{=f....D..M..
0030  3c 25 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15   <%..............
0040  16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25   .......... !"#$%
0050  26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35   &'()*+,-./012345
0060  36 37                                             67
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      4 0.030759    10.0.0.6              10.0.0.5              ICMP     Echo (ping) reply
Frame 4 (98 bytes on wire, 98 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:33:33.802100000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.000197000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 0.030759000 seconds
    Frame Number: 4
    Packet Length: 98 bytes
    Capture Length: 98 bytes
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    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp:data
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6), Dst: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x06 (DSCP 0x01: Unknown DSCP; ECN: 0x02)
        0000 01.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Unknown (0x01)
        .... ..1. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 1
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 84
    Identification: 0x0de6 (3558)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0x58b3 [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Destination: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 0 (Echo (ping) reply)
    Code: 123 
    Checksum: 0x4566 [correct]
    Identifier: 0xaabf
    Sequence number: 0x0001
    Data (56 bytes)
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0000  00 0e a6 73 e7 25 00 30 18 66 7a 0b 08 00 45 06   ...s.%.0.fz...E.
0010  00 54 0d e6 00 00 40 01 58 b3 0a 00 00 06 0a 00   .T....@.X.......
0020  00 05 00 7b 45 66 aa bf 00 01 44 dc a3 4d 00 0c   ...{Ef....D..M..
0030  3c 25 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15   <%..............
0040  16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25   .......... !"#$%
0050  26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35   &'()*+,-./012345
0060  36 37                                             67
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      5 0.063754    10.0.0.5              10.0.0.6              ICMP     Timestamp request
Frame 5 (54 bytes on wire, 54 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:33:33.835095000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.032995000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 0.063754000 seconds
    Frame Number: 5
    Packet Length: 54 bytes
    Capture Length: 54 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
        0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 40
    Identification: 0xaabf (43711)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
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        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0xbc0b [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 13 (Timestamp request)
    Code: 0 
    Checksum: 0x8a57 [correct]
    Identifier: 0xaabf
    Sequence number: 0x0000
    Originate timestamp: 835036
    Receive timestamp: 0
    Transmit timestamp: 0
0000  00 30 18 66 7a 0b 00 0e a6 73 e7 25 08 00 45 00   .0.fz....s.%..E.
0010  00 28 aa bf 00 00 40 01 bc 0b 0a 00 00 05 0a 00   .(....@.........
0020  00 06 0d 00 8a 57 aa bf 00 00 00 0c bd dc 00 00   .....W..........
0030  00 00 00 00 00 00                                 ......
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      6 0.252004    10.0.0.5              10.0.0.6              ICMP     Address mask request
Frame 6 (46 bytes on wire, 46 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:33:34.023345000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.188250000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 0.252004000 seconds
    Frame Number: 6
    Packet Length: 46 bytes
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    Capture Length: 46 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:icmp
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
        0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 32
    Identification: 0xcfbe (53182)
    Flags: 0x00
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
    Header checksum: 0x9714 [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
Internet Control Message Protocol
    Type: 17 (Address mask request)
    Code: 0 
    Checksum: 0x1f41 [correct]
    Identifier: 0xcfbe
    Sequence number: 0x0000
    Address mask: 0.0.0.0 (0x00000000)
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0000  00 30 18 66 7a 0b 00 0e a6 73 e7 25 08 00 45 00   .0.fz....s.%..E.
0010  00 20 cf be 00 00 40 01 97 14 0a 00 00 05 0a 00   . ....@.........
0020  00 06 11 00 1f 41 cf be 00 00 00 00 00 00         .....A........
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info
      8 2.258017    10.0.0.5              10.0.0.6              TCP      27624 > 65535 [SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0  
Win=6840 Len=0
Frame 8 (54 bytes on wire, 54 bytes captured)
    Arrival Time: Aug 11, 2006 17:33:36.029358000
    Time delta from previous packet: 0.999683000 seconds
    Time since reference or first frame: 2.258017000 seconds
    Frame Number: 8
    Packet Length: 54 bytes
    Capture Length: 54 bytes
    Protocols in frame: eth:ip:tcp
Ethernet II, Src: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (00:30:18:66:7a:0b)
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (00:0e:a6:73:e7:25)
    Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5), Dst: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
    Version: 4
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x10 (DSCP 0x04: Unknown DSCP; ECN: 0x00)
        0001 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Unknown (0x04)
        .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
        .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
    Total Length: 40
    Identification: 0x303f (12351)
    Flags: 0x04 (Don't Fragment)
        0... = Reserved bit: Not set
        .1.. = Don't fragment: Set
        ..0. = More fragments: Not set
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    Fragment offset: 0
    Time to live: 64 (TTL value of 64)
    Protocol: TCP (0x06)
    Header checksum: 0xf676 [correct]
        Good: True
        Bad : False
    Source: 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5)
    Destination: 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6)
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 27624 (27624), Dst Port: 65535 (65535), Seq: 0, Ack: 0, Len: 0
    Source port: 27624 (27624)
    Destination port: 65535 (65535)
    Sequence number: 0    (relative sequence number)
    Header length: 20 bytes
    Flags: 0x0002 (SYN)
        0... .... = Congestion Window Reduced (CWR): Not set
        .0.. .... = ECN-Echo: Not set
        ..0. .... = Urgent: Not set
        ...0 .... = Acknowledgment: Not set
        .... 0... = Push: Not set
        .... .0.. = Reset: Not set
        .... ..1. = Syn: Set
        .... ...0 = Fin: Not set
    Window size: 6840 (Window size = 6840)
    Checksum: 0x9621 [correct]
0000  00 30 18 66 7a 0b 00 0e a6 73 e7 25 08 00 45 10   .0.fz....s.%..E.
0010  00 28 30 3f 40 00 40 06 f6 76 0a 00 00 05 0a 00   .(0?@.@..v......
0020  00 06 6b e8 ff ff 3e 13 41 03 00 00 00 00 50 02   ..k...>.A.....P.
0030  1a b8 96 21 00 00                                 ...!..
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Appendix I – GNU General Public License
GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
**************************
                         Version 2, June 1991
     Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
     59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
     Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
     of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
Preamble
========
The licenses for most software are designed to take away your freedom to 
share  and  change  it.   By  contrast,  the  GNU General  Public  License  is 
intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change free software--to 
make sure the software is free for all its users.  This General Public License 
applies  to  most  of  the Free Software Foundation's  software  and to  any 
other  program  whose  authors  commit  to  using  it.  (Some  other  Free 
Software  Foundation  software  is  covered  by  the  GNU  Library  General 
Public License instead.)  You can apply it to your programs, too.
When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not price. 
Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you have the 
freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for this service if 
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you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you want it, that you 
can change the software or use pieces of it in new free programs; and that 
you know you can do these things.
To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid anyone to 
deny  you  these  rights  or  to  ask  you  to  surrender  the  rights.  These 
restrictions  translate  to  certain  responsibilities  for  you if  you distribute 
copies of the software, or if you modify it.
For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether gratis or 
for a fee, you must give the recipients all the rights that you have. You must 
make sure that they, too, receive or can get the source code.  And you must 
show them these terms so they know their rights.
We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the software, and (2) 
offer you this license which gives you legal permission to copy, distribute 
and/or modify the software.
   Also, for each author's protection and ours, we want to make certain that 
everyone understands that there is no warranty for this free software.  If 
the  software  is  modified  by  someone  else  and  passed  on,  we  want  its 
recipients  to  know that  what  they have is  not the original,  so that  any 
problems  introduced  by  others  will  not  reflect  on  the  original  authors' 
reputations.
Finally, any free program is threatened constantly by software patents.  We 
wish  to  avoid  the  danger  that  redistributors  of  a  free  program  will 
individually  obtain  patent  licenses,  in  effect  making  the  program 
proprietary.  To prevent this, we have made it clear that any patent must be 
licensed for everyone's free use or not licensed at all.
258
The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and modification 
follow.
TERMS  AND  CONDITIONS  FOR  COPYING,  DISTRIBUTION  AND 
MODIFICATION
0. This License applies to any program or other work which contains a 
notice placed by the copyright holder saying it may be distributed under 
the terms of this General Public License.  The "Program", below, refers to 
any such program or work,  and a "work based on the Program" means 
either the Program or any derivative work under copyright law: that is to 
say, a work containing the Program or a portion of it, either verbatim or 
with modifications and/or translated into another language.  (Hereinafter, 
translation is included without limitation in the term "modification".)  Each 
licensee is addressed as "you".
Activities other than copying, distribution and modification are not covered 
by this License; they are outside its scope.  The act of running the Program 
is not restricted, and the output from the Program is covered only if its 
contents constitute a work based on the Program (independent of having 
been made by running the Program).   Whether that is  true depends on 
what the Program does.
1. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Program's source 
code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you conspicuously and 
appropriately publish on each copy an appropriate copyright notice  and 
disclaimer of warranty; keep intact all the notices that refer to this License 
and to the absence of any warranty; and give any other recipients of the 
Program a copy of this License along with the Program.
You may charge a fee for the physical act of transferring a copy, and you 
may at your option offer warranty protection in exchange for a fee.
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2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any portion of it, 
thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy and distribute such 
modifications or work under the terms of Section 1 above, provided that 
you also meet all of these conditions:
a. You must cause the modified files to carry prominent notices      stating 
that you changed the files and the date of any change.
b. You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in whole or 
in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, to be 
licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this 
License.
c. If the modified program normally reads commands interactively when 
run, you must cause it, when started running for such interactive use in the 
most  ordinary  way,  to  print  or  display  an  announcement  including  an 
appropriate copyright notice and a notice that there is no warranty (or else, 
saying that you provide a warranty) and that users may redistribute the 
program under these conditions, and telling the user how to view a copy of 
this License.  (Exception: if the Program itself is interactive but does not 
normally print such an announcement, your work based on the Program is 
not required to print an announcement.)
These requirements apply to the modified work as a whole.  If identifiable 
sections  of  that  work  are  not  derived  from  the  Program,  and  can  be 
reasonably considered independent and separate works in themselves, then 
this  License,  and  its  terms,  do  not  apply  to  those  sections  when  you 
distribute  them as  separate  works.   But  when you  distribute  the  same 
sections as part of a whole which is a work based on the Program, the 
distribution  of  the  whole  must  be  on  the  terms  of  this  License,  whose 
permissions for other licensees extend to the entire whole, and thus to each 
and every part regardless of who wrote it.
260
Thus,  it  is  not the intent of this section to claim rights or  contest your 
rights to work written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to exercise the 
right to control the distribution of derivative or collective works based on 
the Program.
In addition, mere aggregation of another work not based on the Program 
with the Program (or with a work based on the Program) on a volume of a 
storage or distribution medium does not bring the other work under the 
scope of this License.
3. You may copy and distribute the Program (or a work based on it, under 
Section 2) in object code or executable form under the terms of Sections 1 
and 2 above provided that you also do one of the following:
a.  Accompany  it  with  the  complete  corresponding  machine-readable 
source code, which must be distributed under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 
above on a medium customarily used for software interchange; or,
b. Accompany it with a written offer, valid for at least three years, to give 
any  third  party,  for  a  charge  no  more  than  your  cost  of  physically 
performing source distribution, a complete machine-readable copy of the 
corresponding source code, to be distributed under the terms of Sections 1 
and 2 above on a medium customarily used for software interchange; or,
c.  Accompany  it  with  the  information  you  received  as  to  the  offer  to 
distribute corresponding source code.  (This alternative is allowed only for 
noncommercial distribution and only if you received the program in object 
code or executable form with such an offer, in accord with Subsection b 
above.)
The source code for  a  work means  the  preferred  form of  the work for 
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making modifications to it.  For an executable work, complete source code 
means all the source code for all modules it contains, plus any associated 
interface definition files, plus the scripts used to control compilation and 
installation of the executable.
However,  as  a  special  exception,  the  source  code  distributed  need  not 
include anything that  is  normally  distributed (in either source or binary 
form)  with  the  major  components  (compiler,  kernel,  and  so  on)  of  the 
operating system on which  the executable  runs,  unless  that  component 
itself accompanies the executable.
If distribution of executable or object code is made by offering access to 
copy from a designated place, then offering equivalent access to copy the 
source code from the same place counts as distribution of the source code, 
even though third parties are not compelled to copy the source along with 
the object code.
4. You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Program except 
as expressly provided under this License.  Any attempt otherwise to copy, 
modify, sublicense or distribute the Program is void, and will automatically 
terminate  your  rights  under  this  License.   However,  parties  who  have 
received copies, or rights, from you under this License will not have their 
licenses terminated so long as such parties remain in full compliance.
5. You are not required to accept this License, since you have not signed it. 
However, nothing else grants you permission to modify or distribute the 
Program or its derivative works.  These actions are prohibited by law if you 
do  not  accept  this  License.  Therefore,  by  modifying  or  distributing  the 
Program (or any work based on the Program), you indicate your acceptance 
of  this  License  to  do  so,  and  all  its  terms  and  conditions  for  copying, 
distributing or modifying the Program or works based on it.
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6.  Each  time  you  redistribute  the  Program (or  any  work  based  on  the 
Program), the recipient automatically receives a license from the original 
licensor to copy, distribute or modify the Program subject to these terms 
and  conditions.   You  may  not  impose  any  further  restrictions  on  the 
recipients' exercise of the rights granted herein.  You are not responsible 
for enforcing compliance by third parties to this License.
7.  If,  as  a  consequence  of  a  court  judgment  or  allegation  of  patent 
infringement  or  for  any  other  reason  (not  limited  to  patent  issues), 
conditions  are  imposed  on  you  (whether  by  court  order,  agreement  or 
otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this License, they do not excuse 
you from the conditions of this License.  If you cannot distribute so as to 
satisfy simultaneously your obligations under this License and any other 
pertinent obligations, then as a consequence you may not distribute the 
Program at all.  For example, if a patent license would not permit royalty-
free redistribution of the Program by all those who receive copies directly 
or indirectly through you, then the only way you could satisfy both it and 
this License would be to refrain entirely from distribution of the Program.
If any portion of this section is held invalid or unenforceable under any 
particular circumstance, the balance of the section is intended to apply and 
the section as a whole is intended to apply in other circumstances.
It is not the purpose of this section to induce you to infringe any patents or 
other property right claims or to contest validity of any such claims; this 
section has the sole purpose of protecting the integrity of the free software 
distribution  system,  which  is  implemented  by  public  license  practices. 
Many  people  have  made  generous  contributions  to  the  wide  range  of 
software  distributed  through  that  system  in  reliance  on  consistent 
application of that system; it is up to the author/donor to decide if he or she 
is willing to distribute software through any other system and a licensee 
cannot impose that choice.
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This section is intended to make thoroughly clear what is believed to be a 
consequence of the rest of this License.
8.  If  the distribution and/or  use of  the Program is  restricted in  certain 
countries  either  by  patents  or  by  copyrighted  interfaces,  the  original 
copyright holder who places the Program under this License may add an 
explicit geographical distribution limitation excluding those countries, so 
that distribution is permitted only in or among countries not thus excluded. 
In such case, this License incorporates the limitation as if written in the 
body of this License.
9. The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions 
of the General Public License from time to time.  Such new versions will be 
similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to address 
new problems or concerns. Each version is given a distinguishing version 
number.  If the Program specifies a version number of this License which 
applies to it and "any later version", you have the option of following the 
terms and conditions either of that version or of any later version published 
by the Free Software Foundation.  If the Program does not specify a version 
number of this License, you may choose any version ever published by the 
Free Software Foundation.
10.  If  you  wish  to  incorporate  parts  of  the  Program  into  other  free 
programs whose distribution conditions are different, write to the author to 
ask  for  permission.   For  software  which  is  copyrighted  by  the  Free 
Software  Foundation,  write  to  the  Free  Software  Foundation;  we 
sometimes make exceptions for this.  Our decision will be guided by the 
two  goals  of  preserving  the  free  status  of  all  derivatives  of  our  free 
software and of promoting the sharing and reuse of software generally.
                                
NO WARRANTY
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 11. BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE 
IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY 
APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING 
THE  COPYRIGHT  HOLDERS  AND/OR  OTHER  PARTIES  PROVIDE  THE 
PROGRAM  "AS  IS"  WITHOUT  WARRANTY  OF  ANY  KIND,  EITHER 
EXPRESSED  OR  IMPLIED,  INCLUDING,  BUT  NOT  LIMITED  TO,  THE 
IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF  MERCHANTABILITY  AND FITNESS  FOR  A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND 
PERFORMANCE  OF  THE  PROGRAM  IS  WITH  YOU.   SHOULD  THE 
PROGRAM  PROVE  DEFECTIVE,  YOU  ASSUME  THE  COST  OF  ALL 
NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
12. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED 
TO IN WRITING WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY 
WHO  MAY  MODIFY  AND/OR  REDISTRIBUTE  THE  PROGRAM  AS 
PERMITTED ABOVE,  BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,  INCLUDING 
ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
ARISING  OUT  OF  THE  USE  OR  INABILITY  TO  USE  THE  PROGRAM 
(INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING 
RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD 
PARTIES OR A  FAILURE OF  THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY 
OTHER PROGRAMS),  EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS 
BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
                      END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
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